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The relationship between the law and masculinity has not been as thoroughly examined 
as the relationship between the law and feminism or, more generally, between the law and 
gender. Yet, the reach of masculinity stretches deep into the very fiber of the law. Masculinity 
has for too long served as an invisible bedrock on which the law founded both its substance and 
method. The struggle for formal equality during the last half century sought the elimination of 
the masculinist bias, but only has exposed the extent of the entrenchment. The popular idea is 
that the law exists in a removed and exalted position where it sits in judgement of a pre-existing 
and fully formed masculinity. The principal argument in this paper, however, is that the law 
serves as a “technology of sex” that actively produces fixed gender identities and reifies sexual 
difference. Indeed, much of the internal coherence of the law is premised on the integrity of the 
subject and the propagation of sexual difference. Thus, the law is precluded from acknowledging 
or engaging with its own productive power and vacuously characterizes itself as a neutral 
arbiter. To advance this critique, the paper analyzes underlying arguments that support the 
power of law based in classic liberal political theory. It employs recurrent critiques of the law, 
and of liberalism more generally, found in Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory, Queer 
Theory, and Critical Legal Studies to reveal the law as always already intertwined with 
masculinity.  
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 




I was a college student during Quebec’s 1995 sovereignty referendum. It was my first 
exposure to significant discontent with the liberal world order. A little over twenty years later, 
the western world has seen this dissatisfaction boil over. The conventional left/right political 
spectrum that had been internalized by many has been drastically re-arranged—writ small on 
college campuses and writ large in the corridors of western liberal democracies. Whether the 
challenge to liberalism is sustained or whether it is consumed by the larger liberal social order—
as has happened in Quebec, resulting in a satisfied Canada that today serves as a model of a 
western liberal democracy that withstood the rise of populism—remains to be seen. Given this 
challenge, it feels prudent to reconsider how liberalism has created the conditions that have led to 
this boiling over. Arguably, the core of the liberal
1
 project remains the integrity of the subject. 
The gendering of this subject, and the law’s role in the process, as understood within the larger 
space of ongoing critiques of liberalism, serves as the impetus for this paper. 
Decades after having become the subject of serious study in its own right, masculinity 
remains a shifting and conflicted idea, or, stated slightly less cautiously, what masculinity means 
today is more confusing than it has ever been. Masculinity is something acquired over time, 
ushered into, and earned. Yet it is also the most natural of things, something one is born with, 
something defining, irreducible, and constitutive. Masculinity is something to be freed and 
unmoored, but is also elusive and contradictory. For Freud, masculinity and femininity were 
                                                 
1
 Raymond Williams offers a helpful definition of liberal: “liberal” began “in a specific social distinction to refer to 
a class of free men as distinct from others who were not free.” “Liberal” is related to liberty, which, “though having 
an early general sense of freedom, had a strong sense from [the 15th century] of formal permission or privilege.” 
While Liberalism is a doctrine of certain necessary kinds of freedoms, it is also essentially a doctrine of possessive 
individualism. Williams also highlights Shakespeare’s use of liberal as close to licentious: “Who hath indeed most 
like a liberall villaine / Confest the vile encounters they have had.” RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A 
VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 130–31 (2015) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT 
NOTHING act 4, sc. 1). 
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5 
among the most confused concepts in science.
2
 And today, while popular culture perpetuates the 
idea that, beneath the ebb and flow of daily life, there exists a fixed and true masculinity, 
simultaneously there is a recognition that masculinity is not singular, homogenous, or 
unchanging.  
This tension between a fixed, pre-discursive masculinity and a cultural/ideological one 
was on the front pages of the nation’s newspapers in the summer of 2015, when the story of 
Owen Labrie made headlines. Labrie, at the time an eighteen-year-old senior at the St. Paul’s 
School, was accused of sexually assaulting a fifteen-year-old as part of the school’s “senior 
salute,” a ritual in which male students propositioned female classmates for as much sexual 
activity as permitted. The New York Times said the case was “at its core, … about an intimate 
encounter … between a 15-year-old girl and an 18-year-old acquaintance, and whether she 
consented as it escalated.”
3
 Ultimately, Labrie was found not guilty of felony sexual assault 
charges, but was convicted of having sex with a person who was below the age of consent. 
As the Times highlighted, the legal issues in the case boiled down to a question of 
consent or, as Jeannie Suk Gersen asked in The New Yorker, “what makes sex rape?”
4
 What 
made the case front page material—the secret sex rites of an elite prep school—was cast as a red 
herring that distracted from the real issues at stake. This was about rape, not senior salutes. As 
the prosecutors repeatedly reminded the jury, the culture of St. Paul’s School was not on trial, 
                                                 
2
 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, VOLUME VII: A CASE OF HYSTERIA, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY 
AND OTHER WORKS 219 (1905). 
3
 Jess Bidgood, Owen Labrie of St. Paul’s School Is Found Not Guilty of Main Rape Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/st-pauls-school-rape-trial-owen-labrie.html. 
4
 Jeannie Suk Gersen, St. Paul’s School and a New Definition of Rape, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 3, 2015, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/st-pauls-school-and-a-new-definition-of-rape. 
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6 
Owen Labrie was. Notwithstanding this framing, the case was very much about masculinity, 
specifically, about how boys “become men” and our culture’s role in that process.  
In the eyes of the law, this case dealt with the legal definition of rape and of consent, and 
the factual question of whether consent existed. But the law does not think about the worth of the 
idea of consent as an indicator of the legality of sexual relations; instead, it single-mindedly 
focuses on whether or not consent exists. The law does not engage with the question of whether 
the legalization of consent has played a role in legitimizing subordination. The law has so 
thoroughly coopted the idea of consent that any public discussion about consent is almost 
universally confined to the legal parameters that define it.
5
 The law takes the possibility of 
consent as its starting position, in that it assumes that as long as certain conditions are met (e.g., 
age requirements) consent is possible, that relations of power and inequality can be overcome, 
and thus consent is not a hollow concept. But this presumption of consent as the starting point is 
not without criticism. Catharine MacKinnon herself questioned the value of consent as a key to 
emancipation: “If sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less whether there 
was force and more whether consent is a meaningful concept.”
6
  
The premise behind the liberal idea of consent is that the default position is one of 
freedom, from which some semblance of actual consent is feasible, yet the legitimacy of consent, 
it can be argued, “is always instrumentalized in the name of coercion, and that consent is 
                                                 
5
 “To think about the problem of consent outside of the legal frameworks that tend to dominate public discussions is 
difficult. At least within public debate, the problem of consent in conjunction with sexuality is usually understood to 
be a legal problem.” Judith Butler, Sexual Consent: Some Thoughts on Psychoanalysis and Law, 21 Colum. J. 
Gender & L. 3, 5 (2012). 
6
 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, SIGNS Vol. 
8, No. 4, 650 (Summer 1983). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 260 (2005) 
(describing the beginnings of the feminist movement: “This movement was not taken in by concepts like consent. It 
knew that when force is a normalized part of sex, when no is taken to mean yes, when fear and despair produce 
acquiescence and acquiescence is taken to mean consent, consent is not a meaningful concept.”). 
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7 
therefore actually subjugation, and freedom, if it exists, is something wholly different from the 
discourse of consent.”
7
 Or, as the radical feminists who followed MacKinnon have claimed, 
consent in a world of male domination is essentially meaningless.
8
 Unlike contract, for instance, 
in which both parties have supposedly had a voice in creating the arrangement, consent consists 
of submitting to an arrangement that someone else has created. The legalization of consent 
however has included attempts to render sexual relations contractual, furthering the proposition 
that a rigidly legal framework is the most effective means of protecting (usually heterosexual) 
women. This trend of hyper legalization is perhaps most prevalent in the move towards 
affirmative consent on college campuses in America.
9
 However, as has been pointed out by those 
critical of this legalization, consent often serves as a tool for the law to simply legitimate the 
submission of the submitting party.
10
  
The law focuses on liberal constructions like consent because it is structurally 
predisposed to set itself outside of the social order. In addition, the law is predisposed to 
disqualify certain types of knowledge, particularly those that fail to propagate the legal order. 
Given the law’s inability and/or unwillingness to speak to questions concerning rites of passage 
into manhood, the issues permeating the case are narrowed to ones of consent. This emphasis on 
consent suggests that consent is a more objective concept that warrants engagement as opposed 
to less serious cultural components. This prioritization of consent ignores the ways in which 
                                                 
7
 Butler, supra note 5, at 8. 
8




 See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 163 (1995) (“If, in rape law, 
men are seen to do sex while women consent to it, if the measure of rape is not whether a woman sought or desired 
sex but whether she acceded to it or refused it when it was pressed upon her, then consent operates both as a sign of 
subordination and a means of its legitimation. Consent is thus a response to power—it adds or withdraws 
legitimacy—but is not a mode of enacting or sharing power.”). 
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consent is manufactured by pre-existing power relations: “power precedes consent and 
orchestrates the terms in which we encounter moral or practical dilemmas of consent. Thus, the 
law fails in its bid for neutrality, and continues to privilege and perpetuate a particular way of 
doing masculinity, which both undermines its claim to be above the fray and reveals a narrow 
grasp of the mechanics of its power.
11
 
*     *     * 
I will suggest in this paper that the law acts as a “technology of sex”
12
 that plays a 
substantial role in the construction of masculinity in our society, yet it perpetually disavows 
culpability and attempts to situate itself as a neutral arbiter that rationally and compassionately 
oversees some unadulterated raw masculinity, while and through fulfilling its task of defining 
rights and wrongs. I will examine the nature of the law’s power as it pertains to the construction 
of masculinity. I will suggest that the law functions as if masculinity exists outside of culture, 
and therefore of patriarchy (e.g., in the realm of sexuality, the law forms and perpetuates the idea 
that men have uncontrollable urges and natural desires that transcend culture). It situates 
masculinity as something that exists prior to the law and culture, something to be reined in and 
controlled. I will explain what I mean by a technology of sex and lay out the reasons why the law 
                                                 
11
 In any attempt at a progressive politics, the nature of the law and its effectiveness as a tool for change must be 
analyzed. Mary Jane Mossman, in her assessment of the compatibility of progressive feminist politics and the law, 
suggests that law, specifically the legal method, is impervious to feminist challenge. See generally Mary Jane 
Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes, WISC. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (1987). More recently, 
advocating for the importance of administrative law in a progressive trans politics, Dean Spade observed: “To 
practice this politics we have to tackle some big questions about what law is, what power is, how legal systems are 
part of the distribution of life chances, and what role changing laws can and cannot have in changing the 
arrangements that cause such harm to trans people.” DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, 
CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 2 (2015). 
12
 By “technology of sex”—borrowing here from Teresa de Lauretis, The Technology of Gender, in TECHNOLOGIES 
OF GENDER (1987)—I mean the way in which the law acts as a creator of norms, standards, rules, techniques, and 
discourses that govern—in a specific way that emphasizes a particular relationship between power, truth, and 
knowledge—how we think about sex. 
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is able to maintain this space of professed but chimerical exteriority. The law bases its claim to 
truth on the pre-ideological nature of its method
13
—that, methodologically, the law is founded on 
objectivity and rationality and, thus, is free of human interpretation or ideological stimulus. In 
this way, masculinity and the law share in the aspiration of occupying a space devoid of 
interpretation, culture, ideology, whim, or fashion. 
The critique that I am putting forth regarding the relationship between law and 
masculinity shares a foundation with the work of Legal Realists, Critical Legal Studies, Critical 
Race Theory, and Feminist Legal Theory—this foundation being a fundamental critique of 
liberalism. The Legal Realists argued that legal formalism’s claims to neutrality and objectivity 
were simply politics by another name and, in fact, “hidden and often inarticulate judgments of 
social policy.”
14
 Critical Legal Studies attacked the idea of law found in traditional liberal 
political theory: that it existed in a space devoid of ideology.
15
 Feminists suggested that the law 
was not only a tool to fight patriarchy, but a part of it.
16
 Critical Race Theorists argued that 
racism did not exist in a space removed from the law, but was rather inherent to it.
17
 The 
recurring theme is that the law does not exist solely within its own walls; there is no “out there;” 
                                                 
13
 As discussed below, the claimed pre-ideological nature of the law’s method was part of the foundation of much of 
the criticism directed at this liberal conception of law and served to create and mobilize Critical Legal Theorists who 
“contended that liberal and conservative legal scholarship operated in the narrow ideological channel within which 
law was understood as qualitatively different from politics. … Law was, in the conventional wisdom, distinguished 
from politics because politics was open-ended, subjective, discretionary, and ideological, whereas law was 
determinate, objective, bounded, and neutral.” Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, & Kendall Thomas, 
Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xviii (Crenshaw et al 
eds., 1995). 
14
 Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes). 
15
 See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A 
GREATER TASK (2015); DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of the Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 
(1993). 
16
 See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 5 (1989); MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 635-658. 
17
 See generally Crenshaw et al, supra note 13. 
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10 
there is no exit. Contrarily, Formalists argued that there was a rational, principled place beyond 
the reach of politics. Mainstream civil rights discourse suggested that the law could be used as 
tool in the racist and sexist “real world.” Even Marxists saw the law as simply reflecting—not 
serving to construct—the class relations that existed outside of the law.  
In a similar way to how mainstream civil rights activists saw the law as a progressive tool 
to use in the struggle for civil rights—a tool that existed “outside” of the struggle, which was to 
be acquired and then brought back to the struggle—the men’s movement
18
 saw the law as 
something that existed “outside” of masculinity, that served to stifle its “essence,” and, thus, 
sought to free masculinity from the constraining effects of the law. In the former example, the 
ends are progressive, whereas, in the latter, they are exceptionally conservative; yet both posit 
the law as something exterior and, thus, are two sides of the same liberal coin. In each, the law 
occupies an exalted space crucially removed from the problems identified by the respective 
analyses. Fundamental to situating the law—that is, locating its place in the larger social order—
is an examination of the law’s power and the relationship between its power and society as a 
whole. Thinking through these issues with respect to the role played by power, and the critiques 
of liberalism mentioned above, reveals the law and masculinity as concomitant and co-
dependent. 
The law views itself as removed from politics and issues of class and race, similar to how 
power, in conventional liberal political theory, has been viewed as removed from truth and 
knowledge. Liberalism rigidly compartmentalizes power, law, class, race, and politics, in an 
attempt (albeit futile) to uncover an objective, independent truth. Yet “the idea of liberating truth 
                                                 
18
 The men’s movement, discussed below, began in the late 1980s with the goal of reclaiming manhood from the 
emasculating effects of industrial society, feminism, and consumer culture. 
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is a profound illusion. There is no truth which can be espoused, defended, rescued against 
systems of power. On the contrary, each such system defines its own variant of truth. And there 
is no escape from power into freedom, for such systems of power are co-extensive with human 
society.”
19
 Similarly, there is no outside for the law. The law is implicated in creating the society 
which it judges despite its attempts to position itself above the fray. The law, when viewed 
through this “systems of power” lens, is necessarily political and part of the problem of racism 
and patriarchy. How, though, has this manifested in how the law’s relationship with masculinity 
is understood? Has the law tried to characterize masculinity as something that exists removed 
from the law, something that the law engages with only from a removed, exterior place? Is there 
a “true” masculinity that exists beyond the reach of power, beyond the influence of the law, 
untouched by patriarchy, for which the law helps find liberation? 
Legal discourse serves as a crucial site for the production of ideology and the 
perpetuation of social power. In the context of Critical Race Theory, theorists have described 
their project “as uncovering how law was a constitutive element of race itself,”—e.g., “how law 
constructed race.”
20
 Yet the parallel question is rarely asked about masculinity. It seems 
reasonable that masculinity studies should be engaged with asking to what extent is the law 
implicated in the construction of masculinity. Masculinity studies is heavily engaged in 
determining how the law controls, guides, regulates, views, understands, and manipulates men, 
but it rarely sees the law as a constitutive element of what masculinity is. There are many reasons 
for this, notably, an uncertainty over what masculinity actually is; how is it possible to define the 
building blocks of something without knowing what that something is?  The relationship 
                                                 
19
 Charles Taylor, Foucault on Freedom and Truth, 12 Political Theory 152, 153 (1984). 
20
 Crenshaw et al, supra note 13, at xxv. 
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12 
between the law and men (distinguished from masculinity), however, presents something 
observable and tangible, and possibly a good starting place for inquiry, but ultimately not a 
substitute for also engaging with the question of masculinity and law.  
The law remains mired in its liberal identity, incapable of functioning without resort to a 
legal order focused almost exclusively on consent, intent, and volition. The problem has to do 
with the nature of power, knowledge, and truth as they pertain to the law, and with the 
continuing fallacy perpetuated by the law that its power is wielded strictly in a juridical, negative 
sense. The nature of power that the law insists on is one that intimates a top-down, repressive, 
negative force dealing with rights, freedom, censorship, prohibitions, regulations, and 
punishment, rather than a productive force constructive of norms, techniques, and control.
21
  
The law may or may not be substantively progressive, in the sense that the content of 
particular laws appear to serve progressive ends, but, methodologically, the law is stuck in a 
liberal method referred to as “reasoned elaboration.” One characteristic of reasoned elaboration 
is that the principles of the law are to be found internally, that they are contained in the law 
itself.
22
 Were reasoned elaboration thought of differently—as not self-contained—the legal 
cornerstone that jurists apply laws, while legislators create them would be undermined. The deal-
making inherent in the construction of laws is a feasible and palatable way to understand the 
legislative process, but the interpretative component of legal methodology is only acceptable if 
veiled in the language of principle and neutrality, rather than negotiations, interest-group 
                                                 
21
 “Law can also function by formulating norms, thus becoming part of a different sort of power that ‘has to qualify, 
measure, appraise, and hierarchize rather than display itself in its murderous splendor.’” François Ewald, Norms, 
Discipline, and the Law, REPRESENTATIONS 3, 138 (Spring 1990). 
22
 “To a large extent the guiding conceptions of policy and principle that enabled the interpreter to make sense of 
law and that guided him in his practical work were supposed to be already latent in the extant law, waiting to be 
revealed by the legal analyst.” Unger, supra note 15, at 6. 
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13 
pluralism, and compromise. But, of course, the law is produced, as Roberto Unger described, 
“through conflict among interests and among ideology” and, thus, like legislation, has not been 
conceived by a single mind or will.
23
 
Fundamentally, this paper will address the relationship between the law and masculinity, 
specifically how the law contributes to the formation of masculinity. To better understand this 
relationship, I will rely substantially on an analytical framework grounded in the notions of 
power, truth, and knowledge, described in Section II. In Section III, I will examine insights 
gleaned predominantly from feminist legal theory regarding the subject and subjectivity. In 
Section IV, I will examine what exactly we mean by masculinity, the shifting terrain that this 
idea occupies, and how masculinity studies has developed over the last several decades. In 
Sections V and VI, I will explain how the law serves as a technology of sex that produces fixed 
gendered identities and furthers sexual difference in both explicit and implicit ways. Finally, in 
Section VII, I will ask why masculinity studies has failed to consider, let alone apply, certain 
insights from feminist legal theory when addressing foundational issues like sexual difference, 
and suggest opportunities for these insights to render masculinity studies more nuanced and 
effectual.  
*     *     * 
The relationship between power/truth/knowledge and masculinity forms the foundation 
of the critique I apply to masculinity studies. If the power of law continues to be thought about in 
a strictly juridical sense, the full scope of its impact will remain elusive. This is not about 
granting more influence to the law, but to suggest that its power manifests in different ways than 
traditionally conceived. As I will explain in Section II, my project is not about diminishing or 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 11–12. 
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14 
devaluing the importance of the juridical power of the law, but rather about exploring how 
thinking about the power of the law in a strictly juridical sense fails to grasp many components 
central to how the law’s power is employed and its effects. Often, the argument about the power 
of law focuses on whether the law, and its juridical, negative, repressive power, actually 
represents the way power manifests. If, in contrast, power is more accurately represented by the 
creation of norms and the productive deployment of disciplinary techniques, then the law is 
easily dismissed as a residual accessory to the predominant powers of modernity. The problem 
with this characterization, though, is that the power of the law is not only prohibitive, but that 
there is also a norm-creating, expansive, cultural component to the power of law. Equating the 
power of law with repression, fails to account for all the ways that the law’s power functions 
productively to create norms and form cultures—it “excludes a richer consideration of the law’s 
constitutive capacities”
24
—which are the predominant powers of modernity. It is not that the law 
is no longer powerful, or that the power to prohibit or repress is no longer consequential, but 
rather that its power manifests in different ways.
25
 
In Section III, I will review insights gleaned from work on sex/gender, specifically from 
Feminist and Queer Theory. The work I will look at contends that sex and sexuality are “unfixed 
and constructed entities,” and that subject formation “must be placed within specific historical 
and discursive contexts in order to be understood.”
26
 Feminist Theory generally works from a 
                                                 
24
 BEN GOLDER & PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT’S LAW 17 (2009). 
25
 This view of the law has been attributed to Foucault by many commentators. Duncan Kennedy, for instance, 
labelled Foucault a “criminalist” for thinking about law only in a “juridico discursive” way and for ignoring how the 
law functions in different contexts. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 119. For Foucault, “power acts by laying down the 
rule…through the act of discourse that creates, from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of law.” MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION, VOLUME I 83 (Vintage Books 1990) (1976). 
26
 SARA SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER 5 (2002). 
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space where the existence of a subject is sine qua non,
27
 while, in contrast, Queer Theory 
highlights the indeterminacy of all gendered identities. Nevertheless they both provide powerful 
critiques of gender normativity.
28
 Specifically, I will examine the destabilization of the 
subject, the body as a fractured and disjointed site of ideological contestation, and the untangling 
of the sex/gender distinction and the nature of sexual difference. 
The destabilization of the subject represents a foundational challenge to the 
transcendence of man. An undivided subject is pivotal in Western metaphysics. To suggest that 
the subject is a performative construct rather than a “pre-existing metaphysical journeyer”—that 
there is “no doer behind the deed”
29
—radically challenges the most prevalent conceptions of the 
subject in Western philosophy and, indeed, the very rationale, upon which masculinity is 
grounded. There exists a fundamental interdependence between the disembodied man and the 
corporeally bound female; man’s consciousness both pre-exists and outlives his body, on the 
condition that women’s occupation of their bodies remains essential to their identity.
30
 
Masculinity is, in many ways, premised on this pursuit of disembodiment. Instability in the way 
sex and gender are thought about in society creates ontological fractures to our social order that 
implicate many tenets of liberalism, including, importantly, the space occupied by the law. 
The body is often viewed as a self-evident entity—as material and empirical. In this 
paper, I will argue that, rather than being a pre-discursive category, the body is a fragmented and 
                                                 
27
 There are, of course, critiques of this position within feminist theory itself. Feminist anti-essentialism, for 
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Human Rights, 19 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 89, 114 (1996). 
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 Id. at 44–45. 
30
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disjointed site of contestation where materiality is unstable and contingent. The body is 
continually crafted and re-crafted by language; the body is literally articulated into being. Anne 
Fausto Sterling has asserted “As we grow and develop, we literally, not just “discursively” (that 
is, through language and cultural practices), construct our bodies, incorporating experience into 
our very flesh.”
31
 But, not all bodies are created, or rather constructed, equal. Within Western, 
liberal thought, the body has been constructed as inferior to the mind. Not surprisingly, white, 
Western, male, and heterosexual persons are seen as superior within these discourses because 
their bodies are constructed as fully subordinate and subservient to their minds. Racialized, 
female, and queer people, for example, are viewed as less evolved, are infantilized and 
animalized because their bodies are portrayed as controlling their minds. In other words, for 
marginalized people, the hierarchical mind/body dualism is inverted. These persons have bodies 
that dominate or even vitiate their minds. The motifs of the hysterical woman, the promiscuous 
homosexual, the fanatical Arab, and the lawless immigrant exemplify bodies that are out of 
control. These motifs serve misogynist, homophobic, and racist ideological agendas. 
The biological foundation of the body is invested with a set of essentialist truths which 
end up grounding normative claims about gender and law. Critics of the fictional body theory 
argue that, if the body loses its claim to realness, then the body is de-politicized and bodily 
experiences of suffering and oppression lose any moral authority. The presumption is that if the 
body is revealed to be a discursive construction, then its inviolability as a guiding normative 
principle is challenged. However, this presumption posits that anything constructed is somehow 
artificial or of a dispensable character and that to base normative judgements on a “mere” 
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construction is untenable. Is it possible for a construction to not only be constitutive, but to be 
imperative as well? I will attempt to illustrate that the body, rather than being the material given 
from which to found normative claims, is a site of contestation upon which many ideological 
struggles are waged. Indeed, contrary to suggesting that viewing the body as a construction 
provides less certainty or inhibits the relevance of normative claims, I am suggesting that 
understanding the body as a construction legitimates struggles against patriarchy. 
Finally, I will explore the concept of sexual difference, the distinction between sex and 
gender, and the still counterintuitive notion that sex itself is discursively constructed. The term 
“gender” began as a political maneuver in the 1970s, allowing feminists to argue that the space 
women had come to occupy was a cultural construction and not biologically determined. Yet, 
over a quarter century ago, the multiple effects of this strategy were already being considered. 
Carol Smart described the repercussions of the maneuver: 
Having drawn a distinction between sex and gender in the 1970s, feminists were 
largely willing to see gender as something to do with culture and sex as something 
to do with nature (biology). The main debate was over which element had pre-
eminence. But this apparently clear-cut distinction is now being rethought to the 
extent that it is increasingly argued that sex is a discursive construct just as much 
as gender. This has in turn given rise to reinterpretation of the apparently self-
evident categories of woman and man. Where once we could see the limitations of 
being consigned to a feminine gender, we now know that escaping these trappings 





In 1986, Butler explained the sex/gender distinction as “crucial to the long-standing 
feminist effort to debunk the claim that anatomy is destiny,” continuing “sex is understood to be 
the invariant, anatomically distinct, and factic aspects of the female body, whereas gender is the 
cultural meaning and form that the body acquires, the variable modes of that body’s 
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 Butler, however, later defines sex as a fictional heuristic
34
 that is always already 
gendered. Butler explains how gender is something grown into, but not from a gender-less space. 
“We become our genders, but we become them from a place which cannot be found and which, 
strictly speaking, cannot be said to exist.”
35
 Gender, as understood by Wendy Brown, is “a 
human affair, a protean arrangement of meanings, values, and activities born of human mind and 
endeavor, yet so thoroughly ‘naturalized’ over time that the constructed character of the 
arrangement has been lost upon most of Western history’s inhabitants.”
36
  
Next, in Section IV, I will explain how thinking about masculinity has changed over the 
course of the past half century or so. I will review the scholarship that placed men at the center of 
an analysis, and the problems that subsequently arose—including, transcending the patriarchal 
biases which had characterized previous studies of men and the difficulties tied to distinguishing 
the study of masculinity from the study of men. The section will be informed by work in feminist 
legal theory, which provided the basis for much of the work done by masculinity studies 
scholars.  
The study of masculinity has taken two distinct, and often antagonistic, trajectories: 
masculinity studies and the men’s movement. While both assert that masculinity is a particular 
phenomenon that should be investigated in its own right, they emerged out of very different 
political arenas. Masculinity studies emerged from a foundation of feminist theory, while at the 
same time being a response to the men’s movement—a political undertaking that began in the 
1980s to “reclaim manhood” from the purported emasculating effects of industrial society, 
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feminism, and consumer culture.
37
 While the men’s movement is quite variegated, one thread 
that runs through its various manifestations is the search for an essence of masculinity. In 
contrast to the men’s movement’s essentialism, masculinity studies generally views manliness, 
and masculinity itself, as a social construction and “situate[s] masculinities as objects of study on 
par with femininities, instead of elevating them to universal norms.”
38
 
Historically, the masculine subject position has been the default. It wasn’t until the mid-
1990s that scholars even decided that men also had a gender. To the surprise of many, not only 
were men also gendered, but so too were structures, institutions, relationships, and discourses. 
The invisible but ever-present subject (never the object) refused to be named, thus rendering 
male domination even more insidious. Since then, a rich history of scholarship has emerged 
dealing with the relationship between masculinity and law, from varied perspectives and 
ideological viewpoints.
39
 A substantial component of masculinity studies consists of using 
feminist and queer theory to explore variations and dynamics among masculinities. Indeed, 
feminist theory has provided the foundation, both analytically, theoretically, and historically, 
upon which masculinity studies is based. Yet, the critical study of masculinity within a legal 
context remains woefully marginal to mainstream legal study. 
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While feminism has had a discernable impact on history, politics, philosophy, sociology, 
economics, and law, masculinity is most marked by its absence, its invisibility.
40
 Masculinity is 
simultaneously nowhere and everywhere; as Richard Dyer has commented, it is a bit like air: you 
breathe it in all the time, but you aren’t aware of it much.
41
 In much the same way that 
heterosexuality, in contrast to homosexuality, is constructed as not being historically 
contingent—masculinity, until recently, has been thought of as a more self-evident, natural, and 
stable category than femininity. The overseeing and invisible subject—as de Beauvoir has called 
masculinity
42
—however, is now the object of study.
43
 
In Sections V and VI, I will consider the ways in which the law creates and recreates 
masculinity. This entails looking at the characteristics of power, generally, as introduced above, 
but it also entails looking specifically at the juridical power of the law. The prohibitive nature of 
the law’s juridical power contrasts sharply to a Foucauldian notion of a productive power, a 
power that creates rather than represses.
44
 The law is accorded a particular position within the 
reproduction of gender relations within the social structure, and, with respect to the sex/gender 
distinction, for instance, the law views sex and gender as conceptually different. Sex is “of the 
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The way sexual difference is predominantly thought about—binaried and natural—props 
up a legal order that struggles to think about power in any non-juridical sense. Productive legal 
power, on the other hand, would affect a sex considered fluid and dynamic, and thus the legal 
order would be in some sense accountable. This reluctance to take accountability compels the 
law to maintain essentialist understandings of masculinity which, along with the dawning of 
masculinity studies, exacerbate sexual difference. The law ultimately serves as a technology of 
sex that perpetuates a hegemonic masculinity, yet fails to take any culpability when that 
masculinity acts out in ways it was always inevitably going to. 
 This discussion of the law’s productive power and tendency to create masculinity in both 
explicit and implicit ways presents a question for legal and masculinity studies scholars: namely, 
what lessons from the rich history of feminist legal theory are useful in confronting this perpetual 
creation of masculinity? In Section VII, I will identify and discuss four areas where such insights 
could be applied. When looking at the naturalization of the sex/gender divide, for example, and 
the resulting discursive force it deploys across western culture, particularly within the law, it is 
useful to explore how recent changes in thinking about sexual difference affect or are affected by 
the relationship between the law and masculinity. The reluctance of the law to move beyond a 
conception of sex rooted in biological determinants reiterates its failure to exist in a pre-
ideological terrain. The law is a discourse unwilling to move beyond its rigid, dualistic 
conception of the meanings of masculine and feminine, or to try to conceive of one of them not 
in relation to the other (which, after all, makes sense since one does not exist without the other), 
and therefore is constantly in the process of [re]producing the sexed bodies that it judges. 
When something like the media circus that surrounded Owen Labrie occurs, one’s initial 
thought is to hope that the law does not perseverate on the idea of “boys being boys.” There is a 
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fear that, as a culture, we will fall into silly stereotypes about masculinity; that we will accept 
“frat boy” behavior out of young men; that we will perpetuate outdated ideas about what it 
means to be a man and about the rituals that make boys men. But this should not be the only 
concern. There are equally important questions about masculinity regarding more than just 
falling into stereotypical and essentialized ideas about masculinity. No longer does the major 
challenge—although it remains part of the challenge—only entail suggesting that masculinity 
comes in different shapes and sizes and that there is more than one way to be a man. It is no 
longer enough for critiques of masculinity to problematize sex roles and power imbalances, to 
highlight experiences of injustice, and to offer easy solutions that provide superficial critiques of 
patriarchy that resort back to an imaginary origin where equality was ubiquitous. Masculinity 
studies is in danger of turning clinical to avoid the uncertainty and agnosticism pivotal to an 
honest study of masculinity. Masculinity and the law remain pieces in a liberal puzzle that not 
only continues to re-articulate patriarchal relations in ever new ways, but falsely promises an 
illusory cohesiveness and an emancipation that is both inapt and misdirected.  
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II. POWER, TRUTH, AND KNOWLEDGE 
The interdependent structures of power, truth, and knowledge underlie the connections 
between law and masculinity. In this section, I will examine how these structures together form a 
base that sheds light on the relationship between law and masculinity. I will distinguish between 
two overarching theories of power—juridical and productive—and explain how the distinction 
between these theories affects how the impact of the law on masculinity is comprehended. I will 
distinguish between an objective model of knowledge and one that recognizes its political and 
historical dimensions; too often knowledge is constructed as ahistorical and neutral, thus 
obscuring the political motives behind conclusions constructed as common sensical or natural. 
While it is very popular to consider issues of power when considering gender relations, too often 
what power actually means and how it relates to sex equality is taken for granted. Time and 
again it has proven insufficient and inaccurate to glibly claim that equalizing power between men 
and women will lead to sex equality.  
A. Power 
How does power impact the relationship between law and masculinity? Is it that the law 
is regulating what it means to be a man? Is it that men are determining what the law is? Is there a 
causal relationship in one direction or the other? The popular understanding—that men are the 
ones who make law, and, thus, the law is made in masculinity’s image—reflects a unidirectional, 
all or nothing, conception of power. Instead, the dynamic between masculinity and law is 
relational, with power flowing between them.
46
 Indeed, the law is not simply a passive bystander 
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constructed in the image of the men who create it, but an active participant engaged in forging 
the identities of those men whom it regulates.  
The more conventional understanding of power—as held by specific individuals who 
craft laws—results from a fetishization of the liberal conception of volition and of a particular 
form of subjectivity grounded in intentionality. The law once crafted, though, develops beyond 
the intention of its creators and has an impact above and beyond however it was first 
conceptualized. Power does not simply exist in one place (nor does it exist in opposition to 
powerlessness), with one individual or group holding it, like a commodity,
47
 but rather is 
perpetually flowing and infusing the relationship in question.
48
 Power is not something that one 
person wields over others; it circulates, always part of a network; not exercised on individuals, 
but passing through them; individuals are not inert or consenting targets of power but rather 
intermediaries.
49
 Thus, Foucault cautions against focusing on the intention of the individual or 
institution that appears to wield power, explaining that the problem is not one of the “central 
soul,” and recommends, instead, studying “the multiple peripheral bodies, the bodies that are 
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constituted as subjects by power-effects.”
50
 Indeed, power is “the operation of political 
technologies throughout the social body.”
51
 
The determination of where power exists is part of the inquiry,
52
 but it does not address 
the more interesting question of how power works. To Foucault, this is the central question: 
“what exactly happens when someone exercises power over another.”
53
 In any political struggle, 
change is only possible when considering the nature of how power is exercised. “Thinking about 
power only as top/down, oppressor/oppressed, dominator/dominated can cause us to miss 
opportunities for intervention and pick targets for change that are not the most strategic.”
54
 Thus, 
when looking at power, one must consider the mechanisms, networks, strategies, and techniques 
that lead to a particular outcome.
55
 The question becomes less about the justification for the use 
of power, but rather about the process through which power is exercised. In fact, part of the 
problem when grappling with the overarching notion of power, according to Foucault, is that we 
only know how to think about it in terms of justifying its use, since the justification question is 
one that we already have a framework for engagement.
56
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Power functions in two distinct ways: on the one hand, power is juridical, it represses, 
prohibits, and censors; on the other hand, power is productive, positive, and constitutive. In its 
juridical formation, “power has the essential function of prohibiting, preventing, and isolating 
rather than allowing the circulation, change, and multiple combination of elements.”
57
 The law 
exhibits both of these forms of power, yet it rarely considers its power beyond its juridical 
components.
58
 Indeed, given this positive and productive nature of the law’s power, suggesting 
that the law is capable of acting as some sort of passive umpire makes little sense. 
Foucault draws this distinction between the juridical and the productive: “Do not 
concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on their “repressive” effects alone, on their 
“punishment” aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, 
even if these seem marginal at first sight.”
59
 Crucial in this formulation is that the positive 
aspects may seem “marginal at first sight;” the process of identifying and pinpointing the 
repressive components of power is a much cleaner task, and one which yields tangible results. 
The productive effects, on the other hand, appear marginal, are more difficult to identify, yet 
ultimately prove the most insidious. 
In the juridical characterization, the law is seen as an impediment to freedom: but for the 
restrictive laws, freedom could exist. Indeed, this characterization recalls the male outlaw hero 
whose freedom and masculinity are suffocated by legal regulation.
60
 But freedom is not only 
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something that is restricted; it is affected both by rules of prohibition and rules of permission, 
particularly with respect to the social distribution of goods (including, of course, income, wealth, 
power, and knowledge).
61
 In Duncan Kennedy’s formulation, “the invisibility of legal ground 
rules comes from the fact that when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing to do 
with the outcome . . . but the question of intrusiveness is different from that of causal 
responsibility.”
62
 In the context of racial justice, for instance, the questions should not be limited 
to what type of prohibitions are in place to achieve justice (laws prohibiting intentional 
discrimination based on race), but should also consider what behavior is being permitted 
(disparate impact permitted due to business freedoms). The power of law is not binaried, in the 
sense that there exist things that are legal and things that are illegal, and the law exercises its 
power only on or against those illegal things but has no impact on those that are legal.
63
 The 
opposite of having laws is not freedom, but rather lawlessness. Power, therefore, should be 
considered with respect to its permissiveness as well as its prohibitory characteristics. 
An analysis adhering to an understanding of power that followed the conventional 
juridical conception would look at the institution of the law and try to understand what the law 
was invested in, what overarching interests it was serving, whether the institution was 
independent enough of corporate interests, whether the law was representative of the community 
it served, whether the judiciary was independent from the legislative and executive branches of 
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government. The analysis would be top-down, in that it would be looking at the law as 
something with an articulable interest, with intentions and desires, it would look at the specific 
interest in suppressing something and ask what interest is being served by the law suppressing 
this freedom. The analysis would consist of thinking about power as a commodity that the 
judiciary possessed and would analyze how they came to possess it, how they utilized it, and 
why they utilized in the way that they did. But such an analysis would fail to consider the 
relationality of all power dynamics, the de-centeredness of power, and how it is not guided solely 
by the will of individual subjects. This is not to suggest that power is never exercised through a 
“series of aims and objectives,”
64
 for it always is in micro-practices, but, rather, that a search for 
a consistency and coherent logic to the manner in which power is exercised suggest a nonexistent 
rationality. 
Historically, the West has insisted on seeing the power the law exercises as juridical and 
negative, in part, because the political theories of the west are based on the problem of 
sovereignty and, therefore, on prohibition.
65
 The idea that the law functions in a solely juridical 
manner has become internalized to the extent that thinking about productive power is 
counterintuitive.
66
 Carol Smart recommends thinking about power, and specifically the power of 
law, in terms of two parallel mechanisms: the discourse of rights and the discourse of 
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 Through this conceptualization, the productive form of power does not replace 
conventional juridical power, but rather, adds an element that requires a different mode of 
analysis. The discourse of normalization is more creative and less explicit and, thus, often more 
difficult to locate. To François Ewald, an associate of Foucault, “the norm emerges conceptually 
not only as a particular variety of rules, but also as a way of producing them, and as a principle 
of valorization . . . it transforms the negative restraints of the juridical into the more positive 
controls of normalization; thus the norm performs the transformative function.”
68
 Ewald’s 
“principle of valorization” establishes the critical contrast: for the norm to exist at all, the 
abnormal must also exist. Rules that exist simply to identify who is in conformity with them, are 
replaced by norms which are defined by the average and in contrast to the pathological. The 




The ways in which the law uses its juridical power to police the boundaries of sex are 
numerous. The law is a prime participant in explicitly demarcating the boundaries of sex, in 
determining what makes a man or a woman or what prohibits an individual from being a man or 
a woman. Indeed, the legal and medical professions—often the medical profession with the law’s 
blessing—play the largest roles in determining a “true” sex, when the question is at issue.
70
 The 
                                                 
67
 Smart, supra note 16, at 8. 
68




 Whenever a conflict arises between the choice of the individual and that of society, a combination of legal and 
medical forces are used to usurp the choice of the individual. While Foucault does not often talk about sexual 
difference, in his introduction to Herculine Barbin, a case study regarding a 19th century hermaphrodite, he 
addresses the issue sex determination and choice: “From the legal point of view, this obviously implied the 
disappearance of free choice. It was no longer up to the individual to decide which sex he wished to belong to, 
juridically or socially. Rather, it was up to the expert to say which sex nature had chosen for him and to which 
society must consequently ask him to adhere.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, HERCULINE BARBIN ix (2010).   
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law also involves itself in policing the boundaries of sex identification by explaining what is 
reasonable behavior for the average man. For example, in the context of criminal law, the “in the 
heat of passion” defense to homicide, whereby a charge can be reduced if a defendant shows his 
was a “reasonable” response to “adequate provocation,” is based on a conception of masculinity 
that views violence as a natural response to provocation.
71
 Similarly, the law utilizes what can be 
termed masculinist definitions to demarcate the boundaries of certain crimes—e.g., rape—thus 
perpetuating a male understanding of the sexual sphere.
72
 Finally, as is discussed in detail below, 
in antidiscrimination law judges are engaged in establishing how gender is allowed to be 
performed to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the law—both explicitly, in cases like 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., and implicitly, in cases like Ricci v. DeStefano, both 
discussed in Section V). 
In addition to such relative explicit policing of sexual difference, whenever the law is 
working from an assumption of a difference in sex between persons, it demarcates the borders of 
sexual difference. Even when it does not speak explicitly to any difference in sex, the law may 
be, in some way, reinforcing sexual difference. As Martha Fineman has argued, the realm of 
family law has been marked by gendered ideas of self-sufficiency and moral independence, self-
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governance and liberty, which are culturally encoded as masculine and permeate assumptions 
about the family made by the law. Thus, the law’s power stretches beyond the judicial 
pronouncement and into areas of norm creation.
73
 Similarly, administrative systems and the laws 
that govern them, rather than simply sorting and managing what “naturally” exists, actually 
create categories into which people are classified.
74
 Thus, an understanding of power that goes 
beyond juridical power reveals the broader extent of the law’s influence.
75
 And distinguishing 
between the law’s juridical and productive power allows for a better appreciation of the impact 
and role that the law has in creating the parameters of masculinity.
76
 
B. Truth and Knowledge 
For Foucault, power is exercised through the production of truth.
77
 And, as with his focus 
on how power works, as opposed to where it lies, Foucault found the process through which a 
fact became accepted as a fact and the mechanisms at play that led to the creation of knowledge 
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and truths to be more insightful than thinking of the establishment of facts as uncovering some 
sort of pre-existing truth.
78
 For Foucault, truth and knowledge were not apolitical ideas; they had 
a history and a perspective; they were a product of struggle, of political economic, and 
institutional regimes,
79
 not foundational suppositions from which to base political movements. 
While it may be true that today we live in a post-truth world, and while this can remind us of a 
better time when facts mattered, it does not justify returning to a world where facts were 
considered apolitical and unquestioned. The existence of the post-truth world, perhaps, has 
highlighted how truth has never been an idea beyond clever manipulation or not so clever tweets.  
There is an obvious disconnect between Foucault’s conception of truth (something 
political and not existing pre-power) and the law’s understanding of truth (something pre-
existing that must be uncovered). The law positions itself as an instrument to be used to cut 
through the forest of untruths in order to uncover what actually occurred, to let the facts speak 
for themselves. While the law questions the truth, and even often replaces one truth with a new, 
more authentic truth, the idea of there being one truth perseveres.  
Claims to truth are buttressed within a discursive field that structures the beliefs, terms, 
and categories that influence the construction of truth. The validity and force of scientific and 
expert knowledge today illustrate an overarching discourse that structures the manner in which 
truths are legitimized. Each one of these respective fields of knowledge contains its own 
discourse which contains within it a set of rules that exist independently of the worth of the 
statements themselves. Such discursive requirements structure the way we perceive reality. This 
is not to say that discursive requirements obscure one’s access to reality. There is no pre-
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discursive reality; there is no way to see the world that is not structured by and within particular 
discursive fields. In contrast, a Marxist understanding of truth, for instance, conceives of an 
ideology imposing its own conception of reality and obscuring a hidden, true, reality.
80
 In this 
sense, discourse is free of the normative baggage that ideology contains. The idea of discourse id 
more fluid and less nefarious than that of ideology.  
Discourse, like power, is both productive and repressive. Suggesting that nothing is pre-
discursive is not the equivalent of dismissing materiality. Instead, one must question the 
structural and discursive configurations in spaces that are generally considered commonsensical. 
For instance, the manner in which we experience our bodily existence is structured discursively: 
we feel pain, but we interpret what that pain means only through discursive fields, and, 
specifically, we decide whether the pain is legitimate and true. The point of thinking about what 
we experience as true as being, to some extent, discursively constructed is not to close off 
agency, in the sense of suggesting that a larger structural field is determining how we experience 
something as palpable as corporeal pain. It does not mean that as individuals we do not have the 
power to engage with ideas and make determinations as to their validity. In fact, an engagement 
with discursive fields is intended to provide a more comprehensive understanding of ideas that 
are too often accepted as true due to the power of the imposed discursive restrictions. Looking at 
the rules of how the knowledge is produced, as well as the knowledge itself, allows for a more 
thought-through determination of whether or not to accept said knowledge. 
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An understanding of discursive fields is helpful when thinking about the truths produced 
by the law. These truths, more than most others, are assigned an objective status that is only 
challengeable by those with resources and power. The law is structured antagonistically—pitting 
one side against another with a winner and loser—and ostensibly grants each side equal say. A 
discursive analysis illuminates the shared assumptions that shape the respective arguments and 
structure the manner in which the arguments are conceptualized and presented. A discursive 
analysis exposes the structures beneath the surface, the unwritten rules, that construct the façade 
of objectivity and justice around the law. 
C. Power and Knowledge 
Fundamental to the conception of the law’s power as productive is its inseparability from 
and interdependent relationship to knowledge; it is not possible for power to be exercised 
without knowledge, nor can knowledge not engender power.
81
 Power, thus, is not juridical in the 
sense that it acts upon something pre-existing, but, instead, always is partly constitutive of that 
upon which it is acting. As Vikki Bell has noted: “power is productive in the sense of ‘producing 




It is one thing to talk about power being productive and another to answer what it is 
productive of. Bell highlights how this productivity functions on both a corporeal and ideological 
level. Power forcibly dictates where individuals can physically be, controls what they can do, 
determines what they can say, and generates what they think about, amongst other things, 
masculinity, but perhaps most importantly, it ultimately discursively crafts masculine subjects 
                                                 
81
 Foucault, supra note 77, at 52. 
82
 Bell, supra note 63, at 35. 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
35 
into being. So while the tendency is to think about power as functioning on a physical plane only 
when its juridical components are being considered, even its productive characteristics manifest 
physically. Power does not function solely on some ideological level nor is it predominantly 
about the struggle for the minds of people. While ideology does have a place in Foucault’s 
thinking,
83
 outright physicality is not belittled. In fact, “nothing is more material, physical, 
corporal than the exercise of power.”
84
 While perhaps less intuitive than the idea of power as 
ideological, as a tool used to manipulate, fundamental to a conception of power as productive is a 
recognition of its uncontrollability, yet simultaneous tangible, corporeal impact. Productive 
power not only informs subjectivity, but forms subjects themselves.  
Foucault maintained that “[t]he subject of knowledge itself has a history; the relation of 
the subject to the object—or, more clearly—to truth itself has a history.”
85
 Knowledge, thus, 
becomes something to be examined in and of itself. Not the substance of the knowledge, but 
knowledge as an historical and political mechanism, devoid of its substance. In today’s political 
climate, where consensus on the most foundational components of our existences is difficult to 
come by, thinking about the nature of knowledge, as opposed to its substance, seems all the more 
                                                 
83
 Many of Foucault’s ideas on the subject stem from his former professor Louis Althusser—particularly, from 
Althusser’s Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Althusser is obviously addressing ideological questions 
from a Marxist perspective, and this is a conversation that Foucault clearly engages in. The ideological component 
of this argument, as it infuses masculinity and law, will be addressed more specifically in the section below on 
subjectivity and the enlightenment. Questions about ideology are also very present in the context of knowledge and 
truth, particularly vis-à-vis issues of false/consciousness. Generally, though, the concept of ideology is 
unsatisfactory to Foucault for precisely the reasons articulated in this essay; ideology posits power as only 
functioning as a top-down repressive force. It is for this reason that Foucault focuses on the micro-practices 
exercised on the level of daily life rather than on the state apparatuses, which he does not claim are unimportant but 
rather that if changes at the state level are not accompanied by changes at the micro-level the state changes will be 
for not and run into the ground. “Foucault’s bottom-up model of power…enables an account of the mundane and 
daily ways in which power is enacted and contested, and allows an analysis which focuses on individuals as active 
subjects, as agents rather than as passive dupes.” SARA MILLS, MICHEL FOUCAULT 34 (2003). This distinction is 
present in the rubric I describe below mostly in the fifth component regarding power being something that is a 
strategy and performed, rather than possessed.  
84
 Foucault, supra note 77, at 57–58. 
85
 Michel Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms, in POWER 2. (Faubion ed., 1994) (emphasis added). 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
36 
necessary. Depending on one’s perspective, either the vacuous nature of truth has been revealed 
or power has escaped and usurped the moorings of knowledge. But, regardless of perspective, 
the connection between knowledge and power is clear; “the exercise of power perpetually creates 
knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.”
86
  
Knowledge serves to reinforce and support the use of power, providing a justification for 
power to be exercised. Thus, the relationship between knowledge and power is interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing, where knowledge justifies the use of juridical power, and power, in 
turn, produces the knowledge that justifies its own use. Indeed, if, therefore, truth cannot be 
separated from power, does it make sense that truth serves as a moral signpost? The notion that 
the truth ultimately serves as a check on power feels fairly antiquated. Similarly, credos such as 
“knowledge for knowledge’s sake,” have given way to notions of monetizing and leveraging 
knowledge for capital gain. When thinking about power in a productive sense, the attempt to 
separate knowledge from power appears misguided; power is everywhere “not because it 
embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere”
87
 Thus, regardless of how 
persuasive or inscrutable certain truths appear they will always be political. This is not suggest 
that certain things are not true, it is not to claim a flimsy, relativistic perspective where every 
perspective is equal, but rather that all truths are both a function of power and politics.  
According to a conventional liberal reading, knowledge is incompatible with power and 
exists in the domain of truth and freedom, from which power is dissociated.
88
 Exposing the 
connection between the discursive order and the institution that produces it highlights the 
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inherently political character of knowledge. Foucault has called the production of knowledge a 
central strategy of power and has challenged the idea that knowledge can exist only where and 
when power relations are suspended.
89
 This conventional understanding of knowledge—
described as “a series of isolated creative geniuses”
90
 or a “history of ideas” with specific 
individuals who revolutionized thinking on a particular subject—is a conception of history that 
Foucault was skeptical of.
91
 This image of the solitary genius dominates both popular culture and 
liberal thought. When combined with the conventional understanding of power described above, 
the tension between the two concepts is clear: one the one hand, power supposedly supports 
entrenched interests with an agenda to perpetuate the status quo, conservative in the sense of 
maintaining power in the hands of those who have it, and on the other hand, knowledge exists 
supposedly “in the domain of freedom,” invested in the pursuit of truth, unrestrained by any 
ulterior concern (e.g., the intellectually independent and economically uncompromised 
university). In this conventional characterization, power and knowledge are at odds, with the 
purity of knowledge pushing against the entrenched interests of power. The conventional 
understanding eschews the idea that power and knowledge perpetuate themselves, or work in 
tandem, but rather suggests that truth and knowledge almost serve as a check on power.
92
 
However, the Foucauldian understanding of power, instead, emphasizes the interdependence and 
                                                 
89
 Foucault, supra note 44, at 27. 
90
 Mills, supra note 83, at 66. 
91
 Mills refers to Einstein and Louis Pasteur in the natural sciences and Kant and Wittgenstein in philosophy, but the 
examples are countless. Mills, supra note 83, at 67–68. See also Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) for discussion of scientific revolutions occurring through “paradigm shifts” prompted not 
necessarily by genius, but by specific, individualized events. Foucault, in contrast, is not attempting to contribute to 
this history of ideas, but is interested in creating an “archaeology of knowledge” that addresses the material 
conditions allowing for the reification of these truths.  
92
 One need only think of the current political climate in America where the truth and knowledge are explicitly 
characterized by the left as the check on the power of the government. 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
38 
inseparability of power and knowledge (for Foucault, “Power/Knowledge” are inseparable). 
Foucault stresses that knowledge cannot exist in a place exterior to power, for knowledge is 
always already an effect of power: 
Modern humanism is therefore mistaken in drawing this line between knowledge 
and power. Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no 
point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this 
is just a way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power 





D. Critical Race Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Legal Theory 
The inevitable intertwining of knowledge, power, and politics also played a major role in 
other influential critiques of liberalism like Critical Race Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and 
Feminism Legal Theory. These critiques were seen as corrosive to the rule of law due to their 
hostility to certain components of the modernist project. For instance, student protests and the 
organization of an alternative course on race and the law at Harvard Law School in 1981 
following the school’s failure to hire a black professor to replace Derrick Bell symbolized 
Critical Race Theory’s “oppositional posture vis-a-vis the liberal mainstream”
94
 and exemplified 
the political nature of dominant legal discourse. The law school came to be seen as a site where 
power and knowledge are connected and political—no longer an ivory tower that exists 
“exterior” to the messy reality of race relations, but rather a political space where struggles over 
power/knowledge are waged. 
Contrast this to the idea of knowledge as removed from politics and power—as apolitical 
and free. In this notion of knowledge, even amongst progressive law students, structural 
injustices exist in the world that contain a legal dimension and a legal education is a necessary 
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tool for righting those wrongs. The “knowledge” imparted during that education is not thought of 
as having anything to do with the injustices. The problem is not with the law itself, but rather 
how courts are interpreting the law, how the courts are privileging, for instance, property rights 
over human rights, how existing lawyers are not advocating forcefully enough; the structure 
works, but the application is questioned. The law is predominantly a tool used to bring 
progressive change rather than an institution change needs to be brought to. 
In another law-school-related example of a critique of the conventional understanding of 
power and knowledge, Duncan Kennedy published Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System, identifying the power dynamics that created 
hierarchies in law school and in legal practice and exposing the political economy of a legal 
education.
95
 It described two attitudes which left-leaning incoming law students had of the law: 
that the law was a useful tool for progressive change (the “left liberal rights analysis”); and that 
the law itself was super-structurally skewed to favor the elite (the “instrumental Marxist 
approach”).
96
 The “useful tool for progressive change” recalls the position described above and 
central to mainstream civil rights discourse, while the more radical “instrumental Marxist view” 
sees “every judicial action as the expression of class interest.”
97
 This second view reduces the 
law to a function of class power, rather than seeing it as one part of the equation, and in doing so 
diminishes the complex functioning of the totality of the social world to being regimented by the 
legal order in a way that presupposes a logic that the law does not contain. By reducing the law 
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to simply a reflection of class interests, this view ignores the rules and rhetoric of the law that 
those who see the law as a tool for progressive change prioritize. 
Indeed, in this characterization, one sees similarities to ill-conceived conceptions of law 
as independent of the rest of the social world, as well as, in contrast, allusions to the impact 
cultural studies has had on the law.
98
 The law is either too important (the tool for achieving 
justice that only it can) or not important enough (simply reflective of societal power 
relationships). What is needed, according to Kennedy, is a way to “think about law in a way that 
will allow one to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting it, and to manipulate it without 
self-abandonment to their system of thinking and doing.”
99
 This evidences the ambivalence of 
the space occupied by the law; the law is not neutral, yet nor can it, on its own, serve as a 
successful tool to protect subordinated groups.
100
 Indeed, the law may, in fact, also have negative 
effects on the subordinated groups, what Carol Smart has called juridogenic—the harm that law 
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may generate as a consequence of its operations.
101
 Thus, employing the law is not always the 
solution that results in the least harm. This position exists in contrast to the perennial optimists 
who may see some problems with the law but see law reform as a cure for whatever ails it. This 
highlights the law’s own over-valuation of its importance and underscores how part of the way 
this importance is achieved is through the laws own self-advertising. While in the Critical Legal 
Studies position described above, the law is perpetually either over-valuing or under-valuing 
itself, Smart is acutely aware that the law usually over values itself and employs techniques that 
further its claim to truth and in the process disqualifies others, notably, to Smart, female 
experience. The echoes to Foucault’s power/knowledge are prevalent throughout this line of 
thought, particularly with respect to the ubiquity of power (and its resistance) and failures of 
compartmentalization: “What has happened is a simultaneous blurring of lines between classes 
and institutions that were once distinct (at least in theory) and a diffusion of social power through 
the hierarchy that has made it, paradoxically, at once more stable and more vulnerable.”
102
 In 
each example the attempt to conceive of the law as an institution without its own agenda is 
exposed as a frivolous exercise.  
Knowledge, truth, and power factor significantly in Feminist Legal Theory, as well. At 
first glance, a Foucauldian notion of power might appear incompatible with many feminist 
critiques of power, which tend to view power in a more juridical sense, as binaried with men 
possessing power and wielding it over women. Feminist theorists have pointed to the fact that the 
law’s attempt to speak from a universal, neutral, and objective perspective is not a perspective 
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 Further, knowledge and truth themselves have been problematized as 
gendered terms; again, here, we see these terms, which liberal discourse characterizes as 
apolitical, as, in fact, highly political. Feminism has long been engaged in attempting to find an 
alternative jurisprudence, a way of doing law grounded not in the individualistic moralism of 
liberalism but rather in the truth of women’s experience. Margaret Thornton has described the 
law as the “paradigmatic modernist discourse, as universality, objectivity, neutrality and truth 
feature among its central norms. In contrast, particularity, discretion, permeability and 
uncertainty are regarded with suspicion within the dominant philosophy of legal positivism 
because such values are corrosive to the rule of law.”
104
  
In her attempt to create a grand feminist jurisprudence Catharine MacKinnon stated: 
“Radical feminism—after this, feminism unmodified—is methodologically post-Marxist. It 
moves to resolve the Marxist-feminist problematic on the level of method. Because its method 
emerges from the concrete conditions of all women as a sex, it dissolves the individualist, 
naturalist, moralist structure of liberalism, the politics of which science is epistemology.”
105
 This 
version of “standpoint feminism” articulated by MacKinnon is similar to the positions advocated 
by mainstream civil rights activists articulated above. The issue becomes one, not of law per se, 
not of the methodology itself, but rather of the “Truth” that it is relying on to ground it. Replace 
the liberal male truth grounded in concepts that are always already gendered, with the truths 
found in female experience, and then one is left with an effective and just jurisprudence. The 
truth of female experience, in contrast to male experience—always shrouded in neutrality—
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becomes the method of the jurisprudence and the heart of the epistemology. MacKinnon 
continues: “When [the state] is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be most male; when it is most sex 
blind, it will be most blind to the sex of the standard being applied….Once masculinity appears 
as a specific position, not just the way things are, its judgements will be revealed in process and 
procedure, as well as adjudication and legislation…However autonomous of class the liberal 
stance may appear, it is not autonomous of sex.”
106
  
MacKinnon’s argument, however, has been criticized as making a positivistic claim to a 
specific truth. Her theorizing makes universalizing claims when, even at the time, universalizing 
claims were losing their allure, “in arguing that all women are subordinated by virtue of their 
sex, her thesis constitutes a form of modernist grand theorizing that sought to construct new 
universals in the liberal mold at the very moment postmodern theory was seeking to destabilize 
them.”
107
 The alternative method it is proposing is not any more contingent or less objective than 
the liberal model it is seeking to replace; it is only replacing one standard with the other. Again, 
the hegemonic power of the law remains in place, and, as Smart has pointed out, the worth of its 
method is characterized as existing independent of the world around it: “The idea of a feminist 
jurisprudence also seems to imply that law can remain a discrete area of activity, detached and 
somehow superior to ‘society’”
108
 The problem is twofold: on the one hand feminist 
jurisprudence positions itself outside society and thus exacerbates the already encompassing 
power of the law, and, on the other, feminism positions itself within the law in an equally 
dogmatic position as the one it is attempting to replace.  
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The reason for this dogmatism, according to Smart, has to do with the nature of the law: 
“It is unfortunate that working within the discourse of law seems to produce such—it is as if the 
law’s claim to truth is so legitimate that feminists can only challenge and maintain credibility 
within the law by positing an equally positivist alternative.”
109
 Indeed, perhaps also in an attempt 
to take up space appropriately within a juridical framework, feminism generally disavows more 
nuanced and fluid relations of power. The relationship between the law and feminism, in this 
sense, struggles due to the law’s necessity to speak univocally. The law is only capable of 
articulating one truth, which it gnostically posits to be the truth. The law forces on feminism an 
essentialism that it is perpetually struggling with. Whether truth is determined through 
subjective, experiential accounts or through objective, logical accounts each alternative insists on 
one truth. 
When looking at the similarities between Critical Legal Studies and Feminist 
jurisprudence vis-à-vis the issue of “experience,” the inside/outside issue appears again. Critical 
Legal Studies has argued against the law existing outside of the larger social/political order, 
whereas feminism suggests that female experience should serve as the truth on which to 
construct its jurisprudence. Female experience thus gives rise to a truth that exists outside of the 
existing ideological systems. However, when keeping in mind the fluidity of a Foucauldian 
understanding of power, the power relations between the existing ideological system and female 
experience are not static nor are they wholly hierarchical. All “experience,” is generated within a 
larger social context. The compartmentalization of female experience as independent of the 
existing structure fails to recognize the multidirectionality of power. 
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The idea of “freeing” female experience from the ideological restraints of the existing 
patriarchal superstructure implies the potentiality of some sort of “real” female experience. As 
Joan Scott has stated: “To put it another way, the evidence of experience, whether conceived 
through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, 
reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems—those that assume that the facts of 
history speak for themselves . . . .”
110
 In this way, the emphasis on “experience” within the 
ideological system precludes any “critical examination of the workings of the ideological system 
itself.”
111
 The experience is made visible but the categories themselves remain ahistorical, as 
Anne Fausto-Sterling observed “what we conclude about people’s past experiences depends to a 
large extent on how much we believe that our categories of analysis transcend time and place.”
112
 
The relationship that is obscured is how the ideological system positions subjects and produces 
their experiences: “It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted 
through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, 
not the authoritative evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to 
explain, that about which knowledge is produced.”
113
 
This particular relationship—between the production of knowledge and experience—is 
similarly not one-directional. The liberal conception of how history is produced—or stated 
differently, the process from which experience becomes knowledge, in conventional 
historiographical terms, consists of historians using documents (personal testimonies, private 
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journals, letters, etc.) to uncover the “truth” of an experience in the past. In her essay Scott refers 
to Gayatri Spivak’s characterization of the work of a historian as being to help us understand 
“the social and structural positions of people” in new terms that define a “collective identity with 
potential political effects.”
114
 Due, in part, to the complexity of using “experience” to get at the 
“truth” of the past Foucault describes what he is engaged in not as uncovering a history but as 
creating an archaeology which, in contrast to history’s gathering of experiences, is a “set of rules 
which at a given period and for a given society define: the limits and forms of the sayable.”
115
 
Indeed, Scott uses this same template to refine the task of the historian: “It ought to be possible 
for historians . . . to “make visible the assignment of subject-positions,” not in the sense of 
capturing the reality of the objects seen, but of trying to understand the operations of the 
complex and changing discursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted, or 
embraced, and which processes themselves are unremarked and indeed achieve their effect 
because they are not noticed.”
116
 
Lynne Huffer discusses two problems that Foucault identifies in this relationship between 
experience and truth, and the attempt to use experience as a tool to get to truth. Foucault 
addresses the issue in the context of the mad and of sexual deviants and makes two complaints. 
First, the experiences of the marginalized have not been documented to the extent of those not 
marginalized; “the voiced of the mad have, for the most part, been lost to us—we have very few 
documents in which they speak for themselves and in their own words—the problem of 
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accessing the “reality” of their experience is compounded.”
117
 Second, Foucault explains that the 
rendering and capturing of the experiences (of the mad in his case) objectifies the subject. The 
anti-historical solution that Foucault suggests is, in effect, to get at “madness” prior to it being 
captured by knowledge. It is therefore not a “history of knowledge, but of the rudimentary 
movements of an experience. A history not of psychiatry, but of madness itself, in all its vivacity, 
before it is captured by knowledge.”
118
 Huffer points out how Foucault is obviously not trying to 
find a “true” experience that exists prior to knowledge; in other words, a pure, real, free, true 
experience that precedes knowledge is not the object of the analysis. But rather to account for the 
fact that he is “working from the perspective of the present, from within a knowledge that knows 
too much and therefore misses experience itself.”
119
 The corrupting effect of “knowledge” 
therefore, is not to suggest that there exists a prior, purer, experience, but rather the search should 
consider the effects of the capture –the impact on experience once it is becomes knowledge –and  
strive to understand those movements. With respect to masculinity, the question is what impact 
did becoming—going from something natural and thus invisible –an object of study have on it, 
how was it changed by becoming a knowledge? In other words, rather than thinking about 
knowledge reflecting a truth about masculinity that precedes it becoming knowledge, think about 
the relationship being less static and more fluid. In particular, when masculinity goes from being 
something ubiquitous but invisible to an object of study, what are the unwritten rules that lead to 
the universe of discursive formations which circulate around it at any given time?  
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When thinking about the relationship between masculinity and the law, what is the 
process through which ideas about masculinity get established as fact? A crucial distinction to be 
made is between thinking about truths regarding masculinity as revealing themselves to us—the 
distinction is between the pre-existing fact being uncovered and the fact itself being a product of 
a process—and how certain institutional processes establish what comes to be known as a fact 
about masculinity. Indeed, the institutional processes impact the nature of the fact itself. In other 
words, one may ask what happens to masculinity itself once it becomes subject to a “will to 
truth,” once it is viewed as something that contains knowledge. How is the nature of masculinity 
impacted by its exposure to the institutional processes? And is it even possible/insightful to 
distinguish between a “pre-institutional process” and “post-institutional process” masculinity? 
The departure point for this inquiry is the moment when masculinity went from something 
invisible but ubiquitous to a legitimate object of study. Masculinity abruptly was subjected to a 
set of rules and procedures that created new terrain governing how knowledge was formed and 
produced within the discourses that surrounded it.
120
 The explicit intent of Masculinity Studies 
was to render masculinity contingent and to expose it as simply one subjectivity amongst others. 
But, as feminist scholars have been highlighting for decades, the entirety of the human world is 
already a gendered construction.
121
 Thus, the aspiration to think about masculinity in a 
genderless space is from the outset an ill-fated endeavor. 
This objectification of masculinity, resulting, in part, from the creation of Masculinity 
Studies, itself a product of a will to truth, has multiple effects. Until relatively recently, 
masculinity has been noticeably under-theorized. The male subject position has dominated the 
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fields of literature, philosophy, sociology, and law, amongst others. It has done so under the 
guise of “mankind” being the universal prototype from which objective truths can be extracted. 
Masculinity shifted from something that more or less just existed, to something that contained 
truths, something that held answers that were worth knowing. Foucault, in what he called a 
“principle of reversal,”
122
 explained how the will to truth, rather than enlarging a discourse, as 
one intuits it would, actually has the reverse effect. Rather than promoting “swarming abundance 
and … continuity,”
123
 the will to truth leads to a “cutting-up” of the discourse. Foucault’s 
genealogy seeks out difference and heterogeneity to overthrow what he labels the “rancorous 
will to knowledge,”
124
 knowledge which is malicious and rests on injustice.
125
 The will to truth 
limits the voices that can speak authoritatively on the subject. The will to truth leads to self-
regulating that narrows the range and diversity of voices. The form knowledge takes shifts to 
something more governmental, because as Margaret Thornton has pointed out, there has been a 
“resiling from theory, reflexivity and critique in favour of applied and technocratic knowledge 
because the latter are valued more highly within the market.”
126
 Foucault calls this process 
“rarefication,” and it is one of the internal exclusions he describes which limit the production of 
discourse.
127
 Rarefication does not mean that the quantity of speech acts on a subject are 
impacted, but that a hierarchy is created amongst them. Some voices are heard and rendered 
authoritative, while others disappear as quickly as they were uttered. Once masculinity becomes 
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an object of study, with experts in the field, the variety of voices that contribute to the discourses 
that create it are reduced. 
Discourse is controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed. Due to the procedures for 
exclusion being so well known, namely those of prohibition and censorship, society tends to 
fixate on the elimination of repression and on overcoming external controls on discourse, rather 
than thinking through the internal procedures that delineate discourse. One of these internal 
procedures is disciplinary boundedness. Masculinity becomes a subject, a finite category, that is 
then necessarily restricted in some senses. Certain methodological and theoretical tools become 
de rigueur in the discipline. The variety of the ways about which the subject is spoken is 
reduced. This limits the perspectives being brought to bear on a particular subject—one can think 
of other subjects that have been subjected to a dominant methodological perspective (e.g., 
empirical and positivistic turns in the social sciences in the last half century). This limiting of 
methodological perspectives is combined with a drastic lessening of the particular voices that 
will be heard on a subject. Only “expert” voices are able to speak authoritatively about the 
subject; their voices contain truths ungraspable by anyone but themselves. With respect to 
masculinity, the processes of disciplinary boundedness and rarefication reduce the voices and 
perspectives that are heard and promote the continuation down a phallocentric and patriarchal 
path. 
Furthermore, experts see explanations and answers in and through their field—i.e., 
masculinity studies, infused by science/medicine/law/sociology/psychology—similar to how 
lawyers look to the law to find solutions to problems. Many categories serve as both a discipline 
and a lens; for example, one often hears about rewriting history from a feminist perspective or 
about analyzing a film from a sociological perspective. The objectification of masculinity 
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therefore renders it a discipline capable of providing explanations and answers. One of the 
founding texts of Masculinity Studies states in its first paragraph that it will “discuss the 
implications of masculinity research for understanding current world issues.”
128
 Masculinity now 
provides an analysis of lived events, and each time it is employed its status as a discipline is 
furthered, its use as a category perpetuated, its importance questioned less. 
Finally, let us return to the questions posed by the Owen Labrie case. How would that 
case look differently were the law to take seriously the ideas about power, law, and knowledge 
introduced above? Is it feasible for the law to be multivocal and to move beyond liberal ideas of 
consent and volition? Should we think about how the law has created the rules of the game that 
govern the interaction between Labrie and the 15-year-old girl with whom he had sex. The 
conditions that govern the interaction are both the “crystallization of processes of power that take 
place at a distance from legal institutions,”
129
 in that they reflect power dynamics that exist 
beyond the law and that were, however, nonetheless established in a pre-existing legal context. 
There is, obviously, a social power dynamic which engages other factors beyond the law, but 
there is no pre-existing social context in which the law plays no role. Robert Hale describes the 
laws role in such a dynamic as creating the conditions of the play of forces that lead to the 
crystallization. Thus, there is a clear legal context that frames the interaction between Labrie and 
the 15-year-old—laws governing sexual assault and rape, for instance—which can be thought of 
as the culmination of the social power dynamics between men and women, and the end result of 
a type of negotiation. Any interaction like the one in question is framed and qualified by its legal 
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context. It is self-evident that all interactions are impacted by the legal context but the 
pervasiveness of that impact requires further upacking. 
The problem with thinking about a pre-legal negotiation is that it supposes the possibility 
of a negotiation transpiring beyond the spectra of a legal context. This argument anticipates the 
most obvious objection to suggesting that the law plays a productive role in the construction of 
masculinity—that the law is simply a medium that reflects a popular consensus about what 
masculinity means. This notion of the law—as simply a reflector of popular consensus—
supposes a clear divide between the law and the social forces at play, and supposes the existence 
of a pre-legal context. It supposes a context in which there was a negotiation between man and 
woman and the law was not implicated in determining their relative bargaining power. It 
supposes that the law was introduced at the later context to affect the relative bargaining power 
but was not implicated at the outset in creating it, in creating the initial rules of the game that 
determined the bargaining strength. 
The distinction between the prohibitive and permissive roles of the law is helpful here. 
For instance, in the context of a negotiation between a man and a woman, we can think of 
prohibitions against abortion existing that would worsen the harm caused by rape and thus 
changing the relative bargaining power in favor of the male would be rapist; the threat of rape 
which the man possesses would now be worth more and in exchange for not raping the man 
could expect more in return. Therefore, the prohibition-free legal context is actually not a context 
in which only social forces beyond the law are determining the power dynamics, but rather a 
legal context greatly influenced by what the law is permitting. 
Is it then even a reasonable question considering that the question itself suggests a 
disconnect between the law and the regime it regulates –in that it compartmentalizes the law –
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and presents it as removed from the social and political worlds?  The analysis takes two distinct 
tracks, on the one hand, the argument is that the law is implicated in the determination of social 
power throughout the negotiation process and not only in its terminal form, and on the other 
hand, the argument is that there are two distinct forms of power at play. What is being asked is 
for the law to recognize, in itself, the functioning of two distinct forms of power; the law is the 
quintessential example of the juridico-institutional model, but the ask of the law is for it to 
recognize how it also is part and parcel of the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects’ 
very bodies and forms of life, from the outset. The law is both the juridical model par excellence 
and part of the bio-political model of power—not disciplinary alone, not solely functioning on 
the level of the individual body, but on the species as a whole. The power of the law manifests 
both juridically, and is always there in this sense, but also contains within it the regulatory 
technologies of life and the disciplinary controls of the body.  
The law engages in creating truth and controlling bodies, not only through institutions 
like prisons, which are engaged in disciplinary control of individual bodies, but what Foucault 
describes as “State control of the biological.”
130
 In biopolitics there are mechanisms whose 
purpose is to intervene at the level at which general phenomena are determined, to intervene at 
the level of their generality
131
 . . . not to directly impact specific individuals but rather to function 
on a macro level—“it is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes 
of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized.”
132
 Biopower 
manifests through centralizing information and normalizing knowledge; control over life through 
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the control of man, not as an individual but as a species. It is through the use of its biopower that 
the law is tacitly engaged in crafting the parameters of masculinity; less about the power of the 
law as prohibitive, or even permissive, less about discipline and less about the direct control of 
life and death by the State and sovereign, and more about the normalization of truths and 
knowledge, about regulatory controls of life. 
The law contributes to the creation of the norms not primarily through the enunciation of 
a sovereign, in the sense that the parameters are determined and subsequently imposed in a top 
down manner. It is a process by which normativity is produced; a production “which is mediated 
by institutions of the state and elite specialists.”
133
 When one considers juridical power, it is easy 
to locate, associated with hierarchy and bureaucracy, identifiable, relatively transparent in its 
structural arrangements. This is not the case for the production of norms, which remains difficult 
to pinpoint. Due to this, the tendency is often to distinguish the process of norm production from 
the conventional juridical functioning of the law. Normativity is not an imposition but rather a 
process—“produced by experts acting upon populations: examining, interrogating, incarcerating, 
curing, passifying (sic), exciting and regimenting.”
134
 Thus, when the parameters of masculinity 
are challenged, when the borders are threatened, the threat is viewed as a deviation or an 
irregularity (from a norm), not as a violation of an injunction; the law, however, is just as 
implicated in the process of norm production as it is in the imposition of sovereign power, or the 
disciplinary control of bodies.  
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The idea is to move beyond the juridical and toward an analytic of power that does not 
take the law as its model, but that examines technologies of the self as well—processes of 
subjectivization which lead an individual to bind oneself to his identity and consciousness—and 
thus recognize the interdependence between the two analytics. Giorgio Agamben goes as far as 
arguing that “the production of the biopolitcal body is the original activity of sovereign 
power,”
135
 but my point is solely that when reflecting on the manner in which the law exercises 
its power the idea is to both recognize its juridical power, but also to analyze the manner in 
which the law uses its biopolitical power—both disciplinary and regulatory—and the 
relationship between those two usages. This complex coexistence of different elements that come 
together to form the law in Foucault’s thinking has been described by Alan Hunt as “juridical 
assemblage”—Foucault’s “focus on the interaction between different fields of power, knowledge 
and governance manifested itself in his substantive preoccupation with the ways in which forms 
of law interact with mechanisms of discipline and with strategies and techniques of 
governance.”
136
 The crucial connection is between the law and legal processes in place and the 
inventions of new fields of knowledge. In other words, how the law interacts with new forms of 
demographic and macro, regulatory knowledges that did not exist prior. The next step is to look 
at these technologies of the self, or the processes of subjectivization, that occur. 
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III. THE FEMALE SUBJECT 
In this section I will look at the formation of the subject, and how critiques of liberalism 
have destabilized it. I will then examine how the construction of the body within liberalism 
posits it as something pre-ideological and points to its corporeality as evidence of its naturalness, 
suggesting that “nature”—whatever that means—is apolitical. I will look at prominent issues in 
feminist legal theory surrounding subjectivity, like difference, substantial equality, essentialism, 
embodiment, and experience. I will explore certain ideas about non-normative subjectivities and 
examine how these ideas contribute to our understanding of normative subjectivities. These 
issues, I argue, demonstrate how the law engages with masculinity (applying these insights to 
masculinity will be looked at in Section VII). I will revisit questions surrounding the sex/gender 
divide, where there remains a large disconnect between conventional thinking about sexual 
difference and how it is considered in feminist/gender theory. While challenges to traditional 
ideas about sex and gender, and sexual difference more broadly (i.e., that sex does not exist on a 
binary; that our traditional gender categories do not apply to all subjects) have made some 
inroads, sex/gender remains a politically troubling hegemonic discourse, particularly within 
popular culture, and still informs how the law addresses questions of masculinity (e.g., recent 
controversy regarding gender designations of public restrooms). 
A. The Search for Origins 
Is it feasible for the law to adopt a different approach when dealing with questions of sex 
and gender? Is it possible for the law to remain true to its liberal identity (i.e., rule of law, 
freedom of speech, individual rights, liberty, freedom) and think about sexual difference 
differently? Or is sexual difference so foundational to liberalism (and thus our legal system) that 
liberalism would be unrecognizable and self-contradictory without sexual difference? 
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Subjects do not pre-exist our social world, but are fashioned within it, constituted by 
formations of power and regimes of truth.
137
 Specifically, subjects cannot exist in the world 
unproblematically and wholly opposed to formations of power that exist outside of them; there is 
no pre-ideological or apolitical subject. If this point is taken seriously, then there are evidently 
not conceptions of femininity or masculinity that exist outside of power. Rather, “subjects and 
power relations are imbricated and co-constitutive,”
138
 and so, masculinity and femininity are 
never simply constrained or freed by the law, but rather formed by it. True equality, beyond 
either formal or substantive models, will only be accessible if power relations are given more 
than peripheral consideration and seen as both foundational to, and as a producer of, the existing 
social order. 
The effects of this ontological position, however, implicate the law beyond simply how it 
engages with questions of gender. Indeed, many contemporary arguments supporting universal 
human rights are premised on the idea that there are forces acting upon pre-existing subjects 
which require the protection of the law—that rights are needed to protect those subjects from 
power, not that those subjects are created by and through the power dynamics. To suggest that 
there is no subject that pre-exists these rights undermines the core conception of liberal rights 
theory, and, consequently, the aspirational concepts of liberty and freedom. This dynamic exists 
because humanist notions of autonomy, reciprocity, mutual recognition and dignity derive their 
normative force from a metaphysics of subjectivity.
139
 Without a pre-existing subject there is no 
humanism. Critical Race Theorists, for instance, have highlighted the futility of searching for an 
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original position and criticized efforts of liberal civil rights advocates who sought to identify 
events that created the white supremacist culture within that very culture. For Foucault, there is 
no space beyond power relations, no liberation, no pre-power desire, no free subject—i.e., no 
origin. While liberalism imagines a complete subject upon whom the world acts, that subject is 
never whole, never pure or “natural,” always “post” something. 
The problems with any “search for origins” have been well examined (most notably, by 
Judith Butler).
140
 Such an endeavor risks reifying an authentic, pre-patriarchal femininity that 
fails to “formulate an account of gender as a complex cultural construction”
141
 and should “be 
cautious to not promote a politically problematic reification of women’s experience.”
142
 Despite 
a praiseworthy goal of repudiating theories that characterize the subordination of women as 
natural or universal, a search for origins—“efforts to locate moments or structures within history 
or culture that establish gender hierarchy”
143
—has the effect of trivializing the power of 
patriarchy. If one seeks to show that women’s subordination is not natural, the implication is that 
something is; that there is a “natural” position without gender hierarchies, there is an origin, there 
is a pre-cultural subject. In fact, gender is a cultural construction created in order to debunk the 
idea that sex roles are somehow a product of biology. But if the natural, pre-patriarchy position 
doesn’t exist, how can one disrupt the claim that gender itself is natural? In other words, how is 
the “naturalness” of gender challenged without recourse to a pre-patriarchal position? Is it useful 
                                                 
140
 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). The “search for 
origins” means the search for a female subject that pre-exists what Butler talks about as “the law.” “The law” in this 
context refers to the law of the father or of patriarchy. So the “search for origins” is the search for a pre-patriarchal 
female subject. The “search for origins” though, also addresses a search for a place that is pre-desire, pre-power 
relations, or pre-racism. Each of these searches is for a subject that pre-exists the culture it exists within, and one in 
which cultural events can be pinpointed that are responsible for the present situation. 
141
 Id. at 36. 
142
 Id. at 35. 
143
 Id. at 36. 
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to employ this idea strategically to highlight the social constructiveness of gender, or is it 
ultimately a better strategy to resist any recourse to a pre-patriarchal position? 
The idea of a “natural” body that existed before patriarchy and oppression, that some 
search for, sits in stark contrast to the idea of a body invoked by Monique Wittig: “we have been 
compelled in our bodies and in our minds to correspond, feature by feature, to the idea of nature 
that has been established for us. Distorted to such an extent that our deformed body is what they 
call ‘natural,’ what is supposed to exist as such before oppression.”
144
 To Wittig, the natural 
body is itself a distortion, not an idyllic pre-oppression entity, but instead a thing that 
corresponds to an idea (nature) that has been created within the parameters of the law.
145
 
In psychoanalytic language, the question to ask is what the subject looks like in its pre-
oedipal phase. As Butler states, “Do we need recourse to a happier state before the law in order 
to maintain that contemporary gender relations and the punitive production of gender identities 
are oppressive?”
146
 Butler ultimately claims that this narrative strategy makes “…all effort at 
recovering that origin in the name of subversion inevitably belated.”
147
 The idea that this attempt 
at subversion inevitably fails, if even only deployed strategically, appears to run counter to many 
struggles for equality undertaken in certain progressive circles, specifically many feminist 
groups, who have foregrounded the female subject as the centerpiece of equality struggles. 
Feminism, with this apparently strategically misguided struggle has, in Joan Scott’s words 
“produced the “sexual difference” it sought to eliminate.”
148
 Thus, when, in the alternative 
                                                 
144




 Butler, supra note 140, at 75. 
147
 Id. at 78. 
148
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strategy, the challenge to patriarchy is tied inextricably to the instability and indeterminacy of all 
gender identities and to the deconstruction of the categories themselves, is it feasible nonetheless 
to foreground a female subject in the struggle for equality? The switch in strategy moves from 
identity to direction or, to paraphrase Paul Gilroy, from roots to routes.
149
  
B. Difference and Equality 
Prior to the switch from looking backwards for a pre-patriarchal female subject to 
looking forward toward a space without gender categories, the debate within feminist circles was 
not about the integrity of the subject (for that was taken for granted), or whether a subject existed 
prior to patriarchy, but rather about struggles for equality based on the sameness or difference 
between men and women. Importantly, the decision to switch focus exists within a historical 
framework constituted “by universalist discourses of individualism (with their theories of rights 
and citizenship) that evoke ‘sexual difference’ to naturalize the exclusion of women.”
150
 The 
interconnectedness of sexual difference and liberalism is here foregrounded. The debate is about 
how to address differences between women and men and where these differences came from. On 
the one hand, the debates focus on the question of whether differences between men and women 
are biological or socially constructed,
151
 and, on the other, on how the differences between men 
and women ought to be addressed legally and politically. 
                                                 
149
 PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS (1993). 
150
 Scott, supra note 148, at 16. 
151
 While this debate/controversy has been central in feminist circles in many respects, some commentators have 
suggested that ultimately the debate may be less important than it seems: “For feminist legal theory, a lot less turns 
on the essentialist/social constructionist controversy in cultural feminism than you would suppose from the amazing 
amount of ink that has been spilled on the question. We can have a sensible policy agenda for or against human 
activities and attitudes that are biological; for instance we are against death and have many policies that push against 
this inevitable, gruesomely embodied, natural event.” JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A 
BREAK FROM FEMINISM 59 (2006). 
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The debate manifests most markedly when addressing issues of public policy.
152
 On the 
one side, there are those who argue that sexual difference should be irrelevant and on the other 
those who insist that appeals of women ought to be made in terms of the needs, interests, and 
characteristics of women as a group.
153
 Each of these positions affirms a cultural component to 
women’s identity, a specific women’s culture, and assumes that sexual difference is an 
immutable, apolitical fact. Indeed, the terms of the argument incredulously suggest that to be 
treated equally women need to be the same as men. Joan Scott has described the manner in 
which the terms of debate get framed: 
Are women the same as men? And is this sameness the only basis upon which 
equality can be claimed? Or are they different and, because or in spite of their 
difference, entitled to equal treatment? Either position attributes fixed and 
opposing identities to women and men, implicitly endorsing the premise that there 




The debate is often characterized as being between cultural feminists and liberal 
feminists, with the cultural feminists suggesting a change to society in which character traits 
labelled female (e.g., compassion, empathy, and collaboration) are revalued and treated as at 
least on par with those masculine traits which are so valued by society (e.g., aggression, 
competitiveness and ambition) and the liberal feminists arguing that, but for the lack of power 
and resources resulting from a lack of opportunity, women would not be subordinate to men. For 
liberal feminists, sex equality is an attainable end, achieved by correcting the imbalance of power 
and resources between women and men, which is at the root of sex inequality and discrimination. 
With the focus on equality of opportunity, the law is ideally situated to help achieve sex equality; 
                                                 
152
 For example, ought sexual difference be a relevant consideration in schools and employment? 
153
 Joan Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 
in FEMINIST SOCIAL THOUGHT: A READER 761 (Diana T. Meyers ed., 1997). 
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 Scott, supra note 150, at x. 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
62 
a vital tool for accessing power and resources and achieving more opportunity; an inherent part 
of the solution, not of the problem. Thus, the overarching structure is not questioned; the world is 
fine, the rules of the game are fine, except for the fact that women are underrepresented in all 
positions of power. For liberal feminists the law is undoubtedly a tool to be used to access sex 
equality.  
Furthermore, the issue of what constitutes difference or sameness for women, invites the 
almost rhetorical question: the same or different from what? The answer being, of course, the 
same or different from men. So, beyond the incomprehensiveness of the question itself, the 
overarching structure it exists within has already subordinated women’s story, constructed it as 
dependent on man’s story; in the words of Janet Halley:  
The very idea that justice for women depends on a comparison of their life 
situation with that of men limits equality theories to the terms set by male 
dominance; and indeed, the oscillation from equal to special treatment and back 
again is a classic symptom not of women’s interests but of the way in which they 





What is exactly abstract about the justice framing the double bind? The law likes 
palatable and implementable solutions, problems that are resolvable. The law is not in the 
business of empathy or compassion; the law is a problem solver. The justice that the law likes is 
not abstract. Nonetheless, justice is abstract in that it is not attainable in such straight forward a 
way. The sameness/difference paradigm suggests that one of the two alternatives contains a 
solution; the search for justice becomes simply a question of deciding upon the correct 
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 The idea is that justice is attainable, potentially imminent, if only practitioners are 
able to set on the right strategy, implying that there is a right and a wrong decision. Implying that 
there are not systemic impediments to the attainment of sex equality, nor alternative methods to 
attaining equality beyond the sameness/difference model. The idea that to attain equality a 




The reification of a male/female binary also serves to eliminate or, at best, to reduce in 
significance differences that exist between individuals on each side of the duality. Within this 
dualist paradigm women and men tend to be constructed in more absolutist terms, in which 
differences within the groups give way to differences between the groups. Resisting essentialist 
categories of sexual difference, does not deny sexual difference per se, but does suggest that 
normative rules based on sexual difference are unhelpful and misguided.
158
 
The struggle remains one of resisting categorical constructions of women that aspire for 
some ultimate truth. This disavowal of categorical truths, however, does not mean an uncritical 
embrace of what Joan Scott called “happy pluralism”
159
 that replaces the unhappy dualism, but 
rather a questioning and rethinking of the relationship between equality and difference. It means 
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 Scott, supra note 150, at 17 (“By writing the history of feminism as if it were simply a matter of choosing the 
right strategy—equality or difference—we imply that one or another of these options was actually available, that 
closure or resolution was and is ultimately attainable.”). 
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 Diana Tietjens Meyers, Introduction to Joan Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in FEMINIST SOCIAL THOUGHT: A READER 757. 
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of sexual difference, essentialist categories. In contrast, absolutist categorizations of difference end up always 
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striving to loosen the “double binds of female subordination within abstract justice.”
160
 Resisting 
categorical differences does not mean one is saying that men and women are the same. 
C. Substantive Equality/Radical Feminism  
Feminist legal theorists have long debated the most effective strategy for achieving 
equality for women. Liberal feminists traditionally have supported an equal treatment model that 
seeks formal equality before the law. Formal equality means that the law treats similarly situated 
people exactly the same; one’s sex should not determine how one is treated. A formal equality 
model emphasizes the similarities between men and women and views special treatment of 
women as patronizing and paternalistic. Liberal feminists argue that, in all ways that should 
matter legally, particularly with respect to employment, women do not differ from men. Thus, 
formal equality means treating men and women the same. 
Cultural feminists, on the other hand, have argued that equal opportunities have not led to 
equal results, because men and women are different in foundational ways. Because the rules of 
the game were established by men, success for women has been measured by women’s ability to 
achieve male norms. Moreover, biological differences between men and women—particularly 
with respect to pregnancy
161
—suggest that equality can only be achieved with special treatment 
in certain circumstances. Cultural feminists also have underscored the different emotional and 
cognitive traits observed in men and women, in general—e.g., men as aggressive and 
competitive; women as caring and compassionate. Given these cultural and biological factors, 
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 Halley, supra note 151, at 80. 
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 The formal/substantive equality debate manifested in a number of cases dealing with pregnancy in the 
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cultural feminists argue, substantive equality can only be achieved when such differences are 
recognized and accommodated by the law. 
While both sameness (formal equality) and difference (substantive equality) deal with 
comparisons to a male norm and are relational concepts to a male referent, feminist thinkers like 
Catharine MacKinnnon viewed true substantive equality not as achieving equality to a male 
norm but rather as liberation from male domination.
162
 MacKinnon’s work was a radical attack 
on the liberal feminists of the time and rejected the notion of encouraging special treatment for 
women when they are not “like men” and equal treatment when they are.
163
 For liberal feminists, 
sex equality is an attainable end, achieved by correcting the imbalance of power and resources 
between women and men, which is at the root of sex inequality and discrimination. With the 
focus on equality of opportunity, the law is ideally situated to help achieve sex equality; a vital 
tool for accessing power and resources and achieving more opportunity; an inherent part of the 
solution, not of the problem. Thus, the overarching structure is not questioned; the world is fine, 
the rules of the game are fine, except for the fact that women are underrepresented in all 
positions of power. Radical feminism, however, suggests that the defining characteristic of 
struggles for equality is not the lack of equivalent social and political opportunities, but rather the 
pervasiveness of male domination. 
To be a woman, in MacKinnon’s view, was to be known by men through institutions 
(e.g., the law) and ideas designed from a male point of view; thus, there is no pre-patriarchal 
space. The echoes of Foucault who, as discussed above, explained no space is not already 
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 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES AND LIFE AND LAW 34 (“Under the sameness 
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his measure…under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence with him.”).  
163
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infused by power, are clear.
164
 Importantly, MacKinnon emphasizes the component of power that 
serves to produce sexual difference.
165
 Male domination—exercised through sexuality and 
embodied in gender
166
—both represses women and creates sexual difference, exhibiting the 
productive nature of power. This reversal of the causal connection—taking sexuality (power) as 
a starting point, which causes gender, which causes sexual difference rather than starting with 
sexual difference—was a radical step which named sexual difference as not natural or inevitable, 
but an effect of power.
167
 
Sexual subordination, in this paradigm, leads to sexual difference, and not vice versa. In 
this way, MacKinnon’s theory of how female identity is created—within the confines of the 
structures of male domination—closely resembles Foucault’s understanding of the discursive 
processes through which identities are constructed.
168
 Both attempt to make visible the process 
by which subject positions are constructed, and challenge to varying extents the authority of 
                                                 
164
 Foucault is often criticized for not considering sex/gender in his theories, yet, as is shown, there are many 
similarities in his thinking and the feminist ideas discussed in this paper.  
165
 MacKinnon refers to Foucault in a footnote: “Although Foucault understands that sexuality must be discussed at 
the same time as method, power, class, and the law, he does not systematically comprehend the specificity of 
gender—women’s and men’s relation to these factors—as a primary category for comprehending them. As one 
result, he cannot distinguish between the silence about sexuality that Victorianism has made into a noisy discourse 
and the silence that has been women’s sexuality under conditions of subordination by and to men.” Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, SIGNS Vol. 7, No. 3, 515-544, 526, 
n.22 (Spring 1982). 
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 Id. at 533 (“Sexuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed, embodies it, not the reverse.”). 
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 Halley, supra note 151, at 42. Halley’s argument is that under the auspice of it being a reflection of sexual 
difference men, in fact, use sexuality to render them dominant and thus create the very sexual difference they claim 
sexuality is only reflecting.  
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 JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 50 (2004) (“This then returns us to the question not only of how discourse 
might be said to produce a subject (something everywhere assumed in cultural studies but rarely investigated in its 
own right), but, more precisely, what in discourse effects that production. When Foucault claims that discipline 
“produces” individuals, he means not only that disciplinary discourse manages and makes use of them but that it also 
actively constitutes them.”) (emphasis in original). Whitehead explains the centrality of discourse to the production 
of selves because of its importance in untangling the social web: “Discourses are the means by which we come to 
‘know ourselves’; perform or identity work; exercise power (in contrast to ‘holding power’); exercise resistance; 
pronounce or deny the validity of knowledges and ‘truths’; communicate with others and ‘our selves’ through the 
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experience, experience in the sense of consideration or reflection of observed events by an 
individual. Both speak to the restrictions on fully comprehending the make-up of identity 
imposed by liberalism. Both speak to the search for origins that characterizes liberalism, the 
attempt by the individual to transcend the boundaries of social reality.  
Both offer scathing critiques of liberal humanism: MacKinnon: “Because its method 
emerges from the concrete conditions of all women as a sex, it dissolves the individualist, 
naturalist, idealist, moralist structure of liberalism, the politics of which science is the 
epistemology;”
169
 Foucault: “our task at the moment is to completely free ourselves from 
humanism and in that sense our work is political work.”
170
 MacKinnon challenged the intuitive 
worth and attainability of the founding principles of liberalism such as individualism, 
rationalism, and equality, particularly as these manifested in the law. While liberal political 
thought conceives of the subject as ontologically prior to and separate from relations of power, 
Foucault viewed the subject as produced by relations of power, with nothing existing prior.
171
 
Similarly, MacKinnon’s subject is a product of male domination and power: “true feminism sees 
the male point of view as fundamental to the male power to create the world in its own 
image.”
172
 The pervasiveness and all-encompassing nature of patriarchy makes the sex hierarchy 
“ontologically and epistemologically nearly perfect.”
173
 
The two also share ideas about the relationship between truth and power. For instance, to 
MacKinnon: “[f]eminism distinctively as such comprehends that what counts as truth is 
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produced in the interest of those with power to shape reality, and that this process is as pervasive 
as it is necessary as it is changeable.”
174
 Similarly, according to Foucault: “[i]t’s not a matter of 
emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already 
power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time.”
175
 MacKinnon would be quick to add that 
the most ubiquitous “form of hegemony” is patriarchy, and that patriarchy is the power that 
forms truth.  
But what of MacKinnon’s promises of emancipation? Here, we see an important 
distinction between MacKinnon and Foucault. For Foucault, there is never any possibility of 
escape, no getting beyond the power that forms truth to find some purer truth; resistance itself 
arises from the power dynamics at play. But MacKinnon conceives of a method to move closer 
to a “truer” truth as well as the existence of an actual (albeit, not universal) truth;
176
 the raison 
d'être of MacKinnon’s theory is an attainable liberation.
177
 
Through this theory, alternatively called radical or power feminism, MacKinnon offers a 
blueprint of sorts to move beyond patriarchy, but it is not easy to step outside the existing 
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 MacKinnon, supra note 165, at 640; see also Halley, supra note 151, at 45 (on the relationship MacKinnon’s 
method to truth: “feminism does not have the truth of women, but rather seeks an unprecedented disruption in the 
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 Foucault, supra note 77, at 133. 
176
 That Foucault never identified an actual truth beyond power—a reality that would exist but for the construction 
of truth by the powers in play—alienated his theories from both progressive feminist causes, and notably, post-
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framework or even conceptualize an alternative women’s point of view. “Feminism criticizes 
this male totality without an account of our capacity to do so or to imagine or realize a more 
whole truth. Feminism affirms women’s point of view by revealing, criticizing, and explaining 
its impossibility. This is not a dialectical paradox. It is a methodological expression of women’s 
situation, in which the struggle for consciousness is a struggle for world: for a sexuality, a 
history, a culture, a community, a form of power, an experience of the sacred.”
178
 For 
MacKinnon, the key to that transcendence is a foregrounding of women’s experience.
179
 Through 
what she labelled “consciousness raising,”
180
 emancipation from patriarchy is possible through a 
transformation of consciousness of women, by women, and for women working utterly without 
leverage from any “outside.”
181
 However, the consciousness being used to identify shared 
experience is itself a product of male domination—“the practice of a politics of all women in the 
face of its theoretical impossibility is creating a new process of theorizing and a new form of 
theory.”
182
 Nevertheless, emancipation from the hegemony of masculine epistemology remains 
the goal—to find a way of thinking about women’s experience, and a way to think, that is not 
subject to the same epistemology of male power. Experience, and the way experience is 
interpreted, becomes central to the political project of feminism, “women’s distinctive 
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 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 637. 
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 MacKinnon’s famous articulation of the relationship between sexuality and gender inequality: “Sexuality, then, is 
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experience as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal—
private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate—so that what it is to know the 




The concept of experience, therefore, develops a vital importance in feminist politics. As 
Teresa de Laurentis has observed: “the notion of experience seems to me to be crucially 
important to feminist theory in that it bears directly on the major issues that have emerged from 
the women’s movement—subjectivity, sexuality, the body, and feminist political practice.”
184
  
For MacKinnon, the importance lies in finding a commonality between female experience—not 
in finding truth in all female experience, but rather in finding a truth that runs through all female 
experience. Experience becomes an uncontestable piece of evidence, yet, obviously, women 
experience the world—and patriarchy—very differently. Indeed, “not all women agree with the 
feminist account of women’s situation, nor do all feminists agree with any single rendition of 
feminism. Authority of interpretation—the claim to speak as a woman—thus becomes 
methodologically complex and politically crucial for the same reasons.”
185
 As MacKinnon asks, 
“How can patriarchy be diminishing to women when women embrace and defend their place in 
it?”
186
 Experience matters because it opens a space to hear stories that the mainstream has not 
told, to give a voice to those who have been marginalized and silenced. Yet, because experience 
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brings with it authenticity and authority, is there any way to challenge those who claim truth 
through their experiences without resorting to a “false consciousness” argument? 
The evidence of experience reproduces rather than contests existing ideological 
systems,
187
 and tells truths through the existing lenses. Yet, experience is supposed to provide the 
antidote to the social regulation that often proscribes the stories that are told. Experience exposes 
the social regulations and the oppressive mechanisms that are in place to silence voices, but the 
experiences themselves only exist within the structures in place—they are not somehow removed 
or free. Thus, what is needed, is not exactly an unveiling of the oppressive mechanisms, because 
this presupposes that the oppressed exist prior to mechanism, but rather an understanding of how 
the experiences are formative. What is needed, according to Scott, is an “attend[ing] to the 
historical processes that, through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences” 
because, “[i]t is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through 
experience.”
188
 Foucault cautions against any search for a pre-existing subject and suggests, 
instead, that the subject is itself formed by the experience. Thus an attempt to isolate and 
compartmentalize the experience and the subject is destined for failure. The analysis to be 
undertaken, therefore, becomes not one that focuses on the indisputable authority of the 
experiences that have not been voiced, but rather an examination of the conditions that led to the 
creation of the identities and experiences in question. The foundation of the analysis is thus not 
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the authority of the evidence of the experience, not the “origin of the explanation,”
189
 but rather 
what is trying to be explained. The analysis extends beyond the mechanisms that have isolated 
and silenced certain experiences and engages with the explanatory categories themselves. 
One complaint often made about MacKinnon’s theory of consciousness raising is that 
certain women have access to the shared women’s experience under patriarchy while others do 
not. Those who do not experience female subordination in the same way, those who experience 
their sexuality in different ways, are somehow not privy to the truths of sexual subordination in 
ways that other women are. How is one to simultaneously highlight experience as a tool to give a 
voice to historically silenced stories and to remain critical of larger structures, since, as Scott has 
said “the project of making experience visible precludes critical examination of the workings of 
the ideological system itself, its categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, 
man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories 
mean and how they operate, and of its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.”
190
 The focus on the 
explanatory categories, and examining the patriarchal mechanisms that renders “consciousness 
raising” particularly difficult, because all women don’t share identical interpretations of their 
experience as women, renders MacKinnon’s project, like that of Foucault, about both politics 
and epistemology. MacKinnon explains how the epistemology of patriarchy creates an inevitable 
dead end when antifeminism appears in female form, and the authority of interpretation becomes 
an issue.
191
 Again, the necessity of thinking within subject/object polarities that lies at the heart 
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of male power renders “consciousness raising” almost implausible within the confines of 
patriarchy. 
E. Norms, Essentialism, and Non-Normative Subjectivities 
Norms function not to regulate a pre-existing gender, but to reproduce and naturalize the 
existing categories of interpretation. The norm creates what is intelligible, and what is gender if 
not a norm—a way that sexual difference is made intelligible. More interesting than how 
experience shapes gender or how gender is regulated by the law is the question of how the law is 
normalizing the category itself, a process more insidious than explicit regulatory mechanisms. 
In addition to allowing human communication, categorization is necessary for political 
movement. A world of infinite particulars loses all relevance and prohibits any collective 
existence. Nonetheless, unpacking the ontological underpinnings that condition the creation of 
sexual categories and the effects and usefulness of the categories themselves unveils the 
categorical imperatives and the alterations that can be made to strategically render them either 
more inclusive or exclusive. In other words, the category “woman” should not be a discourse that 
perpetuates the invisibility and marginalization of women who experience oppression on 
different levels. For example, black women experience oppression qualitatively differently than 
white women because of the intersectional effect of patriarchy and white supremacy. Yet, again, 
one can never reduce black women’s experience to a singular truth either. Thus, to a certain 
degree, a category is always already a fiction with boundaries that can never be fixed. Yet, 
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identifying within a category and working and organizing within a category remain powerful 
tools for social justice.
192
 
Angela Harris called gender essentialism the notion that a unitary, “essential” women’s 
experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and 
other realities of experience.
193
 Essentialism, though, is not confined to gender. Essentialism is 
most commonly understood “as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariability and 
fixed properties which define the “whatness” of a given entity.” The true “essence” that 
essentialism espouses is that which is most irreducible, unchanging and therefore constitutive of 
a person or a thing. Importantly, essentialism is typically defined in opposition to difference; the 
doctrine of essence is precisely that which seeks to deny or annul the very radicality of 
difference. Difference is trumped by sameness as essentialist discourses struggle to discern an 
overarching sameness that enables and allows for social and moral behavior that is responsible 
and creates order in the world. Without the annulment of differences, this argument suggests 
social order is unattainable. 
Harris uses the example of Jorge Luis Borges’s character Ireneo Funes, to illustrate the 
shortcomings of particularism.
194
 Funes was an ordinary young man until the age of nineteen, 
when he was thrown by a horse and left paralyzed, but possessed with perfect perception and a 
perfect memory. Funes’s perfect memory and perfect perception granted him a life filled with an 
infinite number of unique experiences, but also left him with an inability to categorize: “To think 
is to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the teeming world of Ireneo 
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Funes, there was nothing but particulars”
195
 In the context of Funes, the inability to generalize is 
constructed as a limitation. Funes is trapped within walls of particularity that foreclose any 
possible dialogue with others, for there is not only a lack of common language, there is a lack of 
commonality in all details of life. The ability to overlook difference and to make abstractions, to 
generalize and to categorize, allows for a world in which shared thought is possible. To Funes, 
language is only a private system of classification. The notion that it can serve to create and 
reinforce a community is incomprehensible to him. Thus, while any process of categorization 
will privilege certain voices and silence others, categorization is necessary for both human 
communication and social progress. To be adversely critical of all forms of categorization 
because they fail to take into account difference disregards any of the potential benefits of 
“generalized” or “essentialist” discourses. 
Essentialism is not, in and of itself, good or bad, progressive or reactionary, beneficial or 
dangerous. Indeed, MacKinnon highlights this point with respect to those who argue that her 
work is essentialist, and as part of the larger criticism that charges of essentialism are often 
veiled methods of perpetuating the status quo/male domination: “‘Anti-essentialism’ as 
practiced, thus, corrodes group identification and solidarity and leaves us with a one-at-a-time 
personhood: Liberal individualism.”
196
 Discourses which fail to account for differences and use 
language to categorize should not be ignored or rejected simply because they hark back to 
essentialist constructions of gender. Further, simply employing the category “women” does not 
render the category necessarily essentialist. It is possible to use the category without falling into 
the pitfalls of essentialism: “Analyzing women ‘as women’ says nothing about whether an 
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analysis is essentialist. It all depends on how you analyze them ‘as women’: on whether what 
makes a woman be a woman, analytically, is deemed inherent in their bodies or is produced 
through their socially lived conditions.”
197
 
The need to categorize compels the re-examination of the rationales and epistemological 
building blocks that justify the use of the categories themselves. Categories are useful, effective 
and necessary, but they should be “explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable,”
198
 which is all 
the more important in a discipline like law, where “abstraction and frozen categories are the 
norm.”
199
 The project becomes one, not of simply deconstructing categories and highlighting the 
contingency, fictionality, and historical inconsistency of their boundaries, but of reshaping and 
altering categories to recognizing their potential usefulness. The basis of the knowledge that 
provides strength and naturalizes the innateness of the category should be re-evaluated and 
problematized. Unpacking the foundations of these categories enables one to recraft them, or at 
least offers insight into how to approach the problem of interrogating the cultural category of 
gender, for example, so it becomes more accommodating to and less oppressive of already 
marginalized individuals. 
The point of this inquiry is not to cast aside the use of categories, or even, necessarily, the 
use of gender categories, but to struggle to make sexual categorizations less dogmatic, and more 
inclusive, contingent and tentative. Categories must be employed to enable communication and 
facilitate social change, but the innateness of the categories ought to be challenged. The 
boundaries of the categories must be denaturalized and manipulated to be more inclusive, and the 
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use of the category must be considered in and of itself. Rather than focusing on how the 
substance of the category subjugates others, we should evaluate the usefulness of the analytical 
category in the first place. What process, though, should be undertaken to destabilize the solidity 
of sex categories? Unveiling what is accepted as natural in the construction of gender allows for 
these premises to be challenged and for the category to be manipulated so that marginalized 
subject positions will gain membership into the category. The innateness and stability of gender 
categories cannot be untangled and disrupted unless the theories of knowledge and underlying 
assumptions which legitimize them are contested. Constructions of gender that perpetuate 
essentialist systems of knowledge necessarily exclude certain voices and privilege others. Thus, 
recognizing which voices are privileged and which are silenced is vital for the pursuit of equality 
since categorization always entails some degree of generalizing. The voices silenced within the 
category of “woman” “turn out to be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice:”
200
 
people of color, working class people, and queer and gender nonconforming folks. These subject 
positions are further entrenched as particular voices, which are subjective and irrational and 
therefore not reliable. 
The intersectionality of oppression, first articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw, reveals the 
inadequacy of essentialist paradigms in the context of race and sex. Crenshaw explains that the 
way in which racism and sexism affect a black woman’s life “cannot be captured wholly by 
looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.”
201
 Crenshaw’s 
intersectional framework interrogates both the usefulness and accuracy of reverting to a  
monolithic women’s experience and challenges the authority of any essentialist claim by 
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illustrating that a black women’s experience cannot be understood simply as “racism plus sexism 
equal (straight) black women’s experience,” but that the straight black women’s experience is 
qualitatively different. The process of reverting back to any monolithic “essential” women’s 
experience, be it that of black women, lesbian women, or transsexual women, abstracts from the 
actual experience of women and results in a silencing of voices that often are marginalized 
already. Gender categorizations are themselves exclusionary and often disempowering. Yet, 
these problematic aspects of gender categorizations must be balanced with strategic goals of 
achieving social justice for women, goals which are unattainable devoid of the existence of the 
categories. The need to struggle with these tensions—to balance the universal/particular, 
objective/subjective, mind/body, culture/natural, and reason/emotion dichotomies; to understand 
the ontological and epistemological premises that grant these theories authority; to gauge and 
measure the effects of the categorical imperatives; to unveil what ideological agendas are 
furthered through the rigidity of the gender binaries; and finally to account for the subject 
positions that are further marginalized and oppressed by the imposition of these gender 
binaries—is paramount if progressive social advocacy is to disrupt naturalized and hegemonic 
discursive categories.  
When thinking about the authority of experience and of interpretation, similar dynamics 
are at play in feminist theory and masculinity studies. The essentializing that has been the subject 
of much scrutiny in feminist studies is equally ubiquitous in masculinity studies. For example, 
consider the way in which men (and gay men in particular) have been essentialized and 
stereotyped as rabidly sexual. In an otherwise progressive article examining the struggle for 
marriage equality through the lens of the institution of marriage as being an inherently 
oppressive one, Fenton Johnson invokes this stereotype when describing a proposed “morning 
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masturbation meditation” at a retreat intended to clear the testosterone from the air; unless 
uncontrollable sexual urges are dealt with, men will be unable to participate productively.
202
 The 
problem here is not with the essentializing of gay male masculinity per se (gay male men are too 
pre-occupied with sex to function productively), but with the essentializing of masculinity in a 
particular way. A way which does not questions the stability or origins of the stereotype but 
rather thinks of it as something pre-discursive and existing outside of patriarchy.  
The law, similarly, perpetuates the idea that masculinity inherently contains 
uncontrollable urges and natural desires. The question is one of whether the problem is with the 
category itself or with the substance of the category. Is it the way in which masculinity itself is 
characterized—culturally, socially, legally—or is the problem the unreflectedness and perceived 
naturalness of the category itself? Our legal system continues to see itself as a discoverer of 
truth, of a reality that existed prior to its interventions, and views the stories it engages with 
through foundational categories that it takes as pre-discursive. It is the questioning of the 
foundational status of the categories of representation themselves that is rarely engaged in; the 
law must examine its analytical frame as well as examining the events that are its object of study. 
With respect to gender, the law is ubiquitous in regulating it—one can think of numerous 
rules, laws, policies and legal instruments through which, in the words of Judith Butler, “persons 
are made regular”—yet, when it comes to these regulations, the questions asked tend to be about 
how they are incorporated into the lives of the subjects imposed upon.
203
 The legal analysis is 
one which usually tries to reduce the impact of the exterior force imposed on the subject. From 
this Butler asks: “is there a gender that preexists its regulation, or is it the case that, in being 
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subject to regulation, the gendered subject emerges, produced through that particular form of 
subjection? Is subjection not the process by which regulations produce gender?”
204
 Here Butler 
references specifically a productive form of judicial power that forms the subject, and, indeed, 
references how a particular regulation plays a productive role in creating the subject, yet Butler 
also distinguishes between regulations/laws and norms, which function more implicitly and 
behave more like a discursive field.
205
 
This discussion about nature vis-à-vis culture parallels the sex/gender distinction. Firstly, 
the popular understanding of the sex/gender distinction emerged after and has been crucial to 
“the long-standing feminist effort to debunk the claim that anatomy is destiny.”
206
 Gender was 
initially used by American feminists who sought to highlight the fundamentally social quality of 
distinctions based on sex.
207
 The very distinction between sex and gender served as a powerful 
tool in feminist struggles; and has been most famously articulated by Simone de Beauvoir; “One 
is not born, but rather becomes a woman.”
208
 Importantly, using the term “gender” also held with 
it the promise of a reworking of disciplinary formations.  
The introduction of gender as an analytical tool, held the promise of a new history, a 
history in which different voices are heard and different stories are dominant. The introduction of 
gender as a term of analysis expanded the types of knowledges that were allowed entry into the 
business of creating truths. Not only was new subject matter being added (women) but a critical 
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reexamination of the premises and standards of existing scholarly work was being imposed. 
Gender became an analytic category, gender informed many disciplines in some peripheral 
sense. Gender became an object of study, yet the relational component of its introduction; the 
notion that gender was going to, not create a new discipline, but rather, reshape existing 
disciplines has failed to materialize. Joan Scott described the introduction of gender not only as a 
tool to study women as women necessarily but also “stressed the relational aspect of normative 
definitions of femininity. Those who worried that women’s studies scholarship focused too 
narrowly and separately on women used the term “gender” to introduce a relational notion into 
our analytic vocabulary.”
209
 The idea that “gender” was going to, not only introduce a new 
category for analysis, but rather reshape the manner in which existing categories are analyzed 
today seems more far-fetched than ever. In law schools, for instance, the disconnect between 
those teaching black letter law or anything beholden to big firm (corporate) interests, and those 
whose methodologies have been impacted by gender seems as wide as ever.
210
  
Indeed, the impact of the introduction of “gender” as an analytical construct was 
supposed to be two prong: first, as a way to talk about women, about women’s lives, about 
women’s history; a way to talk about stories that had been invisible for years because, for a 
whole source of reasons, they had been thought about as not meriting inclusion. Either being too 
subjective—not neutral enough; gender was initially used to create a sheen of objectivity and 
neutrality that had hitherto been unavailable to scholarship that was about “women.” Gender 
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represented “the quest of feminist scholarship for feminist legitimacy in the 1980s.” Secondly, 
gender  is supposed to be more than a synonym for women—it is supposed to represent a 
relationship, and be equally about men, yet this is not the case—if a subject is not explicitly 
about the relations between the sexes then gender is not thought to be an issue. Rather than being 
simply about women, the use of gender was supposed to “emphasize[s] an entire system of 
relationships that include sex, but is not directly determined by sex or directly determining of 
sexuality.”
211
 Theories of patriarchy do not explain how gender affects those areas of life that do 
not seem connected to it. Partly due to the fact that much of the work in gender studies, 
particularly in its early phases, was associated with reproduction, family division of labor, and 
sexual division of labor under capitalism, other social systems and disciplines—notably the law 
(beyond family law and a select few other areas)—were left without a connection to gender, in 
that an analysis of gender was not seen as something that could contribute to the system in 
question. Gender was seen as a new paradigm from within which one could choose to see the 
world but was not seen as having the power to change existing, historically entrenched, 
paradigms. 
F. Sexual Difference and Embodiment 
The importance of sexual difference in the creation of subjectivities is both indeterminate 
and variable. Any subjectivity itself entails a process that necessitates emphasizing and focusing 
on certain things and de-emphasizing others. An identity necessarily entails an element of 
generalization, in order to provide some illusion of wholeness.
212
 The law appears fundamentally 
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unable to cope with the idea that sexual difference may be tenuous. Tenuous both in that it is not 
grounded, sturdily, in nature, or that, if it is, that fact is not germane. The law, as shown in the 
previous section bases its authority predominantly on claims to truth today, as opposed to force 
or consent, as it had in the past, thus the truth of sex, of sexual difference, provides a pivotal tool 
in the laws ability to contribute to the crafting of masculine and feminine identities. The truth of 
sex buttresses itself within the borders of science (biology) and nature, which manifests in two 
ways; the truth of sex is that sex is found in nature and thus not, in any way, a construction, and 
every individual is one true, definite, unchangeable sex. This attempted reification of sexual 
difference is grounded in a devoutness to the existence of a Cartesian subject and in a very 
particular understanding of embodiment. 
The relationship between the mind and body is always already constructed in language, 
and the exclusivity of the terms is constantly reinforced by the shortcomings of language. By this 
I mean that language is unable to describe a substance that includes the mind and the body as 
one. Words like “self” and “person” struggle to fight the inevitability of the distinction in 
language; speaking of the mind and body as one is impossible without explicitly pointing it out. 
As Butler has pointed out, “If we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes 
and conditions any decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were, by its 
prior power.”
213
 The distinction is one that has been reified by modernism and language into the 
very structure of the social systems within which we exist, including the law. This process of 
reification has not been as smooth as it might appear; the body continues to be a contested 
ideological entity which cannot be easily pigeonholed into any conceptual category. 
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Contemporary philosophers and cultural theorists have returned to the body, have 
theorized “embodiment,” in part because essentialist notions of the body have perpetuated 
certain hegemonic relations between categories of bodies. The cultural category of the body is a 
product of western philosophy which predicates, as a starting point, the Cartesian subject, whose 
rational individual subjectivity is based on the discrete categories of self and other, the insistence 
on sameness and difference. Western philosophic discourses speak of a mythical disembodied 
self whose authority as a person is derived from the foregrounding of the mind and the 
marginalization of the body. Yet the body remains a contentious and highly political idea: 
“power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force 
it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.”
214
 One can see how a subject position 
in tension or conflict with the Cartesian subject is constructed as being unable to produce 
knowledge. Robyn Longhurst describes how embodiment serves to taint and restrict the 
production of knowledge: “Only those who conceptually occupy the place of the mind can 
produce such knowledge. For those people who are constructed by Cartesian philosophy as being 
tied to their bodies, transcendent visions are not possible. Their knowledge cannot count as 
knowledge for it is too intimately grounded in, and tainted by, their corporeality.”
215
  
Essentialist understandings of the body contribute to its marginalization by positing the 
body as a pre-discursive given and distinct from the mind. Yet, not even the body is a biological 
reality outside of history, it is rather “molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down 
by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits 
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 The notion that the body can serve as an essential commonality among selves 
is misplaced for “nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis 
of self-recognition or for understanding other men.”
217
 Due to its distinctiveness from the mind, 
differences between bodies are not beheld as viable ways of producing alternate truths. The 
Cartesian subject strives for certainty, stability, and tangibility that exist outside of the embodied 
subject. Again, the mythical disembodied self, who implicitly can only be white and male, 
becomes the sole producer of knowledge and the sole subject able to locate transcendent and 
objective truths. Ruth Holliday has suggested that the return to the body as a contested 
theoretical substance is a response to the “crisis of modernity,” of universal truth and objective 
knowledge. The body, Holliday continues, is being reclaimed from the abstract and shifted to the 
local, specific and phenomenological.
218
 The shortcomings of the Cartesian subject in accounting 
for many individuals’ experience of their bodies in the world led to different forms of 
subjectivity. 
This new subject is constituted by the very “fuzziness” of its boundaries and its 
interdependent subjectivities. This shift was at first undertaken by queer, feminist, and black 
theorists whose experiences of their bodies placed them on the margins while the disembodied, 
mythical Cartesian subject occupied the center. That one’s experience of the body constitutes 
knowledge and produces contingent but important truths is in stark contrast to the Cartesian 
theory which foregrounds the “mind” as the only reliable producer of knowledge and uncoverer 
of truth. The Cartesian body, as Julia Cream postulates, is not a “biological bedrock upon which 
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we can construct theories of the essences of gender, sexuality, race and disability.”
219
 Thus, the 
pre-discursive, Cartesian subject should not be used as a starting point from which to understand 
deviant bodies, those which threaten categories and blur boundaries. Rather, the project should 
incorporate knowledge gained through these so-called “deviant” bodies. As the feminist thinker 
Margrit Shildrick has suggested, “[instead] of spending time refuting the claim that women’s 
bodies leak, ooze, intermingle, and are far from self-contained, we must accept this proposition 
and theorize from it.”
220
 But such theorizing must resist letting physical difference become an 
unchanging or universal component of sexual difference. Patriarchy is not grounded in physical 
difference, and gender subordination takes on changing forms. As Joan Scott reminds us, history 
is not epiphenomenal to patriarchy.
221
 
In contrast to the archetypal Cartesian subject, the subject positions left unaccounted for 
are fairly self-evident. For the Cartesian subject, representations of the body do not have an 
effect on the mind. The mind exists irrespective of the particular type of body—e.g., black 
bodies, fat bodies, queer bodies, female bodies, disabled bodies, and working class bodies—with 
which it is paired. The experience of existing as an embodied self can only produce unreliable 
knowledge, not premised on universal truths and rational objectivity, but contingent on the 
vagaries of the embodied existence. The viability of the quest for universal truths is dissolved by 
knowledge premised on a particular bodily existence. The Cartesian tradition privileges the “pure 
mind” and equates it “with the rational sovereign individual,” that is, an “unequivocally white, 
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able-bodied, heterosexual and male” individual.
222
 “All ‘others’ are products of their bodies.”
223
 
The body does not exist as a blank slate. All representations of a body contain some or all of the 
following; the body is racialized, classed, gendered, nationalized, and hetero-sexualized. 
Representations of the body are central to the processes by which some groups are denied access 
to economic and cultural resources because they are not recognized as worthy recipients. Despite 
modernist attempts to produce all-encompassing theories of the self, all subjectivities are 
embodied, whether the embodiment is visible or invisible. Thus, the process of making the 
subjectivity visible—the process of representation—becomes vital to understanding the body’s 
very materiality. 
The body’s materiality and representation intertwine in complex ways that accentuate the 
role power plays in constructing the “normal” body. Particular types of bodies are coded as 
inferior and as lacking, for instance the fat body constructs the self as one lacking in self-control 
and unable to regulate the body in the face of social and medical pressure. The representation of 
such bodies as “inferior” contributes to the circular path where the experience of embodiment 
becomes formative of the mind—a mind, though, which is constructed as being inadequate or at 
the mercy of the body. In turn, if working-class bodies, female, black, and disabled bodies are all 
seen as inferior then this produces effects upon those bodies. The materiality of the body is 
perpetually affected by the manner in which bodies are represented. The representation of the 
body manifests itself in physical symptoms on those it represents and those it excludes. This 
cycle highlights the necessity of interrogating the manner by which particular types of bodies are 
represented in culture. Particularly considering that there is no “real” or “material” body to serve 
                                                 
222
 Holliday & Hassard, supra note 218, at 4. 
223
 Id. 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
88 
as a political foundation from which to construct a theory, as Alan Hyde has explained “we have 
literally no way of grasping cognitively the most intimate aspects of our bodies except through 
words and images of legal, that is, political discourse, developed to serve political purposes.”
224
 
The mind/body hierarchy of the Cartesian subject is inverted for abject, marginalized bodies. 
And this inversion has fundamental epistemological effects. 
With respect to sexual difference, the discussion of subjectivity and embodiment is 
revelatory. For Foucault, “the body is not ‘sexed’ in any significant sense prior to its 
determination within a discourse through which it becomes invested with an ‘idea’ of natural or 
essential sex.”
225
 The search, which Butler discusses at length in Gender Trouble, is for a vision 
and idea of the body beyond patriarchy; a liberated body.
226
 This, though, we know is 
impossible. That does not mean that subversion is impossible, it solely means that resisting the 
regulatory structures of patriarchy must occur from within. It also means, recalling Scott, that 
while historicizing sexual difference the naturalness of the category should not be unchallenged. 
Indeed, the relatively simple interpretive act of considering sexual difference as part and parcel 
of patriarchy, and not as a neutral, objective, foundational point of origination, allows for the 
consideration of masculinity and femininity within a different realm of intelligibility. Following 
Carol Smart, the category of woman is constantly subject to differing constructions and each 
discourse brings its own woman into being and proclaims her to be the natural woman, but this 
does not mean that women have been “the quintessential cultural dupes of history” but rather 
have practiced the agency of constructing their subjectivity as well; so woman is not merely a 
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category, it is also a subjective positioning within which there is room to maneuver.”
227
 Indeed, 
if sexual difference is considered as a point of origin, then the ubiquity of patriarchy, and the 
relationship between patriarchy and sexual difference, is rendered invisible. A whole series of 
subsequent connections are naturalized, for instance, the maternal body is constructed as not 
being discursive nor a product of power relations, but rather the institution of motherhood is 
constructed as compulsory and natural for women.  
Butler describes the approach to sexual difference Foucault undertakes: “In opposition to 
this false construction of “sex” as both univocal and causal, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse 
which treats “sex” as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of “sex” as the original and 
continuous cause and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes “sexuality” as an open and 
complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of “sex” as part of 
a strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power relations.”
228
 Part of the reason that this 
occurs, according to Foucault, is, as we have seen above, the way in which power works is 
misunderstood; power is understood to either liberate or subdue a pre-existing “sex,” which is 
not a historicized category. In this account sexuality stems from sex, and heterosexuality, like the 
maternal body, are seen as a natural consequence of the natural category of sexual difference.
229
 
The reverse-discursive argument suggested by Foucault is that the category of sexual difference 
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is generated by sexuality. “Sex” is a regulatory power which should be critically examined in the 
same ways as other regulatory powers, historicized, and not thought about as a point of 
departure.
230
 If this is the point, then, feminism ought to be engaged not only in an emancipatory 
project of liberating women from patriarchy, but equally invested in challenging the category of 
“sex” from the outset. 
The concern with this approach is that feminism loses its subject when the category 
“women” is exposed as a construction. But, as the sociologist Vikki Bell has stated, the struggle 
and importance of feminism is no less important if the subject are people continually crafted and 
constructed as women, as opposed to “straight forwardly women,” and in addition “the notion 
that we each have a “sex” located in the body is the foundation of several discourses that work to 
the detriment of women, ways of speaking which obscure the social discourses that repeatedly 
attempt to ‘pin’ people to a sex (and very often, as a result, to a gender and to a sexuality, i.e., 
heterosexuality).”
231
 Indeed, the idea that founding an argument on the idea of the existence of a 
pre-discursive category of “women” at the expense of accepting certain discourses that are 
harmful to those in the category is evidently counter-productive. The category need not be 
“natural” or pre-discursive to matter. Similarly, the struggle for emancipation, for liberation and 
freedom, should not be conceptualized as finding a “free” space beyond the reach of power, but 
rather of finding freedom within power.  
Monique Wittig, who has written extensively on sexual difference, takes serious issue 
with the naturalization of the category “women” and of the maternal body. Wittig has strongly 
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criticized the “biologizing interpretation of history,” the “biological explanation of their [men 
and women] division, outside of social facts,” and this theory’s “imprisonment in the categories 
of sex” and its insistence that the capacity to give birth is what defines a woman: “women will 
have to abstract themselves from the definition “woman,” which is imposed upon them.”
232
 
Wittig challenges the categories themselves, arguing that the categories of man and woman are 
explicitly political and economic ones. The category of woman itself only exists as an 
“imaginary formation,” which is necessarily always a reinterpretation and the product of a social 
relationship. Wittig incorporated a linguistic turn to the study of “sex,” combining a study of 
power and discourse, along with a more serious engagement with compulsory heterosexuality 
and the oppressive nature of that institution, with language. She emphasized the notion of 
intelligibility, the constraining effects of heterosexuality, and the inability to communicate if not 
in the terms and categories imposed: “these discourses of heterosexuality oppress us from 
speaking unless we speak in their terms…these discourses deny us every possibility of creating 
our own categories” and “sex, under the name of gender, permeates the whole body of language 
and forces every locator, if she belongs to the oppressed sex, to proclaim it in her speech, that is 
to appear in language under her proper physical form and not under the abstract form, which 
every male locator has the unquestioned right to use.”
233
 Wittig focuses on the particularizing 
effect of gender, removing the female subject from the realm of the universal. She has described 
part of her project as being the restoration of the universal point of view to a group condemned to 
being particular. Today’s political climate is similarly engulfed in the politics of pronouns, and 
while Wittig’s suggestion is to use “one” rather than he or her, today we have invented gender-
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neutral pronouns (ze), often employ a singular they, and use Mx. rather than Ms. or Mr.
234
 The 
combination of language, that from the start directs those belonging to a constructed category, to 
a subjugated space, a space without access to the universal, emphasizes the contradictoriness of 
the category itself.  
The problem with the category manifests in two ways. First, not all feminine subjectivity 
is necessarily coterminous with the category in question.
235
 This brings up the problem of 
intersectionality discussed above, specifically the tendency to simply add variables when the 
inclusiveness of the constructed category is challenged. Second, as Wittig, argued, the category 
itself is already too particularizing. Even prior to adding variables the category is itself under 
inclusive. The solution of adding variables, thusly, further particularizes identities which have 
already been excluded from the universal: 
The result of the imposition of gender, acting as a denial at the very moment when 
one speaks, is to deprive women of the authority of speech, and to force them to 
make their entrance in a crablike way, particularizing themselves and apologizing 
profusely. The result is to deny them any claim to the abstract, philosophical, 





Women, in Wittig’s construction, through language, are always just a particular interest group. 
This is part and parcel of the contradictoriness that Smart discusses, part of what makes women 
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Ultimately the insights from feminist legal and social theories discussed above offer a 
deconstructionist view of the category woman. And, due to the particularized nature of the 
arguments, these insights are often not considered when thinking about gender in the context of 
masculinity, that by its very nature tends to focus on the identity of men. In the next section I 
turn to the study of masculinity, and how incorporating these insights, as well as those about 
power, discourse, knowledge and the law discussed above, can affect how masculinity is thought 
about today. Admittedly, the study of masculinity risks particularizing masculinity as a gender, 
and thus removing it as the universal viewpoint that permeates our social world. Perhaps making 
masculinity just one perspective among others is the appropriate strategic turn, although it would 
be the opposite of that proposed by Wittig; rather than rendering each perspective universal the 
idea would be to particularize each position. The question parallels in certain respects deciding 
whether the struggle should be for a world of infinite genders or for a world free of gender.  
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IV. MASCULINITY STUDIES 
Masculinity studies is grounded in the idea of finding a space beyond patriarchy. 
Examining the history of the critical study of masculinity reveals this emancipatory nature; the 
connection between masculinity studies and freedom. When considered through either an 
experiential or theoretical lens, masculinity both restrains and shepherds male behavior, thereby 
limiting an individual’s freedom. Like feminist studies, masculinity studies strives to break free 
from the confines of patriarchy. In addition, and in contrast to the emphasis on freedom, 
masculinity studies has focused on identity and practice, by exposing what masculinities are and 
how they function.
238
 In this way, masculinity studies is an inquiry into the “nature” of 
masculinity, but it also, in some ways, is a response to the men’s movement and the “crisis” in 
masculinity which purportedly created it. 
Examining the way in which masculinity studies emerged as a response to the men’s 
movement highlights an inherent tension that continues to shape the discipline today. In many 
ways, feminism led to two ideologically opposite gendered projects (the men’s movement and 
masculinity studies). Masculinity studies is cognizant of the fact that the men’s movement was 
also a response to feminism and is thus in some sense compelled to address its relationship to the 
men’s movement or at least the concerns of the men’s movement. The tension results from 
masculinity studies needing to respond to the men’s movement while simultaneously respecting 
the analytic traditions of feminist theory. So, in addition to the overarching agenda of 
dismantling patriarchy, masculinity studies responds to the men’s movement by attempting to 
speak to the experiential lives of men (which is what the men’s movement maintains it does) 
without, crucially, suggesting that masculinity contains an essence. Whereas the analytical tools 
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borrowed from feminist (and queer) theory tend to favor more macro issues—like the existence 
of gender categories and both epistemological and ontological inquiries into sexual difference 
and subjectivity—masculinity studies must also respond to the more micro, deep-seated 
experiential alienation felt by particular men. Indeed, this micro/macro tension within 
masculinity studies continues to seriously affect the level of nuance and sophistication brought to 
the critical study of gender today. In addition, the clear need to eradicate the explicit sexism, 
misogyny, transphobia, and “toxic masculinity” ubiquitous in our present culture—issues that, 
decades ago, many of the more optimist among us thought would no longer exist today—renders 
the more macro issues less seemingly urgent. 
In its early days, masculinity studies, like the men’s movement, appeared relatively self-
serving, portraying men as victims of the social construction of masculinity.
239
 Masculinity 
studies represents, simultaneously, a struggle against patriarchy and a response to an experiential 
crisis felt by many men. In this respect, masculinity studies perpetually searches for a balance 
between engagement with larger structural issues that perpetuate patriarchy and with more 
specific experiential conditions which lead to individual men feeling alienated and masculinity as 
a whole being characterized as in crisis.  
The way identity politics have played out is important in this context because of the 
impact they have ultimately had on masculinity. Feminism has provided the theoretical 
framework from which to think more profoundly about the role of masculinity within patriarchy 
and served, in some sense, to generate the men’s movement that claims a crisis in masculinity. 
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That feminism has provoked these two hostile (to one another) reactions illustrates how 
relational identities are and how neither feminine nor masculine identities exist in a vacuum: 
“feminisms exist precisely because masculine power regimes exist; feminisms are a point of 
dynamic resistance, providing their own distinct knowledges, truths, practices, not merely as a 
point of opposition but by offering ontological possibilities through pronouncing and identifying 
distinct epistemologies.”
240
 Thus, feminism, while providing the analytical and theoretical 
foundation for masculinity studies, has undermined male supremacy and contributed to the 
“crisis” in masculinity. 
The men’s movement began in the late 1980s to revision and reclaim manhood. At the 
same time, the burden of the normative constraints of masculinity on men began to intensify. 
What is distinctive about the “crisis” from the perspective of the men’s movement is that it 
resulted from a tension between men who were still expected to be “at the helm” in a culture that 
now expected them to be reflective about their masculinity.
241
 (In contrast, to better contextually 
comprehend the presence of the crisis, legal scholar Nancy Dowd has highlighted how the 
feeling of crisis is itself a characteristic of masculinity and has often been used as a rationale for 
reinterpreting masculinity in a way that reconstitutes patriarchy.)
242
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In response to the perceived crisis, the men’s movement sought to identify and reinstitute 
a singular, unifying essence of masculinity. In contrast, masculinity studies stresses that 
“masculinity should be seen as always ambivalent, always complicated, always dependent on the 
exigencies of personal and institutional power.”
243
 The building blocks of masculinity studies 
derive from the same ambivalent crises of identities and paradoxes that propelled the rise of the 
men’s movement. While the men’s movement addresses these crises by resorting to an 
essentialized understanding of what it means to be a man in today’s world, masculinity studies 
recognizes the inherent struggles and dichotomies which plague any attempt to bound 
masculinity.  
In the context of the men’s movement, masculine identity is very much about loss and 
lacking.
244
 Thus, the men’s movement has emphasized the theme of “retrieval” as being critical, 
psychologically and tangibly, if masculinity is to become whole again. Robert Bly, one of the 
progenitors of the men’s movement, argued that such retrieval can be accomplished once men 
get in touch with their “true selves” by bonding with other men. Bly suggested that a significant 
part of adult male pain originates from the lack of a relationship between fathers and sons and 
that feminism was to blame for the shift in power that left masculinity in crisis. The pride and 
stoicism prevalent in earlier cultural tropes of ideal manhood found in popular representations 
like John Wayne or Clint Eastwood have given way to a defensive masculinity that views itself 
as constantly under threat and wallows in self-pity. Men, the traditional genderless masters of the 
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Certain cultural feminist critiques view normative masculinity as a constitutive element 
of the inequity, violence, and degradation that characterize white, Western, capitalist culture. By 
critiquing the normative male, feminists have contributed to the disavowal of traditional 
attributes of manhood such as “self-direction and discipline” and “toughness and autonomy,” and 
have suggested they be replaced by “soft” behavioral traits such as emotional sensitivity and 
vulnerability. Traits traditionally attributed to women and children are now being ascribed to 
men. In contrast, the men’s movement has sought to find an ahistorical, transcultural, and almost 
mythological definition of full-fledged masculinity. This goal of the men’s movement, believers 
argue, has been supplanted, eroded, covered over, and destroyed by the tandem of feminism and 
“the mode of industrial domination.”
246
 According to men’s movement adherents, industrial 
society and feminism work complicitly to tame the archetypal male; they are not separate and 




While feminist anti-essentialists have criticized the biologistic basis of certain strands of 
feminism that have a one-dimensional view of women, which present victimhood as an almost 
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 Yet, while this occurs there is a sensitive father emerging, struggling and advocating for the right to be the 
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immutable condition, the similarly reductivist view of men as oppressors has received far less 
criticism.
248
 In response to this idea of men as a monolithic social category of oppressors, 
masculinities studies argues that the essentializing of men fails to account for the diversity and 
complexity of men’s lives. By denaturalizing the category of “men,” masculinity studies has 
called into question the essentializing of male identity as all-powerful oppressors who benefit 
equally from patriarchy. Obviously, an essentialized view of men fails to account for differences 
in race, class, and sexuality that drastically impact the way men experience patriarchy. 
Nonetheless, while differences exist among men and while certain men benefit from patriarchy 
more than others, all men do benefit from patriarchy in some sense. This benefit has been called 
the “patriarchal dividend”: the advantage men in general gain from the subordination of women 
and from being complicit in the hegemonic project without the tensions or risks of being on the 
front line of patriarchy.
249
 
Essentialism also appears under the guise of values and cultural attributes that are 
encoded as masculine. Autonomy, reason, individualism, aggressiveness, and self-sufficiency 
serve as the basic tenets of liberal legalism and are generally thought of within western political 
culture as quintessentially masculine. Thus, while essentialism, on the one hand, reduces the 
complexity of men’s experience, it also genders otherwise gender-neutral cultural characteristics. 
It is this challenge to naturalistic assumptions about masculinity which recalibrates the debate as 
being more about politics and less about revealing hidden gendered assumptions that permeate 
the social world. In other words, when the naturalistic assumptions about masculinity are 
exposed, the political and ideological components can be challenged. For instance, the task 
                                                 
248
 Thornton, supra note 104, at 10. 
249
 R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 79 (2005). 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
100 
becomes no longer to locate where in the social world reason is being privileged over emotion, 
but rather to begin to disentangle the forces that bind masculinity to reason in the first place, and 
to expose their political nature. Consequentially, connections that appear commonsensical when 
the naturalistic assumptions are applied are exposed as teleological when they are removed. For 
instance, Carol Smart deconstructs the connection between rationality, men, and lawyering: “So 
law is not rational because men are rational, but law is constituted as rational as are men, and 
men as the subjects of the discourse of masculinity come to experience themselves as rational—
hence suited to a career in law.”
250
 
 Central to the manner in which essentialism has been dealt with in masculinity studies is 
the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The concept of hegemonic masculinity helped explain 
how the diversity of men’s lives could be addressed, while at the same time recognizing the 
existence of a culturally exalted form of masculinity, one that is revered above others.
251
 The 
term suggests that there is a particular way (or ways) of doing masculinity at any particular time 
in any particular society that is (are) privileged over others. By borrowing the Gramscian term 
hegemony, the emphasis is put on how the hegemonic ways of doing masculinity become “taken 
for granted”—the way they get naturalized—and on the cultural and political processes that 
coerce the doing of masculinity in those particular ways. This hegemonic masculinity, while 
culturally ubiquitous and exalted, remains inaccessible to the majority of men, and thus creates a 
certain sense of inadequacy of powerlessness. Michael Kimmel explains what this exalted form 
of masculinity is: “within the dominant culture, the masculinity that defines white, middle-class, 
early-middle-aged, heterosexual men is the masculinity that sets the standards for other men, 
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against which other men are measured and, more often than not, found wanting.”
252
 The 
inaccessibility of this standard to many men sheds light on why individual men, while 
recognizing that as a group men hold power in the world, often feel a sense of powerlessness 
(whether based on issues of race, class, and/or sexual orientation). 
Within feminist theory, there is a symmetry between the way women experience the 
world both as a group, on a public level, and as individuals, on a private level. Women see a 
social order that is mostly dominated by men, and this is reflected in how they privately 
experience the world. There is an expectation that a similar symmetry exists for men, but the 
experience, in fact, is often asymmetrical. While men recognize the power their group enjoys in 
the social order, but this often fails to translate to how men feel as individuals. Thus, when men 
as a group are characterized as “oppressors” and the social order is characterized as patriarchal, it 
fails to fully resonate with many men. It is this asymmetry/symmetry disconnect between the 
sexes that leads to communication breakdowns.
253
  
The idea of hegemonic masculinity is to account for the ubiquity, persistence and 
similarities between certain ways of doing masculinity, without backing into the trap of 
essentializing what it means to be a man. It becomes more difficult to determine what the revered 
forms of masculinity have in common, and how to account for their hegemonic status, as 
opposed to recognizing differences among different forms of hegemonic masculinities. For 
instance, revered forms of masculinity exist within difference communities at the same time—
working class masculinity and white-collar masculinity are very different, as are white and black 
masculinity. What, though, ties these revered forms to one another, because if nothing does, then 
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is there any point to using the concept at all? Further, this strategy is dubious in the first place 
because it suggests that there is something within black masculinity or working-class masculinity 
that is unique to all members of the respective social categories. Important intra-group variations 
are obscured in favor of attempting to account for difference based on conventional categories of 
race, sexuality, religion, class. Hegemonic masculinity also has a normative component in that 
part of the definition is that it legitimates the global subordination of women. The implication 
here is that there is not a “good” or “progressive” way of doing masculinity that can be part of 
the struggle against patriarchy. If society reveres a particular form of masculinity, then it 
necessarily is a form of masculinity that legitimates male supremacy. However, if one of the 
subordinated forms of masculinity becomes revered and becomes the new hegemonic form, does 
that new form itself become oppressive? If so, does that mean masculinity is inherently 
oppressive and, thus, that it has an essence? 
254
 
Notwithstanding the ostensibly progressive agenda of masculinity studies—particularly 
in contrast to the men’s movement—it undoubtedly has had multiple effects. Masculinity studies 
has tended to favor a critique of masculinity itself, as opposed to gender categories themselves. 
And it has tended to favor a relatively narrow critique of patriarchy, without challenging the 
overarching political and social structures that facilitate patriarchy. While masculinity studies has 
tended to view itself as emancipatory, in many ways, it simply reifies established ideas about 
sexual difference. Thus, masculinity studies is often in danger of falling into essentialist rabbit 
holes and privileging experience over theoretical inquiry, and over a comprehensive critique of 
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the relationship between masculinity and power. This relationship—between masculinity and 
power—has always been at the forefront of how the law engages with patriarchy. 
Perhaps most important when thinking about the direction of masculinity studies, 
particularly in the context of its relationship to the law and the history of its relationship with 
both feminist theory and the men’s movement, is the role that power has in masculinity studies. 
The issue of power has been front and center in both the genesis of the men’s movement 
(arguably the “crisis” in masculinity is most concisely described as the forced relinquishing of 
power by men and the resulting psycho-social impact) and in feminist theory. Thus, it is no 
surprise that power (and the power of law) is also a critical issue for masculinity studies. 
Significantly, though, many of the insights regarding power that were foregrounded in feminist 
theory and the subsequent work, have either not received the attention they should, or have been 
too easily dismissed because of what are thought to be more pressing concerns (e.g., dealing with 
the explicit sexism, discrimination, and misogyny). Ultimately, I am suggesting that a more 
robust understanding of masculinity requires a return to an engagement with issues surrounding 
power, notwithstanding such concerns. Absent real engagement with issues of power, today’s 
problems will be exacerbated rather than solved. Masculinity studies seeks to change the 
misogynistic and sexist behavior of men by highlighting the restrictive and unhealthy 
components of masculinity. But while it is tempting to simply argue against the naturalness of 
how masculinity is presented in today’s popular social and cultural world, real growth will only 
occur if a more robust engagement with issues of power is undertaken. 
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Masculinity studies places great emphasis on issues of power. Indeed, as MacKinnon 
observed, if masculinity is anything at all it is a system of power.
255
 Much work has been done 
looking at the functioning of power, but power has been considered less as a discursive force and 
more as the foundation of patriarchy. Power, from the perspective of the law, is often considered 
as a force to regulate or redistribute, when the law ought to spend more time self-consciously 
reflecting on the impact of its own power. The law serves as a technology of sex that reifies 
masculinity and sexual difference by constructing masculinity as a biological given rather than a 
discursive category that is part of a neoliberal political agenda. Nevertheless, the mainstream 
understanding of the relationship between the law and masculinity focuses on how the law is 
needed to control and rein in masculinity. The notion that the law is actually privileging and 
perpetuating a particular form of masculinity is not taken seriously in mainstream legal 
analysis.
256
Masculinity studies, on the other hand, opens the door to a view of the law as a 
contributor to, if not outright creator of, existing power relations and not simply a regulator of 
pre-existing ones.  
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 Male dominance “is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in history.” MacKinnon, supra 
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V. LAW AS A TECHNOLOGY OF SEX: ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW EXPLICITLY CREATING 
GENDER CATEGORIES 
 
The law’s explicit creation of the boundaries of masculinity, ironically, is exemplified in 
a collection of cases dealing with discrimination against women in the employment context.
257
 
Through these cases, the law engages with existence and relevance of group-based (sex) 
differences. However, the source and stability of such differences has received less attention.
258
 
An examination of the source of accepted sex differences requires resisting the tenacity and 
questioning the origins of existing gender stereotypes. 
In 1964, Title VII first prohibited employers from discriminating on the basis of sex: “It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” But, fifty years later, 
the meaning of discriminating “because of [an] individual’s sex” remains unclear. The intuitive 
and plain meaning reading of the text suggests a prohibition on inter-sex discrimination (treating 
men and women differently), but the statute has since been interpreted to also prohibit intra-sex 
discrimination. The intra-sex struggle for workplace equality has meant wrestling with common 
sense assumptions about who “women” are. Thus, while the law struggles to end sex 
discrimination, it is simultaneously engaged in defining who women are, and what femininity 
and masculinity mean. 
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By perpetuating or playing a part in the creation of sexual difference, the law prescribes 
sex roles, but also tells men and women what they should want: “These phenomena operate on 
the deepest levels of human consciousness and institutional logic, altering people’s perceptions 
and behavior in fundamental ways that appear to confirm the stereotype’s truth.”
259
 Differences 
between men and women that are used to justify discrimination are not natural or immutable, but 
have been created by the employer, society as a whole, including the law. For example, an 
employer that offers more parental leave to mothers than fathers is incentivizing the mother to be 
the primary caregiver and thus creating the difference (mother, not fathers, should be or want to 
be the primary caregivers of children). Arguing that sexual difference is not foundational or 
immutable does not deny the existence of difference, but rather denaturalizes it by questioning its 
origins and raison d’etre. The discussion of antidiscrimination cases that follows considers 
whether the differences are the cause of or consequence of the unequal treatment and why it 
matters when courts decline to question the origins of difference.
260
 
A. Pregnancy Cases 
Laws around pregnancy in the employment sphere serve as a paradigmatic example of 
fundamental disagreements about accommodating difference. Pregnancy cases—where pregnant 
women and new mothers brought claims against current or prospective employers for 
discrimination when they were treated differently from men and non-pregnant women—were the 
first major area of law that dealt with the intra-gender (as opposed to inter-gender) disparate 
treatment of women in the realm of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  
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In one early Supreme Court case, plaintiff employees claimed that defendant General 
Electric violated Title VII by failing to extend disability benefits to women who took time off 
work on account of pregnancy. The Court concluded that, because GE’s benefits plan did not 
treat all women differently than all men, the claim was not actionable as sex discrimination: 
“[the plan] does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender” and there was no 
showing that “the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits from [GE’s] plan was a pretext for 
discriminating against women.”
261
 Two years later in response to the ruling, Congress enacted 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which explicitly prohibited sex discrimination on the 
base of pregnancy. 
The question—first before the Court and then before Congress—was framed as whether 
pregnant women merited special treatment in the workforce. On the one side, cultural feminists 
argued that biological differences between men and women justified different leave policies and 
that treating women differently by making accommodations for pregnancy promoted the goal of 
workplace equality. On the other side, equal treatment proponents argued that special treatment 
for pregnant women reinforced harmful stereotypes of women needing protective legislation in 
order to be able to compete with men in the workplace. Others called accommodations for 
pregnant women reverse discrimination against men. 
About a decade after the enactment of the PDA, the Supreme Court again took up the 
question of pregnancy and sex discrimination. Writing for the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
rejected a challenge to a California state law that required employers to provide leave and 
reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy, finding that the law “promotes equal 
employment opportunity” and that “by ‘taking pregnancy into account,’ California’s pregnancy 
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Critics of the California law, including feminists, argued that guaranteeing maternity 
leave for women did not further equality, but, rather, constituted sex discrimination itself, 
because if men and women were not treated the same, then they were being treated unequally 
(and unfairly). Yet, as the Funes parable instructs, no two things are ever exactly the same and 
the way we categorize things, by identifying similarities and difference, is necessary and matters. 
Indeed, such categorization is what determines equality. Equality is not the antithesis of 
difference. “[I]f individuals or groups were identical or the same there would be no need to ask 
for equality.”
263
 In this way, difference is a prerequisite of equality. Thus, part of the process that 
the law engages in when determining whether discrimination occurs is a determination of which 
differences matter. The law assumes that biological differences exist between men and women, 
and that, therefore, unlawful discrimination occurs if the differences are immutable and not a 
product of personal choice. 
Under the special treatment model, pregnancy is seen as an immutable difference 
between men and women. This perspective manifests on both sides of the political spectrum, 
with opposite outcomes. Conservatives argue that women value family roles over work roles 
(essentially the reasoning followed by the court in Gilbert),
264
 while proponents of the special 
treatment model on the left argue that, while pregnancy and motherhood do not necessarily alter 
women’s work aspirations, they conflict with workplace norms and therefore deserve unique 
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accommodation (essentially the reasoning followed by the court in Cal Fed).
265
 In both versions 
pregnant women are viewed as different from other employees: “Conservatives used uniqueness 
arguments to defend denying pregnant women benefits given other employees, and liberals used 
them to defend giving pregnant women benefits denied others.”
266
 
Adherents to the equal treatment model don’t necessarily oppose accommodation for 
pregnant women, but argue that the accommodation should not be granted based on sex (a 
pregnant woman could, for example, receive an accommodation if her pregnancy symptoms 
were physically debilitating in some way). Pregnancy is not constructed as a foundational 
difference between men and women, not a difference that in and of itself renders men and 
women unequal. Rather, the way society and work are structured and the way people think about 
pregnancy combine to create an environment where pregnant women often are discriminated 
against in employment contexts. Such discrimination is not based on any immutable or biological 
difference, but on man-made policies that purport to reflect a natural order, but instead 
incentivize women to stay home once they become pregnant by, among other things, relegating 
them to marginal jobs.
267
  
The equal treatment model considers the factors that keep a pregnant woman from 
participating in the labor market—e.g., physical impairments (nausea and fatigue) shared by 
other medical conditions; a medical event, sometimes involving surgery, that requires a period of 
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 In this way, the disabling conditions that pregnancy may bring about are treated the 
same as disabling conditions experienced by any other employees, male or female.
269
 There is a 
reluctance to characterize pregnancy or the resulting symptoms as disabling because this 
suggests that pregnancy is abnormal. Some criticism of characterizing pregnancy as a disability 
is based on normative judgments about what “disability” means, suggesting that the 
characterization implies something negative about pregnant women (and, for that matter, 
differently abled persons). In this reading, regardless of the problems of its normative 
assessment, language in and of itself is constructed as performative. In a similar way, if one 
focuses on the performativity of language, by characterizing pregnancy as a difference based on 
sex, parents who do not experience pregnancy physically are excluded from the parenting 
experience. Indeed, pregnancy itself becomes fetishized at the expense of other (adoption, 
surrogacy, etc.) methods of family creation, which ultimately does a disservice to pregnant 
women as well. 
The debate among feminist theorists regarding which model—equal treatment or special 
treatment—is a more effective tool in the struggle for equality implicates ideas about 
masculinity, femininity, and gender roles, and, importantly, how and who we want policing those 
borders. The uniqueness of pregnancy and what it means to women, and how what it means to 
women is reflected in women’s labor is being decided by judges. When rendering an opinion like 
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Gilbert or Cal Fed, the court is speaking to what it means to be a woman, because the decision is 
not only speaking to the parameters of employment for all persons, or about treating men and 
women equally, but about characterizing and defining the supposed differences between men and 
women. Considering the personal nature and fluidity of sexual difference and identity, it feels 
odd to look to a staid and conservative institution like the law for guidance about what 
differences are foundational to women and how to perform one’s gender identity.  
The Gilbert and Cal Fed courts both draw clear demarcations between men and women, 
emphasize differences they characterize as insurmountable, and downplaying similarities, but 
these divisions are not necessary. Title VII exists to prevent discrimination, not to create an 
opportunity for judges to make pronouncements on what constitutes sexual difference. Accepting 
that there is nothing inherent or “natural” about these differences, the courts are deciding which 
differences to highlight and which to ignore. They are creating the categories and making 
decisions about what matters. And, importantly, those decisions are not based on a blank slate, 
but rather represent an assessment of the categories that litigant employers have decided matter. 
In this way, employers themselves inform the creation of categories that they then use to justify 
discriminatory policies.
270
 Against this backdrop, “[f]uture progress toward workplace sex 
equality will require renewed determination to challenge assumptions about difference that 
justify the status quo—this time, challenging not the reality but the self-reinforcing quality of 
alleged differences by focusing attention on how employers help create the differences they cite 
to justify discriminatory policies.”
271
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Perhaps most importantly in the context of masculinity studies is how the pregnancy 
decisions evidence the performative power of the opinions. In his Gilbert dissent, Justice 
Brennan states: “These policy formulations . . . show that pregnancy exclusions built into 
disability programs both financially burden women workers and act to break down the continuity 
of the employment relationship, thereby exacerbating women’s comparatively transient role in 
the labor force.”
272
 The focus on how employment policies affect the way women engage with 
the labor market stands in stark contrast to conservative essentialist arguments that suggest that 
employment patterns simply reflect women’s interests which are “naturally” and immutably 
different from men’s and, thus, justification for policy. Justice Brennan shows that these policies, 
and the subsequent legitimization of them by the courts, do not merely reflect pre-existing sex 
differences, but are in fact creating them. 
The acceptance by courts of the policies and their sex-based distinctions sends a pro-
active signal to future policymakers as well as outlining sex roles for society at large. Thus, we 
see the law not simply passively gauging the worth of a pre-existing policy that claims to reflect 
differences between men and women, but rather taking an active part in both creating the 
differences and suggesting that policy ought to exist in the first place. Challenging the 
importance of such differences is not the same as denying them; instead, “it means 
denaturalizing difference by questioning its origins and stability,”
273
 nonetheless these pregnancy 
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cases provide important lessons for masculinity studies—namely, the importance of not 
essentializing male experience and of recognizing the performative power of stereotypes, 
especially those about masculinity which historically have lurked under the radar and resisted 
having their naturalness challenged. 
B. Lack of Interest Cases 
The sameness/difference debate shows up in sex discrimination cases where women have 
been denied certain types of employment but employers argue that differences between women 
and men were the cause, not any discrimination. In Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC) v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., the EEOC alleged that Sears had discriminated 
against women by promoting only men for high-paying commission sales positions; Sears argued 
that its hiring practices simply reflected the interests of its employees and that, because women 
were naturally less competitive than men, they lacked interest in certain positions.
274
 The court 
rejected the claim, finding that “women [were] much less interested in commission sales at Sears 
than men,”
275
 and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
276
 
Again, the question underlying the case asks whether women’s interests are best served 
and sex equality furthered by policies that treat women and men identically, ignoring the social 
and cultural differences, or by those that treat them differently.
277
 Under this “difference 
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dilemma,” as Martha Minnow has labelled it, “both focusing on and ignoring the difference risk 
recreating it.”
278
 To escape the dilemma, we need a new way to think about difference that resists 
the notion that equality and difference are in opposition. 
The origins of the supposed differences between men and women claimed by Sears (that 
women are less competitive and prefer “friendly” noncommission positions) were not questioned 
by the court. Neither Sears nor the EEOC addressed systemic or structural roots of the 
differences and focused instead on autonomous individuals making decisions—supervisors 
deciding who to hire; female employees deciding which jobs to apply for. The fact that values 
and character traits identified as male (aggressiveness, competitiveness, individualism) are what 
society prizes and rewards with higher paying jobs is not challenged. Thus, while “the aim is to 




Indeed, the reliance on supposed sex differences to justify employment discrimination (as 
discussed above with respect to the pregnancy context), creates feedback loops that perpetuate 
and amplify the differences. In Sears, the differences (that women are less competitive than men) 
being relied upon to justify the discrimination are actually created by Sears’ own policies; by 
maintaining an all-male team of commission salespeople and policies (written and unwritten), 
Sears communicates to women that women are not competitive and wouldn’t be interested in the 
commission jobs. Certainly, women have no inherent interest in lower paying, less challenging, 
                                                 
278
 Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 160 (Spring 1985). 
279
 Elizabeth Comack, Theoretical Excursions, in LOCATING LAW: RACE/CLASS/GENDER CONNECTIONS (Comack, 
ed., 1999). 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
115 
or more “stable” jobs. Instead, workplace aspirations of both men and women are rooted in 
responses to signals from the labor market itself.
280
 
The framing of the issue in Sears as a dichotomous choice without nuance—that the lack 
of women in commission sales jobs was due either to discrimination by Sears or a lack of interest 
by women—is one that resonates with the law. Neither the parties nor the court focused on 
whether the claimed differences in interest between men and women were a cultural creation or 
whether they were somehow natural and immutable. And if the differences are natural or 
immutable, the question becomes one of whether employers (and the law) have a duty to 
accommodate those differences. This question suggests that equality and difference are at odds, 
and that, in order for two things to be equal, they must be the same. But this formulation presents 
a false choice—that women can only be entitled to the same high-paying commission jobs at 
Sears as men if they can show they were the same as men with respect to aggressiveness and 
competitiveness. 
Equality does not mean sameness, and difference does not mean inequality. As Joan Scott 
has observed: “when equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an 
impossible choice . . . the only response is a double one: the unmasking of the power relationship 
constructed by posing equality as the antithesis of difference and the refusal of its consequent 
dichotomous construction of political choices.”
281
 In other words, constructing the problem as 
one of equality versus difference allows for only two alternatives: either men and women are 
equal, and, thus, no differences exist, or they are different, and men and women are not equal. 
But, of course, men and women can be both equal and different.  
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In addition, by focusing on whether or not men and women are the same (have the same 
interests in particular jobs), the two categories are presented as internally homogenous—all 
women are assumed to share a common set of interests. By ignoring diversity within gender 
categories themselves, the question of whether men and women are the same or different 
becomes even more nonsensical. This failure to recognize diversity within a gender category is 
prevalent in masculinity studies, where there is a concern about men being characterized, within 
feminist theory, as one dimensional and treated as a monolithic group.  
Even in Sears, which relied explicitly on a single characterization of women as a group, 
the court affirmed ideas of masculinity presented in Sears’ policies, citing Sears’ sales manual 
which described commission salespeople (who were all men) as “special breed of cat, with a 
sharper intellect and more powerful personality than most other retail personnel . . . [one who] 
possesses a lot of drive and physical vigor, is socially dominant, and has an outgoing personality 
and the ability to approach easily persons they do not know.”
282
 While this description is not 
meant to describe all men, it does describe what successful men, those that deserve higher paying 
jobs, should be like, and creates a caricature of hegemonic masculinity that is alienating and 
ultimately harmful to individuals of all sexes. 
By failing to question the origin of the sex differences at play in Sears, the court 
implicitly accepts those differences as natural. Thus, stereotypes about men—aggressiveness, 
competitiveness, appetite for risk, a willingness to be away from home for extended periods—are 
constructed as what men “naturally” are like. Masculinity studies challenges this sort of 
essentializing of men and explores how such construction of masculinity alienates those men 
who do not conform to the model. Similarly, the assignment of characteristics like humaneness, 
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compassion, and nurturing to women results in the idea that these characteristics should be 
avoided by men, that men who exhibit them are not “real” men. A key part of the project of 
masculinity studies has been to unpack male identity and look at its origins. What has been 
determined is that “the two most defining elements of masculinity are imperative negatives: not 
to be a woman and not to be gay.”
283
 Sears, a decision that, on its face, has little to do with 
masculinity, thus, lays out a roadmap for how men can “not be a woman”—i.e., be less humane, 
compassionate, and nurturing. 
In the thirty-odd years since Sears was decided and affirmed, lack of interest arguments 
have persisted, sometimes in more amorphous form. The success or failure of lack of interest 
arguments have tended to fall along political lines, with conservative courts being more receptive 
and liberal courts rejecting the arguments, resulting in a split in the circuits and a lack of any 
clear line of precedent.
284
 Even when the Supreme Court finally weighed in on a lack of interest 
case, it sidestepped the fundamental issue.  
In 2011, the Supreme Court heard Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
285
 a case with a 
strikingly similar fact pattern to that of Sears. Current and former women employees of 
Wal-Mart alleged that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion 
matters resulted in discrimination against them in violation of Title VII. While the lower ruled in 
favor of the employees, the Supreme Court ultimately refused to certify the women as a class 
and, thus, neatly sidestepped the issue of discrimination. In a brilliant sleight of hand, the 
conservative majority (the opinion was decided 5-4 along party lines) refused to certify the group 
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because the various women plaintiffs were not similar enough—turning the traditionally 
progressive attack on lack of interest arguments for their essentializing of women on its head. 
The Court, in contrast, suggested that certifying the group was in fact essentializing women’s 




While conservative courts had before found that because women share certain “natural” 
interests, and different treatment based on those interests was lawful, the Court found the various 
women all so unique and different from each other and without a shared interest, that class 
certification couldn’t be justified (the court suggested that proof of discrimination at each of 
3,400 stores would be needed to illustrate a pattern, notwithstanding evidence of company-wide 
discrimination).
287
 Advocacy work, let alone communication of any sort, is impossible if every 
experience is considered unique and ungeneralizable (recall Funes).  
The Court’s decision exemplifies the danger of using claims of essentialism to undercut 
attempts to deliver justice to women as a group—a critique prevalent in both feminist theory and 
masculinity studies. As MacKinnon has pointed out, “analyzing women ‘as women’ says nothing 
about whether an analysis is essentialist. It all depends on how you analyze them “as women” on 
whether what makes a woman be a woman, analytically, is deemed inherent in their bodies or is 
produced through their social lived conditions.”
288
 In Sears women were grouped together and 
characterized as lacking interest in high-paying jobs because of something that was deemed 
inherent in their bodies. In Wal-Mart, women were grouped together because of the social lived 
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condition that they shared—the experience of having been discriminated against by Wal-Mart 
due to their sex. Both feminist theory and masculinity studies suggest that an appropriate 
response to anti-essentialist critiques or critiques of sexual difference more generally is not a 
retreat from categorizing men and women as groups, but, rather, a recognition of how the group 
is being characterized.  
The highly politicized nature of the “lack of interest” opinions highlights the role the law 
plays in speaking to the question of how to think about the interests of women. Is it really 
desirable to have judges setting the parameters surrounding what makes a woman a woman? 
Like the feedback loop described by Justice Brennan in his Gilbert dissent, there is a self-
reinforcing tendency to recourse to the law being the solution to the problems it encounters. The 
law insists that it is the way to address the issue and to solve the problem, and points to past 
successes to illustrate its future potential. However, with respect to defining individuals’ interests 
and desires, in a charged political context that the law has proven time and again to be immersed 
within, holding out hope in the emancipatory power of the law is perhaps overly ambitious. 
C. Gender Stereotyping Cases 
Arguably, the area of antidiscrimination law where the parameters of masculinity are 
being most clearly and explicitly delineated is a collection of cases dealing with Title VII 
employment discrimination claims relating to gender stereotyping. In 1989, the Supreme Court 
set forth the gender stereotyping doctrine with its decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
289
 In 
that case, plaintiff Ann Hopkins claimed that her employer, Price Waterhouse, had denied her 
partnership because she did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes. An unquestionably 
qualified candidate, Hopkins was the only woman out of eighty-eight employees up for 
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partnership. Despite her professional success (securing a multi-million-dollar contract) and 
assessment of her work as outstanding, she was considered an “overly aggressive…tough talking 
somewhat masculine hard-nosed” manager.
290
 She was characterized by her employer as unduly 
harsh, difficult to work with, and macho, and was told that she used too much profanity and was 
seen as overcompensating for being a woman. In performance evaluations, she was advised to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and take a course at charm school.”
291
 
The Court held that Hopkins had been illegally discriminated against because sexual 
stereotyping had played a part in Price Waterhouse’s evaluation of Hopkin’s candidacy for 
partner—i.e., her behavior resembled what her employer and members of the court considered 
masculine. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declared “we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group.”
292
 Price Waterhouse expanded the scope of Title VII’s to prohibit 
discrimination not only based on a biological (immutable) conception of sex but also to prohibit 
any discrimination based on a person’s nonconformance with gender norms.  
In more recent cases dealing with sex stereotyping Title VII claims, litigants have argued 
that discrimination based on one’s sexual orientation, while not a specifically enumerated 
category in Title VII, should be prohibited as discrimination “because of [an] individual’s sex,” 
under the Price Waterhouse expansion of the concept to cover sex stereotyping. The resulting 
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jurisprudence has been mixed, with a circuit split
293
 that likely will end up at the Supreme 
Court.
294
 While the debate continues as to whether sexual orientation should be included under 
the sex stereotyping rubric, another series of cases—those dealing with uniforms and personal 
grooming—cases has resisted finding its way under that umbrella.
295
  
In 2000, Darlene Jespersen, a bartender at Harrah’s Casino, refused to comply with a 
company policy that female beverage service employees wear full makeup (i.e., foundation, 
blush, mascara, and lip color) at all times—and she was fired as a result.
296
 Jespersen sued, 
alleging that the policy and her termination discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The 
district court rejected the claim, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy did not 
create an unequal burden on female bartenders as opposed to male bartenders, who were required 
to comply with different grooming standards.
297
 While the Price Waterhouse decision intuitively 
would seem to govern Jespersen, claims involving dress and appearance trigger an inter-gender 
formal equality unequal burden test. In order to prove discrimination, Jespersen would have had 
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to show that the grooming standard imposed a greater burden on women than it did on men.
298
 
“Notwithstanding the direction in which Price Waterhouse seems to urge equality jurisprudence, 
many courts are reluctant to relinquish the conventions that femininity belongs to women and 
that masculinity belongs to men.”
299
 
Ann Hopkins was penalized because her biological sex (female) did not match her 
behavior (too masculine—according to her employer’s standards). Darlene Jespersen was 
penalized because her biological sex (female) did not match her behavior (not feminine 
enough—according to her employer’s standards). In both instances, a woman failed to conform 
to the parameters of normative sex roles. As Katherine Franke explains, “the second order 
question, what does it mean to treat women unfairly, always has buried within it the first order 
question, what does it mean to be a woman?”
300
 While the decisions in these cases have an 
obvious effect on the women who have suffered discrimination, they also legitimize ideas about 
normative sex roles and, thus, have an impact on other women, but also on men. 
When applying a masculinity studies lens to the cases, we have as a starting point the fact 
that masculinity is a construct. Masculinity does not belong to either gender, but, as reflected in 
Price Waterhouse and Jespersen, as long as traits, attitudes, and behaviors are gendered, then 
women who are read as “too masculine” will be negatively valued. This characterization is 
similarly harmful to men because, to be a successful man, according to Price Waterhouse, one 
should be sufficiently aggressive, harsh, profane, and impolite. And men who do not attain or 
choose to not strive for this type of masculinity also will be negatively valued. 
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The underlying discriminatory behavior at issue in both Price Waterhouse and Jespersen 
was explicit. Price Waterhouse is full of smoking guns and outrageous statements by colleagues 
regarding Ann Hopkins. And Jespersen involved a formal policy regulating women’s bodies. 
Antidiscrimination law is well suited to address such exoteric, explicit problems. It is successful 
at identifying the “bad guy,” but is not necessarily in a position to uncover subconscious biases 
when evidence of malicious intent is not present. When recalling one of the goals of masculinity 
studies—exposing and interrogating the default subject position held by men—we are reminded 
to examine what the cases are communicating implicitly and tacitly, to read between the lines, 
and to interrogate the norms that have been taken for granted. This is a major reason why 
antidiscrimination law—the blunt instrument that it is—is not ideally situated to address 
discrimination that is often more systemic than volitional.  
When outright and explicit sexism and misogyny shift instead to uneasiness over 
evolving sexual categories and how masculinity and femininity are being performed differently 
than in the past, is antidiscrimination law the best way to address these harms? Do we really 
want judges deciding how we should be expressing our gender?
301
 Antidiscrimination law deals 
with singular and explicit examples of wrong doing dealing with gender categories and roles that 
are intelligible to it, but, to borrow Franke’s language, antidiscrimination law “provides little 
protection for gender outlaws.”
302
 An individual only becomes a viable and culturally intelligible 
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Antidiscrimination law actively creates the parameters of what it means to be a man. In 
Jespersen,
304
 the court did not simply legitimize normative gender categories; instead, it 
explicitly policed the border of gender expression, by finding a requirement to wear make-up 
reasonable and related to a bartender’s employment. And while the court in Price Waterhouse 
did find discrimination, it based its judgment of that discrimination on a particular understanding 
of masculinity, thus weighing in on what masculinity is. Recalling Justice Brennan’s feedback 
loop, by weighing in on what masculinity is, the Court is also taking an implicit stand on what 
masculinity ought to be. When courts continue to trade in sexual stereotypes, individuals of all 
sexes are harmed. 
Masculinity studies has exposed the presence of a hegemonic masculinity: “the 
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of 
the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of 
men and the subordination of women.”
305
 Crucially, it is the successful claim to authority, rather 
than any sense of universalism, in that it is possessed equally by all men, which marks 
hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to various 




 Carbado, supra note 301, at 55 (“The approach the court took in Jespersen’s obscured the fact that Harrah’s 
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 It is historically dependent and only ever a “currently accepted” 
strategy as opposed to an essence or truth. The lack of universalism, or stated differently, the 
rejection of any naturalistic component to masculinity (although society does read the “currently 
accepted form” of masculinity as “natural” at the time), renders the notion of hegemonic 
masculinity inherently political. So, while lacking universalism in that sense, hegemonic 
masculinity is the “currently most honored way of being a man…and legitimates the global 
subordination of women to men.”
307
 There is nothing natural or immutable to the forms of 
masculinity condoned and perpetuated by the law, the law is buying into ideas about what 
“normal” behavior is for men that simply increase sexual inequality. 
When antidiscrimination law explicitly decides whether or not individuals can be 
terminated from their jobs because of the way they perform their gender, judges are 
unequivocally policing the borders of gender. In deciding what kind of gender performances are 
protected by the law, judges are saying what kind of genders are legitimate. If the law continues 
to legitimize stereotypes (and not recognize that there are multiple ways to perform one’s 
identity) and remains unable adopt a more nuanced understanding of sexual difference, then 
regardless of whether the legal doctrine employed embraces difference or sameness (substantive 
or formal equality), the results will continue to re-enforce sexual inequalities. 
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VI. LAW AS A TECHNOLOGY OF SEX: THE IMPLICIT CREATION OF MASCULINITY 
Masculinity studies allows for a view of the law as a contributor to what masculinity 
itself is, rather than just a regulator of a pre-existent masculinity. I use the very passive language 
“allows for” (as opposed to saying that masculinity studies, in fact, is doing something) because 
while the discursive space is available to masculinity studies due to its theoretical foundations, 
unfortunately the analysis of power (and specifically the way the power of the law is exercised) it 
employs is often lacking. While feminist theory was interested in thinking about redistributing 
power and, significantly, about how power operated, masculinity studies often acts as if the 
“how” question is already answered, and the only remaining issue is redistribution. Like 
mainstream civil rights advocates, masculinity studies tends to be preoccupied with combating 
patriarchy through legalistic means, as opposed to thinking about power as relational, productive, 
and, crucially, not solely held by certain individuals like a commodity. Thus, while the ideas 
about power discussed above, born in feminist legal theory, have found application in 
masculinity studies, each have been embraced to varying degrees. 
According to a conventional understanding of how power manifests, law is prohibitive 
and repressive; it exerts its power primarily through domination. Particularly in U.S. 
Constitutional law, where the charter is conceived of as containing negative liberty rights that 
protect citizens from the government stepping into their private lives, as opposed to a source of 
positive liberty rights, the law rarely conceives of its power as productive. If, in contrast, power 
actually manifests in the creation of norms and the productive deployment of disciplinary 
techniques, then the juridical power of law is easily dismissed as a residual accessory to the 
predominant powers of modernity. Equating the power of law exclusively with repression, fails 
to account for all the ways that the law’s power functions productively to create norms and form 
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cultures—it “excludes a richer consideration of the law’s constitutive capacities”
308
—which are 
the predominant powers of modernity. Due to the combination of repressive and productive 
powers, the law occupies a unique position with respect to the reproduction of gender relations in 
our social environment. 
To the extent that the law attempts to influence a society, it identifies qualities that can be 
scaled up from a model individual,
309
 and the ultimate society created reflects the qualities that 
the law has validated and perpetuated in the model individual. Of note, the so-called model 
individual evidently exists within a patriarchy and, thus, any scaling up from such individual 
perpetuates a phallocentric culture. Thus, the law creates a structure for society based on an 
already-adopted theoretical position on the nature of sexual difference and the characteristics of 
an individual subject that is both formed and dominated by the law. In this way, the law can 
never be separated from its own understanding of sexual difference, which is forever intertwined 
with the model of the world the law seeks to create. Therefore, the law is a “technology of sex” 
in that it is a creator of techniques, norms, standards, rules, and discourses that dominate and 
govern the way society understands sex and gender. 
In the words of James Boyd White, the law is: 
not merely a system of rules (or rules and principles), or reducible to policy 
choices or class interests, but it is rather what I call a language, by which I do not 
mean just a set of terms and locutions, but habits of mind and expectations—what 
might also be called a culture. It is an enormously rich and complex system of 
thought and expression, of social definitions and practices, which can be learned 
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The law is perpetually invested in re-articulating its own world view, resulting in the “creeping 
hegemony of the legal order.”
311
 This creeping hegemony matters because it affects the way 
masculinity is thought about. Indeed, once coopted by the legal order, the study of masculinity 
becomes another tool with which the law can propagate—implicitly and explicitly, intentionally 
and unconsciously—a particular form of masculinity and, in the process, further entrench sexual 
difference. The power of the law, therefore, is continually reinforcing itself, continually re-
articulating its own world view, and continues to weigh on society until the perspective it is 
advocating is internalized. As certain scholars have highlighted, to some extent the law operates 
in its own realm, but it is also engorged in power struggles over cultural dominance.
312
 
If, on the other hand, the power of the law was actually recognized to be productive (and 
if sex was considered fluid and dynamic), then it would be accepted that the law had an impact 
on sexual difference, and the legal order would be in some sense be accountable. But, since 
sexual difference is predominantly thought about as binaried and natural, the legal order is rarely 
considered to have an impact on sexual difference and not held to be responsible—how could the 
law (something so conceptual) actually affect something like sexual difference (something so 
corporeal)? The law’s reasoning, though, is teleological—in order to not be held responsible for 
the way masculinity manifests in the world, the law needs to believe in both a particular 
conception of the power of law and a particular idea of sexual difference. The law claims to not 
have a productive power by pointing to the naturalness of sexual difference which is, from its 
perspective, clearly beyond the influence of the law. The reluctance to take accountability 
compels the law to maintain essentialist understandings of masculinity which reinforce its 
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conception of sexual difference, and the cycle begins again. Therefore, the law serves as a 
technology of sex that perpetuates a hegemonic masculinity, yet it fails to take any culpability 
when that masculinity manifests in ostensibly undesirable but inevitable ways. Rather than being 
presented as a fractured and disjointed social construct, sexual categories are presented as 
resilient and stable, harking back to dated notions of a stable subject, and suggesting that through 
much trial and error, masculinity will one day find its essence. 
A. Ricci v. DeStefano: About Masculinity, Too 
The 2009 Supreme Court decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,
313
 ruling on a reverse 
discrimination (discrimination against traditionally advantaged groups) claim against the City of 
New Haven, and the subsequent Senate confirmation hearing for then-Judge Sotomayor, 
provides an example of how the law utilizes its power to creates norms with a scope far greater 
than the explicit subject matter of any one particular case. In Ricci, white firefighters scored 
higher than their Black and Latino counterparts on written tests for promotion. Given the 
disparities in exam scores, the city civil service board declined to certify the results. The suit 
alleged that, by discarding the test results, the City discriminated against the plaintiffs based on 
their race, in violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court concluded that race-based action like the City’s is impermissible under Title 
VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the 
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute. According to the Court the 
City’s race-based rejection of the test results could not satisfy the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard. The Court found that, because the tests were job related, the City lacked sufficient 
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evidence that it would have been liable for disparate impact had it certified the test results. While 
the Court’s opinion explicitly focuses on race, the decision and the spectacle that ensued when 
two of the plaintiffs testified at the Sotomayor confirmation hearing,
314
 which adopted the image 
of the “firefighter hero”
 315
 as a white male, feature elements that would benefit from being 
viewed from a perspective informed by gender.  
Applying a masculinity studies lens to Ricci reveals how ingrained particular conceptions 
of masculinity are in our culture in three main ways. (Counterintuitively, the insidiousness of 
hegemonic masculinity is often most apparent when gender issues are not being addressed 
directly.) First, Ricci highlights the complexities and biases that permeate assessment 
mechanisms and, more specifically, how internalized, gendered ideas inform the selection of 
relevant performance criteria. Second, Ricci perpetuates a notion of hegemonic masculinity that 
ultimately results in feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy among young men, who are 
compelled to prove their manhood in harmful ways. Third, Ricci exemplifies how the law 
decides to see a case from one perspective (the aggrieved white and sometimes Latino 
firefighter) that both privileges and endorses a specific notion of hegemonic masculinity.  
The Ricci decision provides a classic example of the law employing its power in a norm-
creating, non-juridical manner. The criteria believed to be determinative of character and 
leadership, which have been internalized by the law and which are endorsed by the Court, exhibit 
a substantial male bias that render leadership and character more accessible to those who perform 
masculinity in a conventional manner. At the heart of the Ricci decision and the subsequent 
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questioning of two of the plaintiffs by the Senate Judiciary Committee was the accuracy and 
fairness of the mechanism by which the City assessed fitness for job promotion.
316
 
The Committee Republicans (7 white men) invited plaintiffs Frank Ricci and Ben Vargas 
to testify. Their questioning touched upon the validity of the firefighter promotion exams. Ricci 
and Vargas repeatedly noted that the tests were “unquestionably job-related” and stressed their 
fairness.
317
 When asked why the tests were important Ricci answered “over 100 firefighters die 
in the line of duty each year, an additional 80,000 are injured. You need to have a command of 
the knowledge in order to make command decisions. . . . Experience is the best teacher, but only 
a fool learns in that school alone.”  
The opinion, penned by Justice Kennedy, includes an excerpt of a statement by Ricci: “I 
don’t even know if I made it [b]ut the people who passed should be promoted. When your life’s 
on the line, second best may not be good enough.” The second sentence aligns with the Court’s 
focus on the job-relatedness of the tests, but Kennedy’s choice to include the first sentence (“I 
don’t know if I made it”) is curious. Here, he highlights Ricci’s integrity, picking an example of 
the firefighter’s magnanimity—he’s here not out of self-interest, but because he cares about the 
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profession! The quote does not speak to the value of the assessment mechanism, but rather to 
Ricci’s character—something that, due to its inclusion, we can assume Kennedy found relevant. 
The worth of the assessment mechanism can be considered in numerous ways: on the one 
hand, whether the assessment mechanism in question was discriminatory;
318
 on the other, how as 
a society we assess character and leadership. The Court’s conflation of character and competence 
is exacerbated by the flimsiness of our ways to measure character; as McGinley points out: “No 
one questioned whether the test results would necessarily locate the persons who would be best 
for the jobs. All equated test results with merit and with hard work.”
319
 Indeed, Kennedy noted 
expert testimony regarding the inadequacy of written tests to assess people,
320
 but punted, 




Almost as if taking a cue from Kennedy’s highlighting of character, most of the plaintiff 
firefighters’ time during the confirmation hearing was spent describing the character needed to 
fight fires. They spoke about fairness and that they had “played by the rules.” They spoke about 
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of the test results before it.” 577 U.S. at 592. 
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hard work and sacrifices. They spoke about the danger and complexity of their jobs. They spoke 
about their roles as the heads of their families, as breadwinners, fathers. Senator Lindsey Graham 
told Ricci that he would “want [him] to come to my house if it was on fire.” The Ricci and 
Vargas were repeatedly thanked for their service, held up as exemplar members of their 
community, and commended for their courage.  
B. Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearings: Scholar-Athletes Don’t Rape 
That emphasis on the ways to determine character was on display again when then-Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee at his confirmation hearing in 
October 2018. Like the firefighters, much of Kavanaugh’s testimony,
322
 focused on his character; 
Ricci, Vargas, and Kavanaugh all testified about the characteristics that made them good men 
and good leaders. According to McGinley and Boyd “The explicit message [from the Senate 
hearings] was that the nearly-all white plaintiffs were “real men” and “real firefighters” who 
worked hard and cared for their families.”
323
 In Justice Kavanaugh’s testimony, he repeatedly 
returned to his athletic prowess in high school as a foundation of his leadership skills and 
character. As some commentators have pointed out (somewhat flippantly), make it to practice for 
four years and enjoy the presumption of integrity for the rest of your life.
324
  
Like his mentor Kennedy, Kavanaugh recognizes the importance of integrity. The issue 
here is not whether integrity matters, but rather how we measure it and what we think it consists 
of. Sports have at least since the industrial revolution been used in schools to build integrity and 
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 but the Kavanaugh episode takes this tradition a step further and mixes up 
character and competition. 
While Ricci and Vargas did not explicitly point to sports for their character bona fides, 
their refrains of hard work, sacrifice, and “playing by the rules”—a sports metaphor—echo 
precisely Kavanaugh’s list of workout sessions, practices, and captaining his athletic teams. In 
addition, their testimony displayed their conformance with gender norms (as did 
Kavanaugh’s),
326
 and all three resort back to patently masculine definitions of character and 
leadership. Kavanaugh’s testimony exploited the American patriarchal fallacy that success in 
high school sports is tantamount to having integrity, while the plaintiff firefighters’ testimony 
“lionized a particularly traditional form of heterosexual masculinity”
327
 which places “men at the 
head of their families, in the traditional role as breadwinner and protector, doings men work.”
328
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 See Deborah L. Brake, Sport and Masculinity: The Promise and Limits of Title IX, in MASCULINITIES AND LAW: 
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And Kavanaugh: “I was at the top of my class academically, busted my butt in school. Captain of the varsity 
basketball team. Got in Yale College.”  
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Both Kavanaugh and the firefighters articulated definitions of character that are patently 
masculine and, thus, unavailable to those who don’t fit into traditional gender norms, nor, really 
to women at all.
329
  
In many ways the similarities between the testimonies are not surprising; with respect to 
the construction of masculine identity, the firehouse and the frat house at Yale where the 
respective masculinities were formed are mirror images. The performances of masculinity in 
both settings have been known to include verbal harassment and physical hazing purportedly 
designed to create a strong sense of “brotherhood” that is prioritized above all else. The firehouse 
and college fraternity both value hard work and dedication, and view outsiders, including and 
especially women, as lacking the dedication, drive, and ability needed to succeed.  
Such articulations of straight, white, male “character” in America today prove dangerous 
because they reify a conception of character that excludes and alienates non-conforming 
individuals. Therefore, “character,” in practice, ends up privileging a particular type of person 
(e.g., white, straight, men) and, crucially, does so under the neo-liberal pretenses of objectivity 
and neutrality. Again, as expert witness Janet Helms testified in Ricci (and as Justice Kennedy 
quoted): “regardless of what kind of written test we give in this country . . . we can just about 
predict how many people will pass who are members of under-represented groups”
330
—i.e., the 
white supremacist patriarchy that is America does not provide for anything else. Yet, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
them sympathetic because they followed the script. But this script is not equally available to women and some 
men.”). 
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marginalized are not told that structural barriers are in place or that subjective decisions are 
being made against them, but rather that they do not measure up on some objective scale.  
Once again, the insidious invisibility of masculinity suffocates those who fail to conform. 
Beneath the surface of the legal argumentation in Ricci lies internalized determinations about 
integrity and character that supersede the persuasiveness of any juridical argument any 
disagreeing Justice could make. Part of the project of masculinity studies has been to expose and 
objectify masculinity, to no longer allow it to remain hidden behind the cloak of objectivity and 
neutrality. While it remains hidden, masculinity takes on deific qualities, ubiquitous in the 
quotidian.
 
Thus, the imperative of masculinity studies exposing, objectifying and rendering 
visible the practices of masculinity. 
C. A Vicious Cycle: Notions of Hegemonic Masculinity Leading to Perceived 
Powerlessness that then Result in Harmful Exhibitions of Masculinity. 
Prior to the Kavanaugh performance, the last time privileged boys’ high school behavior 
received such public and legal scrutiny was the case of Owen Labrie. A masculinity studies 
analysis of Ricci and the picture of Justice Kavanaugh’s teenage years presented during his 
confirmation hearing demonstrates how the identity of men is formed equally by male/male 
relationships as it is by male/female relationships. It also describes how sex-based harassment 
frequently results from a desire to prove the perpetrators’ masculinity, rather than to pursue 
sexual pleasure/gratification, and underlines how society and courts ignore that harassing 
behaviors and the motives behind them are nearly identical in schools and workplaces.
331
 
 These insights help explain how we got from Labrie to Kavanaugh. The story of Owen 
Labrie made headlines in the summer of 2015. Labrie, at the time an eighteen-year-old senior at 
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the St. Paul’s School, was accused of sexually assaulting a fifteen-year-old as part of the school’s 
“senior salute,” a ritual in which male students propositioned female classmates for as much 
sexual activity as permitted. The New York Times said the case was “at its core, . . . about an 
intimate encounter . . . between a 15-year-old girl and an 18-year-old acquaintance, and whether 
she consented as it escalated.”
332
 Ultimately, Labrie was found not guilty of felony sexual assault 
charges, but was convicted of having sex with a person who was below the age of consent. The 
legal issues in the case boiled down to a question of consent. Notwithstanding this framing, the 
case was very much about masculinity, specifically, about how boys “become men” and our 
culture’s role in that process. In the eyes of the law, this case dealt with the legal definition of 
rape and of consent, and the factual question of whether consent existed.  
In feminist theory, male identity is often viewed as coming from a privileged position of 
power and defined in contrast to females. However, according to masculinity theory, male 
identity is often formed by feelings of powerlessness and, in contrast, not to females, but to other 
men. Patriarchy is not based straightforwardly on misogyny; there is a mimetic component to 
patriarchal violence, like that inflicted by Owen Labrie, that renders the responsibility collective. 
Unlike feminist theory, that tends to not think of patriarchy outside of a male/female paradigm, 
masculinity studies recognizes the impact that competition among men has on patriarchy. The 
desire for hegemonic masculinity does not come from the deep recesses of male souls, as the 
men’s movement would have us believe, but whether we follow Foucaultian theory of desire 
(desire dependent on power) or a Giradian theory (we imitate the desires of others), the 
responsibility for the violence of patriarchy is rendered collective. 
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Male identity is as much about relations with other men as it is about relations with 
women. Males are perpetually competing with one another over who can come closest to 
achieving the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Both the plaintiff firefighters and Justice 
Kavanaugh delivered testimony promoting this ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Nevertheless, it 
is the rare man that meets the hegemonic masculinity standard.
333
 Thus, while men as a group are 
powerful, individual men do not always or necessarily feel powerful. While the men’s movement 
posits that this powerlessness is a backlash to gains made by women and minorities, masculinity 
studies suggest that the feeling of powerlessness derives from competition among men to 
conform to the unattainable hegemonic masculine ideal.
334
 Whether stemming from a backlash 
or a failure to conform to an unattainable standard, the feeling of powerlessness leads to men’s 
rejection of a core claim of feminism—that men are the most powerful social force. It is for this 
reason that the equality riddle that feminism is perpetually working to solve must almost 
necessarily include an analysis of relationships solely between males.
335
 
When high school males exhibit toxic masculinity that is sometimes written off as “boys 
being boys,” what they are doing is competing with one another over who best achieves the ideal 
of hegemonic masculinity that has been communicated to them.
336
 Masculinity scholars, 
scrutinizing male initiation rituals, have explained how “boys’ masculinities include a process of 
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shutting down emotion and taking risks in order to prove manhood.”
337
 The initiation ritual 
responds to the inherent lack of stability in masculinity, ushering its participant into a simpler 
time, into something untarnished and natural. Claude Lévi-Strauss described such ritual practices 
“as an expression of the unconscious apprehension of the truth of determinism, the mode in 
which scientific phenomena exist.”
338
 The ritual is infused with myth and transcendence—with 
determined truths. It both grounds masculinity and renders it something potently metaphysical. 
Rituals are the medium through which a shared cultural heritage is transmitted and ultimately 
serve as the modes of an individual and collective “process of subjectivation;” they are 
fundamental to the “social and cultural creation of oneself as a subject.”
339
 
In Ricci and in the Kavanaugh testimony, the ideal of hegemonic masculinity that boys 
strive for is validated and fêted by the law and the Senate Judiciary Committee. Why is it 
surprising then, that high school boys feel intense pressure to “prove their manhood”? When 
viewed through a masculinity studies lens, we can understand that Labrie’s participation in the 
“senior salute”—an initiation ritual of there ever was one—has less to do with his relationship 
with or opinions about women and girls and more to do with his need to compete with his male 
peers to meet a standard of masculinity that the law acclaimed in Ricci and Senators glorified in 
the Kavanaugh hearing. (Was Kavanaugh’s “Devil’s Triangle” any different from Labrie’s senior 
salute?)  
One potential lesson from masculinity studies is that, when Labrie participates in the 
senior salute, he is not explicitly brandishing his male power, for he likely feels a certain degree 
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of powerlessness—not due to any strides of feminism which have taken any real power from him 
however, but due to the perpetual cultural, legal, and political veneration that hegemonic 
masculinity receives in our society.
340
 Society continuing to place a particular form of hegemonic 
masculinity on a pedestal encourages men to engage in a constant struggle with other men to 
prove their masculinity, and inevitably results in instances of masculinity gone astray like Labrie 
and Kavanaugh. 
D. Perspective Is Everything: Endorsing a Particular Kind of Masculinity by Pretending 
it Doesn’t Exist 
While the law holds itself out a neutral arbiter, the Kavanaugh and Ricci examples reveal 
the ever-present straight, white, male lens through which the law views disputes before it. The 
image of the blindfolded, robed woman holding a set of scales might represent, instead, the law’s 
failure to see that which is not male. By continually affirming the validity of a particular male 
perspective, the non-juridical power of the law propagates a particular form of masculinity. The 
law repeatedly communicates the reasonableness and fairness of this perspective, without 
actually addressing it, until ideas like “men should be breadwinners” and “character and 
competence are interchangeable” become internalized. 
Arguably the most important role played by judicial opinions, particularly appellate 
opinions, is to educate prospective litigants, lawyers, and lower court judges.
 341
 In Ricci, for 
example, the law is signaling to employers what they can and cannot do in order to render their 
hiring practices non-discriminatory and, importantly, signaling to employees, potential 
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employees, and the larger community whether or not certain hiring practices are acceptable. This 
educational component of judicial decisions both provides concrete direction that applies to very 
specific sets of facts and creates structures and systems that suggest legally correct ways of 
approaching and seeing the world. The educational role of the law consists of disseminating a 
specific perspective to receptive audiences. There is nothing “natural” or “correct” about seeing 
the world in the way presented by the law; it is just one way among many to make sense of the 
world. 
The law, with respect to its educational role, is more focused on the reasons why the 
judgement is made than on the decision itself.
342
 The reasons provide guidance and perspective. 
The reasons are what communicates to the audience the way they should view the world and the 
principles and values which should form their sensibilities. What the law is ultimately doing here 
is creating norms and standards that help guide its citizenry; it is exercising its non-juridical 
power. Indeed, this educational role is a major reason that thinking about the power of the law as 
being primarily juridical misses its biggest impact. 
Two common elements in the Ricci and Kavanaugh examples help us understand the 
law’s power to act in this non-juridical capacity. Traditionally, hegemonic masculinity contained 
an element of stoicism; however, that stoicism was not present in the testimony of Ricci, Vargas, 
or Kavanaugh. All three presented themselves as victims. This willingness to articulate one’s 
victimhood and explain to crowds of people how wronged one has been is a relatively new 
component of masculinity. The impetus for this willingness to play the victim is readily traced to 
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the men’s movement and its belief in and highlighting of the disempowering effects of the civil 
rights movement on straight white men.
343
  
The victimized white male became the prevailing perspective in each confirmation 
hearing and in Justice Kennedy’s decision.
344
 In both hearings, the other side was heard from, but 
ultimately the alternative perspective was discarded.
345
 The three male witnesses were repeatedly 
congratulated for their hard work, courage, and strength to stand up to the unfairness they were 
exposed to. During Ricci’s confirmation hearing testimony, Senator Lindsey Graham 
emphasized how Ricci had been wronged: “I appreciate how difficult this must have been for 
you, to bust your ass and to study so hard and to have it all stripped at the end.” Interestingly, it 
was Senator Graham whose diatribe at the Kavanaugh hearing switched the tenor of the 
remainder of Committee Republicans’ questioning and even the delivery of Kavanaugh’s 
testimony itself from calm and measured to an outrightly hostile and aggressive presentation 
about how Kavanaugh had been wronged. When given his five minutes, Senator Graham’s face 
reddened and pointing his finger he boomed: “This is the most unethical sham since I’ve been in 
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politics . . . I cannot imagine what you and your family have gone through . . . if you are looking 
for a fair process, you came to the wrong town at the wrong time my friend.” Vargas and Ricci 
were lauded by the Committee Republicans because they represented right against wrong in the 
lawsuit.
346
 The prevailing narrative in both hearings was that these men had been wronged, they 
had been treated unfairly, they were victims. 
Of course, this white, male victim perspective was not the only one the Court and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee could have embraced. What about the Black, Latino, and female 
firefighters who had not succeeded in the exam? What about the Black applicants who did much 
better in the oral part of the exam?
347
 What about the role of the law as educator…what message 
was being communicated to both the white firefighters and to the female, Black, and Latino 
firefighters? What message was being communicated about how character is measured? What is 
being communicated to young girls about their opportunities? The perspective embraced is that 
of the aggrieved, innocent, white man. The voices of those unable to become firefighters because 
of the structural and systemic disadvantages they encounter are not heard. 
When decisions are rendered that blatantly mischaracterize an existing law or when 
society must deal with cases of explicit bigotry or sexism, locating and remedying the problem is 
a more straightforward exercise then when one is dealing with an issue of perspective. 
Masculinity exerts its power more subtly in this context. Perhaps its most ubiquitous 
characteristic is its invisibility, which manifests here as an ability to shape the perspective 
through which issues are viewed. Hidden under the liberal cloaks of neutrality, merit, fairness, 
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and colorblindness, one perspective is adopted, and others are marginalized. The perspectives 
adopted and endorsed by the law in the Ricci and Kavanaugh examples demonstrate the 
importance of question framing as opposed to simply arguing the merits. When we ask whether 
the Ricci firefighters merited promotions we have chosen the wrong framing because the validity 
of the tools that were used to assess merit is itself in question. Similarly, if we ask the question of 
whether or not Brett Kavanaugh sexually assaulted his teenage peer Christine Blasey, larger 
systemic issues like how our society defines sexual assault, how it is proved, how victims who 
speak out are treated, and whether a past assault should disqualify a person from elevation to a 
seat on the highest court are ignored and voices other than that of the accused are marginalized. 
VII. INCORPORATION OF FEMINIST THEORY INSIGHTS 
As explained above, like feminist theory, masculinity studies is an emancipatory project. 
Initially, discrimination and patriarchy were conceptualized as problems of equal treatment—
problems tailor-made for the law to tackle. But once patriarchy emerged as structural and 
equality not simply as something formal, solutions proved more elusive. The depressing 
conclusion that patriarchy was built into the discursive arrangements of society complicated the 
goal of emancipation. However, because the law has historically served as a relatively receptive 
tool for rights-based arguments and because success can be measured in more tangible ways in 
the legal arena (after all, one can win a case), the law continues to be viewed by many an 
attractive avenue for addressing the problems of patriarchy. Notwithstanding ingrained problems 
of perspective that permeate the law, for advocates it remains a space to fight patriarchy, rather 
than one that perpetuates it. 
Rights-based arguments were, in fact, in many ways, conceptualized to appeal to an 
individuated, neoliberal, legal system based on the reasoned elaboration of principles and 
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policies. In addition, feminist equality/difference arguments are something that the law is 
inherently receptive to—particularly in areas of employment law—because the masculine subject 
position remains the de facto norm against which the alternative position will either be found 
equal to (with the male remaining the norm) or different from (confirming the inimitableness of 
masculinity). Equality, or lack thereof, for example, is not the reason that women are paid less 
for the same work as men; the reason is, rather, that society does not value the work that women 
do the same way it values the work that men do. As the expert witness in Ricci, Janet Helms, 
pointed out, the table has already been set by the time the guests show up to dinner; racist and 
patriarchal relations inform the very production of subjects in the first place. Therefore, legal 
claims of “equality” will never actually threaten the balance of power. Until the production of 
subjectivity can occur within gender relations that are not patriarchal, we (like Helms) will not 
need to look at the tests to know what the results will be.  
Lip service has been paid to the dependence of masculinity studies on feminist theory, yet 
not all of the significant insights from feminist theory have received their due consideration. 
Masculinity studies has succeeded in incorporating certain insights—the import of: essentialism, 
intersectionality, substantial equality, sex roles, and hegemonic masculinity, while it has been 
less successful at incorporating others—namely, issues of power, the “search for origins,” the 
authority of experience, and the political nature of sexual difference/categories.  
In part, the history of masculinity studies and the presupposition of masculinity as an 
object of study are responsible for such failure. The framing of masculinity occurs within a 
white, heteronormative conception of gender that essentializes male-female difference and tends 
to ignore differences within gender categories. “[T]he concept of masculinity is said to rest 
logically on a dichotomization of sex (biological) versus gender (cultural) and thus marginalizes 
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or naturalizes the body.”
348
 A slight variation to this point is that the importance of focusing on 
masculinity as its object of study has led masculinity studies to have a sharp disinterest in the 




This theoretical foundation has led to segregative thinking when it comes to addressing 
practical concerns.
350
 The assumption of gender difference both creates a disinterest in the other 
gender among those looking for solutions to problems characterized as only impacting a 
particular gender, and often contains within it a built-in remedy.
351
 The tendency is to make 
gender analysis a zero sum game; either you analyze the impact on men or the impact on women, 
or you analyze something other than gender. Thus, incorporating issues and insights that are not 
specific to masculinity has been something that has had trouble gaining traction in masculinity 
studies. Masculinity studies should show more of an appetitive for thinking beyond the confines 
of masculinity. 
A. Power Analysis 
In many respects, though by no means all, the impetus behind masculinity studies is the 
existence of patriarchy, and, thus, an understanding of the oppressive power of male supremacy 
is central to masculinity studies. Patriarchy generally conceptualizes of power as repressive. 
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Masculinities scholars tend to evaluate the ways that conceptions of masculinity are used to 
produce power. Partly because a so-called “power analysis” remains the centerpiece of feminist 
advocacy—the struggle to equalize power between the sexes—masculinity studies has been 
focused on the issue of power within society and within masculinity.
352
 
Hegemonic masculinity is founded on the idea that it exerts a normative power on men to 
conform to its tenets—as discussed above with respect to the Labrie case. Thus power manifests 
in a juridical manner in two distinct ways; both as contributing to male supremacy over females, 
and over men who do not conform to conventional gender identities.
353
 Male power though, in 
both of these dynamics, exerts its might in an essentialist manner. In other words, power is more 
or less characterized as univocal and oppressive, it is one dimensional and focused on men as a 
group having power over women as a group and over men who “do” masculinity differently. 
Masculinity studies scholar Jeff Hearn has posited that “while power functions, flows and 
re-forms in multiple ways, it is difficult to avoid the fact that in most societies, and certainly 
those of western, ‘advanced’ capitalism, men are structurally and interpersonally dominant in 
most spheres of life.”
354
 Thus, “looking at gender and power is an important part of the anti-
essentialist project, as essentialist notions of gender reinforce power structures.”
355
 Challenging 
dominant notions of masculinity has an impact on disrupting the hegemony of men. To Hearn, 
the project should focus on the hegemony of men, which he defines as “that which sets the 
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agenda for different ways of being men,”
356
 rather than on the identification of hegemonic 
masculinity, and, in this way, have the focus be more individualized.  
The analysis of power within masculinity studies has employed various frameworks. Two 
of the most prevalent are: (1) a capacity to dominate others, and (2) ideological conditioning.
357
 
The second view directs one to a more structural level. It strays slightly from a juridical 
understanding of power, yet by emphasizing the ideological components, it nonetheless 
highlights its agentic components. The analyses of power in masculinity studies, therefore, 
continually fail to seriously engage with the production of masculinities from a perspective that 
sees power as productive and, crucially, discursive. Further, if power is recognized as productive, 
then its ideological components ought not to be the focus of the analysis, as this analysis 
suggests a misunderstanding of the role played by individual subjects. Individual subjects do not 
simply own an amount of power which they deploy as they see fit. Power flows between 
individuals and is thus not wholly subject to the whims of specific individuals. Power, in that 
sense, is both relational, and dependent on those who have some and those who have none. 
Hearn has suggested that masculinity studies should ask “which men and which men’s practices 
. . . are most powerful in setting those agendas of those systems of differentiations,”
358
 here we 
see, once again, an example of the intentionality only present in a juridical understanding of 
power being considered. 
Masculinity studies gives lip service to the idea that power flows, but continues to paint a 
picture of it as something that functions juridically. There is the sense of something ideological 
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going on; dismantling patriarchy is conceived of as a political project, yet political in the wrong 
sense. The fight against patriarchy has emerged as a contest to root out sinister masters of the 
universe pulling societies levers from some secret location. The focus on hegemony is “about the 
winning and holding of power and the formation (and destruction) of social groups in that 
process…hegemony involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly 
through the media, and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear ‘natural,’ 
‘ordinary,’ ‘normal.’”
359
 This operation foregrounds the individual subject and position him in a 
dominating position that again views power as hierarchical rather than circulatory. 
Hearn, for instance, while at numerous times suggesting that he thinks about power as 
something that flows and shouldn’t be conceptualized in a unitary sense, distinguishes between 
men who are both formed in the hegemonic gender order and form the hegemonic gender order, 
and women who are solely formed in it. This understanding of power is one directional, with 
women being the passive recipients of the force of power deployed by men. While it is easy to 
say that “power flows,” it is much more difficult to theorize ways of making sense of masculinity 
while accepting that premise. This is true both because a juridical understanding of power has 
been internalized by most in our society; it has become common sense. As Butler reminds us, 
“power is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life; it 
constitutes our tenuous sense of common sense, and is ensconced as the prevailing episteme of a 
culture.”
360
 It is more difficult to find solutions when thinking about power in that sense. It is 
easier to address and counteract patriarchy when it is conceptualized as something ideological, 
complete with intentionality and agentic subjects directing it. 
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The concept of hegemonic masculinity provides an analysis of power that is exceedingly 
helpful to understand the process of male identity creation. For instance, with respect to the 
Labrie case, this concept renders it easier to comprehend the powerless that is felt by many 
young men, and that the perpetuation of patriarchy is just as much about competition among men 
as it is about misogyny. Masculinity studies, however, tends to pinpoint the idea, in the sense that 
it is very good at locating examples of where hegemonic masculinity appears, yet it is less 
successful at deconstructing the idea. It tends to characterize hegemonic masculinity as stable, 
controlled and somewhat self-serving; it is interested in understanding how power dominates, yet 
understanding the complexities and relationality of power make dealing with hegemonic 
masculinity much more difficult than locating it.  
B. Searching for Origins 
A second problem with the current trajectory of masculinity studies is that, because it 
remains tied to an emancipatory ethos, it therefore is focused on a misguided search for origins. 
The project remains guided by a search for a freedom beyond patriarchy and, in this way, is 
always intertwined with liberalism. Masculinity studies is tied to the project of locating 
masculinity, which involves asking whether masculinity existed prior to its production through 
social structures, and, if it did, then somehow rendering “the problem” less to do with the action 
of actual men. The search for origins drowns out the experiences of particular individuals, 
marginalizes male practices, and “involves an evacuation of questions of responsibility and 
agency.”
361
 Thus, on the one hand, masculinity studies remains tied to an idea of power as 
ideological conditioning, which grants individual subjects too much agency, and on the other, it 
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remains committed to a “search for origins,” which takes agency away from individual subjects. 
Masculinity studies seems to perpetually struggle with this “agency” balance. 
In Ricci, the search for origins problem manifests quite clearly. Particular in the 
arguments suggested by the expert witness Janet Helms. Recall that Helms didn’t need to look at 
tests to claim that she knew how minority candidates would perform in it. Equality is impossible 
in a world where patriarchal relations inform the production of the subjects. It is not possible to 
reach a pre-patriarchy place. Indeed, even the tools of legal method which had been presumed to 
be neutral have now been exposed, and ideas like equality itself, are problematic because one is 
always equal to something. A masculinity studies analysis of Ricci, therefore, allows one to see 
that a case that apparently has nothing to do with gender is actually infused with patriarchal 
ideas, yet it continues to wrongly suggest failed ideas for moving beyond them.  
The problems tied to the “search for origins” are one of the reasons that the usefulness of 
masculinity as an analytical category has been questioned by certain theorists who argue for a 
shift of attention to men’s actual practices. But that shift remains emancipatory and 
problematically suggests that the problem of patriarchy is solvable by changing the actions of 
men. The trend in masculinity studies has been to narrow the scope, to move away from grand 
theories, to focus on the local, where change can be seen and felt, and while this does provide 
some sense of tangible change, it ultimately suggests that patriarchy is solvable by ridding the 
world of the “bad” acts of men, and that the existence of patriarchy itself is due to these 
particular “bad” acts of men. This has the effect of ultimately disempowering those subjects who 
don’t identify as men because they are once again characterized as not being a part of or having a 
role in what has created the social world. 
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Further, part of the reason that masculinity was initially thought of as being a ripe area of 
study, in contrast to simply thinking about the actions of men which perpetuate male supremacy, 
is that there were structural, political, and theoretical impasses identified in feminist theory that 
were not “solvable” simply by identifying these “patriarchy perpetuating acts.” Focusing on the 
hegemony of men, rather than masculinity, fails to recognize that the category of men is equally 
problematic, and constructed, as the category masculinity. Trying to move beyond masculinity to 
men suggests the knowability of some sort of original position, some sort of pre-discursive, pre-
gendered position, from which actions were taken which resulted in patriarchy, and that 
emancipation is possible by re-tracing and reversing those actions. 
The insight from feminist theory to be worked from is not identifying the actions of 
subjects who identify as men which contribute to the domination and subordination of others, but 
rather to be critical of the existence of the categories in the first place. Each of these tasks 
appears political, yet the more radical position and the position that offers the least feel-good 
results is that of critiquing sexual difference/categories as a whole. This is not to suggest, 
necessarily, that the project should be to dismantle sexual categories (sexual categories are 
perhaps re-signifiable to serve ends that do not contribute to male supremacy),
362
 but that 
engaging in the process of examining particular acts, rather than holding men accountable, is 
actually disempowering and perpetuates the system as a whole. In short, the question becomes is 
it possible to preserve gender without preserving domination?
363
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Again, this is not to suggest that in a practical sense these actions should be condoned or 
ignored, but that the job of masculinity studies should be about addressing the categories 
themselves, rather than just focusing on the actions, which only serve to reify those categories. 
When the point of masculinity studies is thought of as being emancipatory, that masculinity 
studies has a goal and that that goal is equality or freedom or the dismantling of patriarchy, then 
masculinity studies is expressing its problem with origins, in that the goal itself is political and 
there is, once again, the suggestion that there is an accessible original position devoid of 
patriarchy. The concern of disembodying masculinity from men, of divorcing an analysis of 
masculinity from the “real” impact of the actions of men, suggests that masculinity studies 
should focus on equalizing power between categories, rather than on the validity of the 
categories themselves. Collier has cautioned against remaining tied to masculinity and suggested 
re-theorizing men identities “in ways that might produce a richer, more nuanced conceptual 
framework in which men’s and women’s practices, subjectivities, and bodies can be 
approached.”
364
 Such an approach would undoubtedly move beyond the actions of those subjects 
socially categorized as men, while acknowledging men’s agency within contexts shaped by 
power. 
C. Authority of Experience 
The emphasis on the behavior of particular men also highlights the importance of 
experience in the context of masculinity studies. Experience, in practice, often becomes the most 
authentic evidence on which to base claims to truth. Within masculinity studies, when the focus 
turns to ways of “doing” masculinity, and to an analysis of the actions of men, “truth” is once 
again being found through experiential claims. The paradigm suggested by turning toward the 
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specific behavior of individuals is one in which the reality of patriarchy is attributable to the 
actions of certain bad apples. The focus on domination on a micro level renders the views of 
particular individuals the source of explanations.
365
 The problem with this is that “[experience] 
operates within an ideological construction that not only makes individuals the starting point of 
knowledge, but that also naturalizes categories such as man, woman, Black, white, heterosexual, 
or homosexual by treating them as given characteristics of individuals.”
366
 This tendency brushes 
aside issues of language, discourse, structure, and history, and instead focuses on how particular 
subjects experience the world. Rather than focusing on how particular subjectivities are 
constructed and how discourse precedes subjecthood, masculinity studies works generally from a 
more humanistic perspectives that sees individuals who have experiences. 
There appears to be a tension between the need for a local, contextualized approach to 
problems of gender oppression (which avoid buying into essentialist accounts of gender) and not 
overly relying on the evidence of experience; anti-essentialism suggests going more micro while 
critiques of experience seem to suggest a more macro approach. What has occurred is that the 
trend in masculinity studies has been to turn inward, to move from macro to micro, to be 
practical and focus on the actual behavior of men, rather than on big boring questions about 
discourse, theory, and language. But something gets lost in making this decision. There need not 
be any grand theory that suddenly makes masculinity comprehensible. In fact, focusing on 
individual experiences is partly done because of a desire for tangible solutions, to reduce harm 
and eliminate suffering, to make the world a tangibly more just place. The implication is not to 
                                                 
365
 See Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 
89, 114 (1996) (identifying the problem with founding arguments on individuals’ stories: “The notion that women 
may be oppressed in part through the internalization of cultural norms calls into question the reliance on individual 
accounts of oppression.”). 
366
 Scott, supra note 187, at 782. 
Dylan A. Yaeger 
Fordham University School of Law, S.J.D. Dissertation 
March 28, 2019 
 
155 
throw out experience, as we are cautioned by Scott “[e]xperience is not a word we can do 
without, although, given its usage to essentialize identity and reify the subject, it is tempting to 
abandon it altogether,”
367
 but simply not to rely on it as something apolitical and devoid of 
interpretation. 
In the context of Ricci, we see how the experiences of the firefighters are constructed as 
the foundation of the truth. The categories with which the firefighters built their reality—e.g., 
white, Black, male, female—are made to appear ahistorical, and thus devoid of interpretation. 
The subjects, though, have been conceived within patriarchal and white supremacist social 
relations; the visions of the firefighters are structured through particular discourses and histories 
and the experiences are not pre-discursive, but rather formed in discourse. The question, in this 
case, is not one of choosing between two alternative perspectives (white vs. Black; man vs. 
woman), but rather about questioning the structures that formed the subjects.  
One of the insights from the expert witness in Ricci Janet Helms was that subjects are 
formed within existing social (e.g., racist and patriarchal) relations. It is not only that there are 
two contrasting perspectives that are equally true. That paradigm is palatable to the law, it 
adheres to the conventional narrative of history that new evidence is discovered that changes 
existing interpretations; the constant being that the experiences themselves are occurring to 
subjects and not the subject constituted by the experience. The insight of Helms is not palatable 
to the law, and, thus, her testimony was considered beyond the scope of the case and not taken 
seriously by either the majority opinion or the dissent. But the insight is an important one 
because it reorients the focus from the question of choosing between two contrasting experiences 
to that of the naturalness of the categories that structure the experiences themselves. 
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When experience is viewed as the foundation of truth, then we risk missing the fact that 
experience is both always already an interpretation and something that needs interpreting. The 
subject is constituted through the experience, as opposed to subjects simply having experiences. 
In practice, however, the law does determine which experiences to privilege and which 
perspective to adopt. In doing so, the fact that subjects are formed within patriarchal relations 
continues to play a role. In the example of Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing, patriarchy 
rendered Dr. Ford’s experience an interpretation while Justice Kavanaugh’s was something to be 
interpreted. 
Experience should not serve as a stand-in for an analysis of the production of knowledge. 
Thinking within the terms dictated by experience simply reproduces the categories of analysis 
without any critical turn, which, in the context of masculinity studies, is vital considering the 
validity, usefulness, and effect of the category, is what is being interrogated. Thinking about 
structural problems, the discursive construction of subjects, and of the need to think beyond and 
in different terms than sexual differences allow, is a daunting task without tangible near-term 
goals. Indeed, making the decisions to not pursue these questions, or rather to emphasize the 
others, is making a political decision; a decision that claims, rightly or wrongly, that the 
overarching political structure within which we live is capable of accommodating the changes 
that are sought.  
Dylan A. Yaeger 
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In 1987, Alan Bloom published The Closing of the American Mind. Thirty years later, 
Mark Lilla published The Once and Future Liberal. Bloom a republican, Lilla a democrat, both 
feel a little repugnance toward diversity and see the students of their day as too narcissistic. 
Bloom sees openness and acceptance as signifiers of relativism.
368
 Bloom’s book was called a 
“raging assault on liberal tolerance,”
369
 while Lilla rants against “identity” activists, urging them 
to shut up, stop marching, and “get real.”
370
 Both Lilla and Bloom complain about the lack of 
some larger moral vision. To Lilla, we have been subjected to liberal identity politics that have 
come to control our university campuses, while to Bloom, we had all become soft relativists, 
quasi-narcissists, too self-involved to be concerned with transcendent truths. Bloom wants us to 
reprioritize the great books on which Western civilization was founded, and Lilla wants us to 
teach our students the great forces that have shaped our history (as opposed to emphasizing 
things like the relatively trite women’s movement). We live in a time of individual self-
fulfillment, where there is truth to experience and being true to oneself is paramount—“speak 
your truth.” Lilla has famously called for a post-identity liberalism and described contemporary 
American liberalism as having “slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender, and 
sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying 
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force capable of governing.”
371
 Lilla’s call for a renewed liberalism and the castigation of 
America’s universities and colleges for a disproportionate focus on diversity issues
372
 at the 
expense of what teachers ought to be teaching their students—an awareness of their system of 
government and the major forces and events in our history—sounds remarkably similar to 
Bloom’s complaints about the lack of interest in transcendent issues in the youth of his day. A 
similar sense of self-fulfillment is palpable among both generations. Both Bloom and Lilla, from 
different angles, have articulated concerns that liberalism has somehow been disfigured. To both 
thinkers, “truth” has lost prominence in our society—warped by identity politics to Lilla and 
relativism to Bloom. Today, the youth are dogmatic about their progressiveness, and the 
authenticity of their experience. And there is a sense of a larger moral vision, one in which those 
who are read as intolerant or not progressive enough are deemed harmful. Importantly, though, 
there is also a deep extant sense of alienation from these voices. And the group feeling most 
alienated? Men. 
The political nature of the emancipatory project at the heart of masculinity studies is 
manifest when one looks at how subjectivity is viewed. The existence of a pre-existing subject is 
tied to the humanist conception of each individual containing some sort of essence, and thus, 
potentially, being worthy of certain rights. Masculinity studies, therefore, by foregrounding a 
pre-discursive subject and describing its project as emancipatory, is implicitly buying into the 
politics of liberal humanism. It becomes difficult to suggest a radical politics or agenda within a 
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discipline defined by those parameters. Masculinity studies, thus, is essentially a humanist 
project, striving for freedom and equality through rights and law, but it needn’t be. The focus can 
turn back to the political implications of thinking about sexual difference as naturalistic and 
inevitable, it can focus on the implications of thinking about masculinity studies as an 
emancipatory project focused on retrieving a pre-patriarchal space, it can stop exclusively 
focusing on the actions of individual men and recognize how experience is not the sole key to 
knowledge. 
While it is generally accepted that masculinity plays a role in informing what the law is, 
the more counterintuitive proposition—that the law plays a non-negligible role in creating the 
parameters of masculinity today—is equally problematic. I have suggested that the law creates 
the parameters of masculinity not only via an explicit exercise of juridical power—i.e., through 
rulings that specifically address questions regarding masculinity, or, more specifically, rulings 
which determine who gets to be a man. I am suggesting that the relationship between the law and 
masculinity is most effectively revealed when the power of the law is thought about as 
productive, as a creator of claims of truth. In a modern, liberal society, force is more robustly and 
insidiously deployed, not in the juridical nature of the law, in physical or economic might, but in 
claims of truth. 
When thinking about and studying masculinity there is a fear that, as a culture, we will 
fall into silly stereotypes about masculinity; that we will accept “frat boy” behavior out of young 
men; that we will propagate outdated ideas about what it means to be a man and about the rituals 
that make boys men; that we will contribute to the seemingly endless perpetuation of patriarchy. 
But this should not be the only concern. There are equally important questions about masculinity 
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regarding more than just falling into stereotypical and essentialized ideas about masculinity. No 
longer does the major challenge—although it remains part of the challenge—only entail 
suggesting that masculinity comes in different shapes and sizes and that there is more than one 
way to be a man. It is no longer enough for critiques of masculinity to problematize sex roles and 
power imbalances, to highlight experiences of injustice, and to offer easy solutions that provide 
superficial critiques of patriarchy that resort back to an imaginary origin where equality was 
ubiquitous. Masculinity studies is in danger of turning clinical to avoid the uncertainty and 
agnosticism pivotal to an honest study of masculinity. Masculinity and the law remain pieces in a 
neoliberal puzzle that not only continues to re-articulate patriarchal relations in ever new ways, 
but falsely promises an illusory cohesiveness and an emancipation that is both inapt and 
misdirected. 
